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PER CURIAM: 
Appellants J. Val Roberts and Verle H. Roberts appeal from a 
judgment awarding damages for condemnation of real property. 
This appeal is before the court on appellee's motion to dismiss 
the appeal or affirm the judgment and motion to strike 
appellant's docketing statement and on appellant's motion for 
partial summary reversal. Appellant's request for oral argument 
is denied on the basis of our determination that lf[t]he facts and 
legal arguments are adequately represented in the [memoranda] and 
record and the decisional process would not be significantly 
aided by oral argument.M Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3). 
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in limiting 
the issues at trial to the value of the property taken and 
severance damages, if any, based upon the parties' stipulation. 
Under the facts of this case, where the stipulation does not 
expressly reserve for trial the issue of the necessity of the 
taking, and the evidentiary hearing on the issue was vacated and 
an order of immediate occupancy issued based on the stipulation, 
the trial court did not err in limiting the scope of the issues 
for trial to the value of the property taken. See Cornish Town 
v. Roller. 817 P.2d 305, 309 (Utah 1991); Redevelopment Agency v. 
Tanner. 740 P.2d 1296, 1299-30 (Utah 1987), The trial courts 
order of immediate occupancy, in reliance upon the stipulation, 
made the required findings as to public purpose and need for the 
property. Having made those findings, the trial court did not 
err in placing the burden of proof on appellants to show the 
value of the property taken. See Utah State Road Comm. v. 
Fribercr, 687 P.2d 821, 832 (Utah 1984). Appellants' claim that 
appellee lacked authority to use eminent domain proceedings to 
obtain property for sidewalk construction is without merit. See 
Utah Code Ann. S 27-12-96(9) (1995). Finally, appellants have 
failed to demonstrate that the trial court's findings of fact in 
support of its judgment on the value of the property taken are 
clparly erroneous. .§e^  State vr p$nft, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 
1994). 
Appellants seek summary reversal of the trial court's order 
requiring appellee "to install fill so the distance from the top 
of the retaining wall to the ground level is no greater than 2 
feet 6 inches in the area immediately west of the retaining 
wall,11 to slope the area three feet to the west, and to install 
sod. The trial^court-spacif icailX-£flUiJ44 A<? 9£Y9rance damages 
S*#WJLtLS$ Iron the manner *n whipft the wall y&§ CQns£ruct^dT*-^* 
Appellant seeks jreversal?of this ruling and a determination by 
this court th^t, #ppallae muatL.install ^ pafety^railinjg or pay for 
taking an additional three feet of appellants' property. 
Although there may be SQlf guestion about whether tfc§ trial courts 
had authority to fashion an equitable remedy in this condemnatiop 
case,, appellants' request for a safety railing*also assumes that 
the court had this authority. Appellants did not preserve the 
issue that the remedial measures constituted an additional taking 
in the trial court. Under the facts of this case, appellants 
have demonstrated no basis for reversal of the ruling. The 
remaining issues raised on appeal are without merit. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gregory K-/Orme, fcresiaing Judge 
^ 7~ 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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[424 US 295] 
ALAMO LAND & CATTLE CO., INC., Petitioner, 
v 
STATE OF ARIZONA 
424 US 295, 47 L Ed 2d 1, 96 S Ct 910 
[No. 74-125] 
Argued October 14 and 15, 1975. Decided February 24, 1976. 
SUMMARY 
In federal condemnation proceedings involving lands which, under the 
New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act (36 Stat 557), were held in trust by 
Arizona for school purposes under federal grants, and which had been 
leased by Arizona to a private party under a 10-year grazing lease as 
authorized by the Act, the United States District Court for the District of 
Arizona held that the lessee was entitled to share in the compensation 
award to the extent of both its leasehold interest at the time of condemna-
tion and its improvements on the lands. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit recognized that the lessee was entitled to compensa-
tion for the improvements, but held that under the Enabling Act, Arizona 
had no power to grant a compensable property right to the lessee (495 F2d 
12). 
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 
In an opinion by BLACKMUN, J., expressing the view of six members of the 
court, it was held that (1) nothing in the Enabling Act, apart, possibly, from 
the extent it might incorporate Arizona law by reference, prevented the 
usual application of Fifth Amendment protection of an outstanding lease-
hold interest, and thus Arizona could execute a grazing lease in such a 
manner that the lessee would be entitled to just compensation for the value 
of the unexpired leasehold interest upon federal condemnation, and (2) on 
remand, the Court of Appeals should determine various questions, including 
whether under state law and the lease provisions, the lessee could not 
possess a compensable leasehold interest upon federal condemnation. 
WHITE, J., joined by BRENNAN, J., dissented, expressing the view that 
Briefs of Counsel, p 839, infra. 
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under the Enabling Act, the lessee was entitled to compensation only to the 
extent of the improvements 
STFVFNS, J , did not participate 
HEADNOTES 
Classified to U S Supreme Court Digest, Lawyers Edition 
Public Lands § 26 — federal granta to Eminent Domain § 108 — federal con-
state — sale damnation — Arizona trust land* 
la, lb The full value provision of the — rights of leasee 
New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act (36 ^ 2 b ' ^ Nothing in the New Mexico-
Stat 557), which provides that no lands A n z o n a Enabling Act (36 Stat 557), 
. . . . ,
 A j r J i apart, possibly, from the extent it may held in trust by Arizona under federal *\ f . , - ' 
, , , , , , incorporate Arizona law by reference, 
grants shall be sold for less than their
 p r e v e n t a t h e u g u a l a p pl l c a t l o n of Fifth 
appraised value, does not exclude an Amendment protection of an outstand-
appropnate deferred payment arrange- , n g leasehold interest, and Arizona may 
ment execute a 10-year grazing lease of lands 
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—held in trust for school purposes by 
Arizona under federal grants—in such a 
manner that the lessee, upon federal 
condemnation of the lands, will be enti 
tied to just compensation for the value of 
the unexpired leasehold interest 
Public Lands § 26 — federal grants to 
state — disposition of state's in-
terest 
3 The New Mexico-Arizona Enabling 
Act (36 Stat 557) requires that when 
Arizona disposes of its interest in lands 
held in trust under federal grants, the 
trust is to receive, at the time of disposi 
tion, the then full value of the particular 
interest which is being dispensed 
Eminent Domain § 108 — just com-
pensation — leasehold interest 
4 The holder of an unexpired lease-
hold interest in land is entitled, under 
the Fifth Amendment, to just compensa 
tion for the value of that interest when 
it is taken upon condemnation by the 
United States 
Damages §§120, 122; Eminent Domain 
§ 108; Public Lands § 26 — federal 
grants to Arizona — lease — con-
demnation 
5 When a lease is made by Arizona of 
land held in trust under federal grants 
pursuant to the New Mexico-Arizona En 
abhng Act (36 Stat 557), the trust must 
receive from the leasee the then fair 
rental value of the possessory interest 
transferred by the lease, and upon a 
subsequent condemnation of the land by 
the United States, the trust must receive 
the then full value of the reversionary 
interest that is subject to the outstand 
mg lease, plus the value of the rental 
rights under the lease, the trust is not 
entitled, in addition, to receive the com 
pensable value, if any, of the leasehold 
interest, which if it exists and if the 
lease is valid, is the lessee's 
Damages § 122 — condemnation of 
leasehold interest 
6 Ordinarily, upon condemnation of a 
leasehold interest by the United States, 
the leasehold interest has a compensable 
value whenever the capitalized fair 
rental value for the remaining term of 
the lease, plus the value of any renewal 
right exceeds the capitalized value of 
the rental specified in the lease 
Eminent Domain § 108, Public Lands 
§ 26 — federal grants to Arizona 
— lease — condemnation 
7 Under the New Mexico-Arizona En 
abhng Act (36 Stat 557), if a lease is 
made by Arizona of land held in trust 
under a federal grant for a rental of 
substantially less than the land's fair 
rental value, the lease is null and void, 
and the holder of the claimed leasehold 
interest is not entitled to compensation 
upon condemnation of the land by the 
United States 
Public Lands § 26 — Arizona trust 
lands — grazing lease 
8 Under the provision of the New 
Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act (36 Stat 
557) that no "mortgage or other encum 
brance" of trust lands held by Arizona 
under federal grants shall be valid a 
lease of trust lands for grazing purposes 
for a term of 10 years or less, as autho-
rized by the Act, is not a prohibited 
"mortgage or encumbrance " 
Appeal and Error § 1692 1 — remand 
— questions not considered be-
low 
9a, 9b Upon holding that a United 
States Court of Appeals erred in conclud 
ing that under the New Mexico-Arizona 
Enabling Act (36 Stat 557), a lessee of 
school trust lands held by Arizona under 
federal grants was not entitled to com 
pensation for the unexpired leasehold 
interest upon federal condemnation of 
the lands, the United States Supreme 
Court will remand the case for the Court 
of Appeals' determination of the ques 
tions, not initially determined by the 
Court of Appeals, (1) whether, under 
state law and the lease provisions, the 
lessee could not possess a compensable 
leasehold interest upon the federal con 
demnation, (2) if the lessee did possess 
such an interest, how it is properly to be 
evaluated and calculated (with the sub-
sidiary questions of the relevance of pos 
3 
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Bible lease renewals and of possible value 
additions by reason of the lessee's devel 
opment of adjoining properties), and (3) 
if such interest proves to be substantial , 
whether it is permissible to find from 
such fact a violation of the Enabling 
Act's requirement that a lease, when 
offered, shall be appraised at its true 
value and be given at not less than such 
value 
D a m a g e s §122; P u b l i c L a n d s § 26 — 
A r i z o n a trus t l a n d s — l e a s e h o l d 
i n t e r e s t 
10af 10b Under the New Mexico-Ari-
zona Enabling Act (36 Stat 557), rentals 
under a grazing lease of lands held in 
trust by Arizona under federal grants 
must be adjusted to reflect current fair 
rental value before any renewal of the 
lease, and thus upon federal condemna-
tion of the lands, the calculation of the 
lessee's compensable leasehold interest 
cannot include the prospect of renewing 
the lease at less than fair rental value 
SYLLABUS BY REPORTER OF DECISIONS 
In 1962 Arizona, as lessor, and pe-
titioner, as lessee, executed a 10-year 
grazing lease of certain tracts of land 
which had been granted to Arizona to be 
held in trust under the N e w Mexico-An 
zona Enabling Act In 1966 the United 
States filed a condemnation complaint in 
connection with a flood control dam and 
reservoir which included the leased 
tracts In allocating the st ipulated com 
pensation payable by the Uni ted States 
for the tracts the District Court awarded 
Arizona a certain amount for its fee 
interest and petitioner one amount for 
the improvements and another amount 
for "its leasehold interest at the t ime of 
taking and its reasonable prospective 
leasehold in teres t" The Court of Ap-
peals, while recognizing that petitioner 
was entit led to compensat ion for the 
improvements, and finding it unneces-
sary to determine petit ioner's rights 
based upon the provisions of the lease or 
upon state law, held that under the 
Enabling Act Arizona, as trustee, had no 
power to grant a compensable leasehold 
interest and that petit ioner therefore 
never acquired a property right for 
which it is entitled to compensation 
Held 
1 Noth ing in the Enabling Act, apart, 
possibly, from the extent it may incorpo-
rate Arizona law by reference, prevents 
the usual application of Fifth Amend-
ment protection of the outstanding lease-
hold interest whereby the holder of such 
an interest is entitled to just compensa-
tion for the value of that interest when 
it is taken upon condemnation by the 
United States 
2 To be determined on remand are (1) 
whether, under state law and the provi-
sions of the lease, petitioner could not 
possess a compensable leasehold interest 
upon the federal condemnation, (2) if 
petitioner did possess such an interest, 
how it is properly to be evaluated and 
calculated (with the subsidiary questions 
of the relevance of possible lease renew-
als and of possible value additions by 
reason of petitioner's development of ad-
joining properties), and (3) if that inter-
est proves to be substantial, whether it is 
permissible to find from that fact a viola-
tion of the Enabling Act's requirement 
that a lease, when offer<*d, shall be ap-
praised at its "true value" and be given 
at not less than that value 
495 F2d 12 reversed and remanded 
Blackmun, J , delivered the opinion of 
the Court, in which Burger, C J , and 
Stewart, Marshall, Powell, and Rehn-
quist, JJ , joined White, J , filed a dis-
senting opinion, in which Brennan, J , 
joined, post p 311, 47 L Ed 2d, p 13 
Stevens, J , took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of the case 
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL 
J. Gordon Cook argued the cause for petitioner 
Peter C. Gullato argued the cause for respondent 
Briefs of Counsel, p 839, infra 
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OPINION OF 
Mr Justice Blackmun delivered 
the opinion of the Court 
This case presents an issue of fed-
eral condemnation law—as it relates 
to an outstanding lease of trust 
lands—that, we are told, affects sub-
stantial acreage in our Southwestern 
and Western States 
I 
Under § 24' of the New Mexico-
Arizona Enabling Act, 36 Stat 572 
(1910), specified sections of every 
township in the then proposed State 
1. "Sec 24 That in addition to sections 
sixteen and thirty six, heretofore reserved for 
the Territory of Arizona, sections two and 
thirty two in every township in said proposed 
State not otherwise appropriated at the date 
of the passage of this Act are hereby granted 
to the said State for the support of common 
schools 
2 "Sec 28 That it is hereby declared that 
all lands hereby granted, including those 
which, having been heretofore granted to the 
said Territory, are hereby expressly transfer 
red and confirmed to the said State, shall be 
by the said State held in trust, to be disposed 
of in whole or in part only in manner as 
herein provided and for the several objects 
specified in the respective granting and conhr 
matory provisions, and that the natural prod 
ucts and money proceeds of any of said lands 
shall be subject to the same trusts as the 
lands producing the same 
"Disposition of any of said lands, or of any 
money or thing of value directly or indirectly 
derived therefrom, for any object other than 
for which such particular lands, or the lands 
from which such money or thing of value 
shall have been derived, were granted or 
confirmed, or in any manner contrary to the 
provisions of this Act, shall be deemed a 
breach of trust 
"No mortgage or other encumbrance of the 
said lands, or any part thereof, shall be valid 
in favor of any person or for any purpose or 
under any circumstances whatsoever 
Nothing herein contained shall prevent (I) 
the leasing of any of the lands referred to in 
this section, in such manner as the Legisla 
ture of the State of Arizona may prescribe, 
for grazing, agricultural, commercial, and 
homesite purposes, for a term of ten years or 
PTLE CO v ARIZONA 
d 2d 1,96 SCt 910 
THE COURT 
were granted to Arizona "for the 
support of common schools " By § 282 
[424 US 297] 
of the same Act, 36 Stat 574, as 
amended by the Act of June 5, 1936, 
c 517, 49 Stat 1477, and by the Act 
of June 2, 1951, 65 Stat 51, the lands 
transferred "shall 
[424 US 298] 
be by 
the said State held in trust, to be 
disposed of in whole or in part only 
in manner as herein provided and 
for the several objects specified 
less, or (4) the Legislature of the State of 
Arizona from providing by proper laws for the 
protection of lessees of said lands, whereby 
such lessees shall be protected in their rights 
to their improvements (including water 
rights) in such manner that in case of lease or 
sale of said lands to other parties the former 
lessee shall be paid by the succeeding lessee 
or purchaser the value of such improvements 
and rights placed thereon by such lessee 
'AH lands leaseholds, timber and other 
products of land, before being offered, shall be 
appraised at their true value, and no sale or 
other disposal thereof shall be made for a 
consideration less than the value so ascer 
tained 
No lands shall be sold for less than their 
appraised value 
"A separate fund shall be established for 
each of the several objects for which the said 
grants are hereby made or confirmed, and 
whenever any moneys shall be in any manner 
derived from any of said land the same shall 
be deposited by the state treasurer in the 
fund corresponding to the grant under which 
the particular land producing such moneys 
was by this Act conveyed or confirmed No 
moneys shall ever be taken from one fund for 
deposit in any other or for any object other 
than that for which the land producing the 
same was granted or confirmed 
Every sale lease conveyance or contract 
of or concerning any of the lands hereby 
granted or confirmed, or the use thereof or 
the natural products thereof not made in 
substantial conformity with the provisions of 
this Act shall be null and void any provision 
of the constitution or laws of the said State to 
the contrary notwithstanding 
5 
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and . . . the . . . proceeds of any of 
said lands shall be subject to the 
same trusts as the lands producing 
the same." Arizona, by its Constitu-
tion, Art 10, § l,a accepted the lands 
so granted and its trusteeship over 
them. 
Among the lands constituting the 
grant to Arizona were two parcels 
herein referred to as Tract 304 and 
Tract 305, respectively.4 On Febru-
ary 8, 1962, Arizona, as lessor, and 
petitioner Alamo Land and Cattle 
Company, Inc. (Alamo), as lessee, 
executed a grazing lease of 
[424 US 299] 
these 
tracts for the 10-year period ending 
February 7, 1972. App 6-14. By Ari-
zona statute, Ariz Rev Stat Ann 37-
281D (1974), incorporated by general 
reference into the lease, App 7, 
Alamo may not use the lands for 
any purpose other than grazing. 
On May 31, 1966, while the two 
tracts were subject to the grazing 
lease and were utilized as part of 
Alamo's larger operating cattle 
ranch, the United States filed a com-
plaint in condemnation in the 
United States District Court for the 
District of Arizona in connection 
with the establishment of a flood 
control dam and reservoir at a site 
on the Bill Williams River. The 
3. "All lands expressly transferred and con-
firmed to the State by the provisions of the 
Enabling Act approved June 20, 1910, includ-
ing all lands granted to the State and all 
lands heretofore granted to the Territory of 
Arizona, and all lands otherwise acquired by 
the State, shall be by the State accepted and 
held in trust to be disposed of in whole or in 
part, only in manner as in the said Enabling 
Act and in this Constitution provided, and for 
the several objects specified in the respective 
granting and confirmatory provisions The 
natural products and money proceeds of any 
of said lands shall be subject to the same 
trusts as the lands producing the same." 
4. "Tract 304 
tracts in their entirety were among 
the properties that were the subject 
of the complaint in condemnation. 
The District Court duly entered the 
customary order for delivery of pos-
session.8 
Thereafter, the United States and 
Arizona and, separately, the United 
States and Alamo, stipulated that 
"the full just compensation" payable 
by the United States "for the taking 
of said property, together with all 
improvements thereon and appurte-
nances thereunto belonging" was 
$48,220 for Tract 304 and $70,400 
for Tract 305, and thus a total of 
$118,620 for the two. 1 Rec 166, 162.6 
At a distribution hearing held to 
determine the proper allocation of 
the compensation amounts, the only 
parties claiming an interest in the 
awards for the two tracts were re-
spondent Arizona, asserting title 
through the federal grants to it, and 
petitioner Alamo, asserting a com-
pensable leasehold interest in the 
lands and a compensable 
[424 US 300] 
interest in 
the improvements thereon. The 
State conceded that Alamo was enti-
tled to receive the value of the im-
provements, but contested Alamo's 
right, as lessee, to participate in the 
"All of Section 2, Township 10 North, 
Range 13 West, Gila and Salt River Base and 
Meridian, Yuma County, Arizona." 
"Tract 306 
"All of Section 36, Township 11 North, 
Range 13 West, Gila and Salt River Base and 
Meridian, Yuma County, Arizona." App 1-2. 
5. No question is raised as to the propriety 
or effectiveness of the condemnation proce-
dure. 
6. These figures were also the compensation 
estimated for the respective tracts in the 
declaration of taking and paid into court. 1 
Rec 15. 
6 
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portion of the award allocated to 
land value. The District Court, with 
an unreported opinion, App 1-5, 
awarded Arizona $57,970 for its fee 
interest, and awarded Alamo $3,600 
for the improvements and $57,050 
for "its leasehold interest at the 
time of taking, and its reasonable 
prospective leasehold interest." 1 
Rec pp 227-228. On appeal, the 
United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit, while recognizing 
that Alamo was entitled to compen-
sation for the improvements, held 
that under the Enabling Act Arizona 
"had no power to grant a compensa-
ble property right to Alamo," and 
that "Alamo therefore never ac-
quired a property right for which it 
is entitled to compensation." United 
States v 2562.92 Acres of Land, 495 
F2d 12, 14 (1974). The Court of Ap-
peals thus reversed the judgment of 
the District Court insofar as it con-
cerned the leasehold interests. It re-
manded the cause for the entry of a 
new judgment in accordance with its 
opinion. Id., at 15. Because the 
Ninth Circuit's decision appeared to 
implicate this Court's decision in 
Lassen v Arizona ex rel. Arizona 
Highway Dept. 386 US 458, 17 L Ed 
2d 515, 87 S Ct 584 (1967), and be-
cause it was claimed to be in conflict 
with Nebraska v United States, 164 
F2d 866 (CA8 1947), cert denied, 334 
US 815, 92 L Ed 1745, 68 S a 1070 
(1948), we granted Alamo's petition 
for certiorari. 420 US 971, 43 L Ed 
2d 650, 95 S Ct 1390 (1975). 
II 
The Lassen case was an action 
instituted by the Arizona Highway 
Department to prohibit the applica-
tion by the State Land Commis-
sioner of rules governing the acquisi-
tion of rights-of-way and material 
sites in federally donated lands held 
by Arizona in trust pursuant to the 
provisions of the Enabling Act. What 
was involved, 
[424 US 301] 
therefore, was the ac-
quisition of interests in trust lands 
by the State itself. The Supreme 
Court of Arizona held that it could 
be presumed conclusively that high-
ways constructed across trust lands 
always enhanced the value of the 
remainder in amounts at least equal 
to the value of the areas taken and 
therefore refused to order the High-
way Department to compensate the 
trust. State v Lassen, 99 Ariz 161, 
407 P2d 747 (1965). This Court unan-
imously reversed. In so doing, it ob-
served that the more recent federal 
grants to newly admitted States, in-
cluding Arizona, "make clear that 
the United States has a continuing 
interest in the administration of 
both the lands and the funds which 
derive from them." 385 US, at 460, 
17 L Ed 2d 515, 87 S Ct 584. 
The Court read § 28 of the Ena-
bling Act with particularity. It em-
phasized the Act's requirements that 
trust lands be sold or leased only to 
" 'the highest and best bidder' "; that 
no lands be sold for less than their 
appraised value; that disposal of 
trust lands be " 'only in manner as 
herein provided'"; that disposition 
in any other way " 'shall be deemed 
a breach of trust' "; and that every 
sale or lease " 'not made in substan-
tial conformity with the provisions 
of this Act shall be null and void.'" 
385 US at 461-462, 17 L Ed 2d 515, 
87 S Ct 584. The Court then exam-
ined the purposes of the Act and 
concluded that the grant "was 
plainly expected to produce a fund, 
accumulated by sale and use of 
the trust lands, with which the 
State could support the public in-
stitutions designated by the Act." 
Id., at 463, 17 L Ed 2d 515, 87 
7 
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S Ct 584. Sales and leases were in-
tended. The "central problem" was 
"to devise constraints which would 
assure that the trust received in full 
fair compensation for trust lands." 
Ibid. The Court concluded, for rea-
sons stated in the opinion, that the 
Act's procedural restrictions did not 
apply when the State itself sought 
trust lands for its highway program. 
[424 US 302] 
[1a] The Court then turned to the 
standard of compensation Arizona 
must employ to recompense the 
trust for the interests the State ac-
quired. It concluded that the terms 
and purposes of the grant did not 
permit Arizona to diminish the ac-
tual monetary compensation payable 
to the trust by the amount of any 
enhancement in the value of remain-
ing trust lands. The Court empha-
sized that the Enabling Act "une-
quivocally demands both that the 
trust receive the full value of any 
lands transferred from it and that 
any funds received be employed only 
for the purposes for which the land 
was given." Id., at 466, 17 L Ed 2d 
515, 87 S Ct 584. It again stressed 
the requirements of the Act and 
noted that "these restrictions in 
combination indicate Congress' con-
cern both that the grants provide 
the most substantial support possible 
to the beneficiaries and that only 
those beneficiaries profit from the 
trust." Id., at 467, 17 L Ed 2d 515, 87 
S Ct 584. All this was confirmed by 
the background and legislative his-
tory of the Enabling Act. Accord-
ingly, it held that even where the 
State itself is the acquisitor, the 
Act's designated beneficiaries were 
to derive the full benefit of the 
grant. Thus, "Arizona must actually 
7. [1b] The full-value provision does not 
exclude an appropriate deferred-payment ar-
rangement. Lassen v Arizona ex rel. Arizona 
compensate the trust in money for 
the full appraised value of any mate-
rial sites or rights-of-way which it 
obtains on or over trust lands." Id., 
at 469, 17 L Ed 2d 515, 87 S a 584.' 
(footnotes omitted) This standard, it 
was said, "most consistently reflects 
the essential purposes of the grant." 
Id., at 470, 17 L Ed 2d 515, 87 S Ct 
584. 
Much of what was said in Lassen 
had also been said, several decades 
earlier, in Ervien v United States, 
251 US 41, 64 L Ed 128, 40 S a 75 
(1919), when the provisions of the 
same Enabling Act were under con-
sideration in a federal case from 
New Mexico. The Court's concern for 
the integrity 
[424 US 303] 
of the conditions im-
posed by the Act, therefore, has long 
been evident. 
[2a, 3] But to say, as the Court did 
in Ervien and in Lassen, that the 
trust is to receive the full value of 
any lands transferred from it is not 
to say that the Act requires, in every 
Arizona case where a leasehold is 
outstanding at the time of the fed-
eral condemnation, that the trust is 
to receive the entire then value of 
the land and the possessor of the 
leasehold interest is to receive noth-
ing whatsoever. What the Act re-
quires—and we think that this is 
clear from Ervien and Lassen—is 
that the trust is to receive, at the 
time of its disposition of any interest 
in the land, the then full value of 
the particular interest which is be-
ing dispensed. 
[4, 5] It has long been established 
that the holder of an unexpired lea-
sehold interest in land is entitled, 
Highway Dept. 386 US 458, 469, n 21, 17 L Ed 
2d 515, 87 S C t 584 (1967) 
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under the Fifth Amendment, " to 
just compensation for the value of 
that interest when it is taken upon 
condemnation by the United States. 
United States v Petty Motor Co. 327 
US 372, 90 L Ed 729, 66 S Ct 596 
(1946); A. W. Duckett & Co. v United 
States, 266 US 149, 69 L Ed 216, 45 
5 Ct 38 (1924). See United States v 
General Motors Corp. 323 US 373, 
89 L Ed 311, 65 S Ct 357, 156 ALR 
390 (1945); Almota Farmers Elevator 
6 Warehouse Co. v United States, 
409 US 470, 35 L Ed 2d 1, 93 S Ct 
791 (1973); 2 P. Nichols, Eminent 
Domain § 5.23 (Rev 3d ed 1975); 4 id. 
§ 12.42 [1]. It would therefore seem 
to follow that when a lease of trust 
land is made, the trust must receive 
from the lessee the then fair rental 
value of the possessory interest . 
transferred by the lease, and t h a t | 
upon a subsequent condemnation by 
the United States, the trust must 
receive the then full value of the 
reversionary interest that is subject 
to the outstanding lease, plus, of 
course, the value of the rental rights 
under the lease. The trust should 
not be entitled, 
[424 US 304] 
in addition to 
all this, to receive the compensable 
value, if any, of the leasehold inter-
est. That, if it exists and if the lease 
is valid, is the lessee's. See State ex 
rel. La Prade v Carrow, 57 Ariz 429, 
433-434, 114 P2d 891, 893 (1941). 
[6] Ordinarily, a leasehold interest 
has a compensable value whenever 
the capitalized then fair rental value 
for the remaining term of the lease, 
plus the value of any renewal right, 
exceeds the capitalized value of the 
rental the lease specifies. The Court 
has expressed it this way: 
8. "[N]or shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation." 
"The measure of damages is the 
value of the use and occupancy of 
the leasehold for the remainder of 
the tenant's term, plus the value 
of the right to renew . . ., less the 
agreed rent which the tenant 
would pay for such use and occu-
pancy." United States v Petty Mo-
tor Co. 327 US, at 381, 90 L Ed 
729, 66 S Ct 596. 
See Almota Farmers Elevator & Wa-
rehouse Co. v United States, supra. 
A number of factors, of course, could 
operate to eliminate the existence of 
compensable value in the leasehold 
interest. Presumably, this would be 
so if the Enabling Act provided, as 
the New Mexico-Arizona Act does 
not, that any lease of trust land was 
revocable at will by the State, or if it 
provided that, upon sale or condem-
nation of the land, no compensation 
was payable to the lessee. The State, 
of course, may require that a provi-
sion of this kind be included in the 
lease. See United States v Petty Mo-
tor Co. 327 US, at 375-376 and, n 4, 
90 L Ed 729, 66 S Ct 596; see also 4 
Nichols, supra, § 12.42 [1], pp 12-488 
and 12-489. 
[7] A difference between the rental 
specified in the lease and the fair 
rental value plus the renewal right 
could arise either because the lease 
rentals were set initially at less than 
fair rental value, or because during 
the term of the lease the value of 
the land, and consequently its fair 
rental value, increased. The New 
Mexico-Arizona Enabling 
[424 US 305] 
Act has 
a protective provision against the 
initial setting of lease rentals at less 
than fair rental value. This is specif-
ically prohibited by § 28. The prohi-
bition is given bite by the further 
very drastic provision that a lease 
9 
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not made in substantial conformity 
with the Act "shall be null and 
void." Thus, if the lease of trust 
lands calls for a rental of substan-
tially less than the land's then fair 
rental value, it is null and void and 
the holder of the claimed leasehold 
interest could not be entitled to com-
pensation upon condemnation. 
[2b] On the other hand, the fair 
rental value of the land may in-
crease during the term of the lease.* 
If this takes place, the increase in 
fair rental value operates to create a 
compensable value in the leasehold 
interest. It is at this point, we feel, 
that the Court of Appeals erred 
when it held that the Act by its 
terms, and apart from the extent to 
which it incorporated Arizona law 
by reference, barred Arizona from 
leasing trust land in any manner 
that might result in the lessee's be-
coming constitutionally entitled to 
just compensation for the value of 
its unexpired leasehold interest at 
the time of the federal condemna-
tion. Instead, the Act is completely 
silent in this respect. 
Ill 
[•] Arizona, however, suggests 
that this usually acceptable analysis 
may not be applied under the New 
Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act. It ar-
gues, as the Court of Appeals held, 
495 F2d, at 14, that under that Act 
the State, as trustee, has no power 
to grant a compensable property 
9. The Arizona statutes governing grazing 
leases of trust lands recognize this possibility 
and provide for adjustment of rent at specified 
times to account for fluctuations in fair rental 
value. Ariz Rev Stat Ann §§37-283, 37-286 
(1974) Indeed, under § 28 of the Enabling Act, 
at the termination of a lease, a re-evaluation 
would appear to be required before release or 
renewal. 
10. The Supreme Court of New Mexico long 
[424 US 306) 
interest to Alamo, as lessee. It bases 
this thesis on the Enabling Act's 
provision in § 28 that no "mortgage 
or other encumbrance" of trust land 
shall be valid, and it claims that a 
lease is an encumbrance, citing, 
among other cases, Hecketsweiler v 
Parrett, 185 Or 46, 52, 200 P2d 971, 
974 (1948) (agreement to sell real 
estate free and clear of encum-
brances), and Hartman v Drake, 166 
Neb 87, 91, 87 NW2d 895, 898 (1958) 
(partition). One seemingly apparent 
and complete answer to this argu-
ment is that § 28 goes on to autho-
rize specifically a lease of trust land 
for grazing purposes for a term of 10 
years or less, and further provides 
that a leasehold, before being of-
fered, shall be appraised at "true 
value." See n 2, supra. These provi-
sions thus plainly contemplate the 
possibility of a lease of trust land 
and, in so doing, intimate that such 
a lease is not a prohibited "mortgage 
or other encumbrance."10 Further-
more, Arizona statutes in other con-
texts specifically protect the lessee's 
interest. Ariz Rev Stat Ann §§ 41-
511.06, 37-291 (1974). See Ehle v 
Tenney Trading Co 56 Ariz 241, 107 
P2d 210 (1940). To this the State re-
sponds that, while a lease is possible, 
it falls short of being a compensa-
ble interest when the property is sold 
because the Act prohibits the sale 
unless the trust receives the full ap-
ago ruled that a grazing lease of state lands is 
not a "mortgage or . . . encumbrance," within 
the meaning of the identical prohibition, ap-
plicable to New Mexico, in § 10 of the New 
Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act, 36 Stat 563. 
American Mortgage Co. v White, 34 NM 602, 
605-606, 287 P 702, 703 (1930). See United 
States v 40,021.64 Acres of Land, 387 F Supp 
839, 848-849 (NM 1975); State ex rel. State 
Highway Comm'n v Chavez, 80 NM 394, 456 
P2d 868 (1969). 
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praised value of the land. The argu-
ment assumes that such compensa-
tion is to be measured by the entire 
land value despite the presence of 
the outstanding lease. That ap-
proach overlooks the actuality of a 
two-step disposition 
[424 US 307] 
of interests in 
the land, the first at the time of the 
granting of the lease, and the second 
at the time of the condemnation. 
Full appraised value is to be deter-
mined and measured at the times of 
disposition of the respective inter-
e s t , and if the State receives those 
values at those respective times, the 
demands of the Enabling Act are 
met. The State's argument would 
serve to convert and downgrade a 
10-year grazing lease, fully recog-
nized and permitted by the Act, into 
a lease terminable at will or into 
one automatically terminated when-
ever the State sells the property or 
it is condemned. The lessee is enti-
tled to better treatment than this if 
neither the Enabling Act nor the 
lease contains any such provision. 
We have noted above that the Act or 
the lease, or both, could provide for 
that result. The Act, however, does 
not specifically so provide. Whether 
either the Act or the lease does so 
through incorporation of state law is 
an issue not addressed by the Court 
of Appeals, and it is to be considered 
on remand. We merely note that the 
fact that it is within Arizona's power 
to insert a condemnation clause in a 
lease it makes of trust land does not 
mean that the State may claim the 
same result when its lease contains 
no such clause. 
IV 
Alamo suggests that the Court of 
Appeals' decision is at odds with the 
above-cited case of Nebraska v 
United States, 164 F2d 866, cert de-
nied, 334 US 815, 92 L Ed 1745, 68 S 
Ct 1070. There, in the face of a 
totality claim like that made by Ari-
zona here, the Eighth Circuit ruled 
that trust lands in Nebraska were to 
be treated as any other property and 
that condemnation proceeds were 
subject to allocation between the 
State as trustee and the holder of an 
outstanding agricultural lease. The 
Nebraska Enabling Act of April 19, 
1864, c 59, 13 Stat 47, was an earlier 
edition of this type of statute, and 
was adopted 
[424 US 308] 
more 
than four decades before the New 
Mexico-Arizona Act. It did not con-
tain the detailed restrictive provi-
sions that appear in the 1910 Act 
and that were developed and utilized 
as passing years and experience 
demonstrated a need for them. Be-
cause of this, one may say, as Ari-
zona does, that the Nebraska case is 
distinguishable from the present 
one. But the decision is not devoid of 
precedential value, for it is consist-
ent with our analysis of the New 
Mexico-Arizona Act in its recogni-
tion of the possibility of a compensa-
ble leasehold interest in trust land 
upon federal condemnation, and it 
demonstrates that the existence of 
that interest is not incompatible 
with the trust land concept. See also 
United States v 78.61 Acres of Land, 
265 F Supp 564 (Neb 1967), a post-
Lassen case; U n i t e d S t a t e s v 
40,021.64 Acres of Land, 387 F Supp 
839, 848-849 (NM 1975). 
[9a] Finally, the Court of Appeals 
observed, but only in passing, 495 
F2d, at 14, that the lease recited 
that it was made subject to the laws 
of Arizona; that if the State "relin-
quished" the property to the United 
States, the lease "shall be null and 
11 
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void as it may pertain to the land so 
relinquished"; and that no provision 
of the lease "shall create any vested 
right in the lessee " The court also 
observed, ibid., that Ariz Rev Stat 
Ann §§37-242 and 37-293" restrict a 
lessee's participation in the 
[424 US 309] 
11.5 37 242: 
"A. When state lands on which there are 
improvements for which the owner thereof is 
entitled to be compensated are offered for 
sale, and the purchaser is not the owner of 
the improvements, the purchaser shall pay 
the person conducting the sale ten percent of 
the appraised value of the improvements and 
the balance within thirty days thereafter. If 
the state land department determines that 
the amount at which the improvements are 
appraised is so great that competitive bidding 
for the land will be thereby hindered, the 
department may sell the improvements on 
installments payable ten per cent upon an-
nouncement of the successful bidder, fifteen 
per cent thirty days thereafter, and fifteen 
per cent annually thereafter for five years, 
together with six per cent interest on the 
balance remaining unpaid, which amount, 
until paid, shall be a lien upon the land The 
purchaser shall at all times, keep the insura-
ble improvements insured for the benefit of 
the state. Payments shall be made at the time 
and in the manner prescribed for payments 
on the land, and any default in the payments 
for improvements shall be deemed a default 
in the payments for the land. 
"B. When improvements are sold on install-
ments, the first twenty-five per cent, after 
deducting all rents, penalties and costs owing 
to the state on account of the land, shall be 
paid to the owner of the improvements, and 
the balance shall become a legal charge 
against the state. 
"C Upon surrendering possession of any 
such land, the owner of the improvements 
thereof shall file with the commissioner of 
finance his claim for the balance on the im-
provements remaining unpaid, and if the 
claim bears the approval of the department as 
to correctness, and a certificate that posses-
sion of the lands and improvements has been 
surrendered by all persons having lawful 
claims for improvements on the land, it shall 
be paid by the state treasurer on the warrant 
of the cammifwioner of finance from any fund 
in which there is money subject to invest-
ment As payments for the improvements are 
made by the purchaser, they shall be depos-
proceeds 
of a sale of public land to the value 
of improvements. Having made 
these observations, however, the 
court thereupon concluded that it 
did not find it necessary 
[424 US 310] 
"to determine the 
ited with the state treasurer and both princi-
pal and interest shall be returned by him to 
the fund from which they were taken. 
"D. Failure to pay the balance of the pur-
chase price or the fifteen per cent within 
thirty days after the announcement of the 
successful bidder shall constitute a forfeiture 
of all rights to the land and all payment* 
made." 
§ 37-293: 
"A. A lessee of state lands shall be reim-
bursed by a succeeding lessee for improve-
ments placed on the lands which are not 
removable. If the retiring lessee and the new 
lessee do not agree upon the value of the 
improvements, either party may file with the 
state land department an application for ap-
praisal of the improvements. Thereafter an 
appraisal of the improvements shall be made 
in the same manner and subject to the same 
conditions as appraisals of improvements are 
made when state lands are sold. 
"B Upon making the appraisal, the depart-
ment shall give notice of the amount thereof 
by registered mail to each person interested 
in the appraisal. The notice shall require that 
the new lessee pay to the department for the 
prior lessee the entire amount of the ap-
praisal within thirty days from the date of 
the notice, or the department, when the value 
is greater than the rental for the period of 
the lease, may require that payment of ten 
per cent of the appraised value be made 
within thirty days, fifteen per cent within 
sixty days, twenty-five per cent at the end of 
the first year of the new lease, and twenty-five 
per cent at the end of each year thereafter 
until the entire balance is paid. 
"C If the improvements are not paid for as 
required in the notice, the succeeding lessee 
shall not be permitted to sell, assign, or trans-
fer his lease, nor sell, assign or remove any 
improvements whatever from the land until 
the entire amount of the appraised value of 
the improvements has been paid. Upon de-
fault he shall be subject to the Bame penalties 
and liabilities as provided by § 37-288 for 
failure to pay rents, including a cancellation 
of the lease" 
12 
ALAMO LAND & CATTLE CO. v ARIZONA 
424 US 295, 47 L Ed 2d 1, 96 S Ct 910 
rights of Alamo based upon these 
lease provisions or the state law." 
495 F2d, at 14. 
The significance of the provisions 
referred to and of the cited statutes 
will now be for determination upon 
remand. We note only that the land 
in question was condemned and thus 
does not appear to have been techni-
cally "relinquished" by Arizona to 
the United States; that we are not at 
all sure that there is language of 
restriction in §§37-242 and 37-293; 
and that Ariz Rev Stat Ann §§37-
288 and 37-290 respectively permit 
forfeiture for violation of the condi-
tions of a lease or for nonpayment of 
rent, and cancellation of a lease if 
the leased land is reclassified to a 
higher use, and thus could explain 
the lease's provision against vesting 
in the technical sense that it is not 
subject to any contingency whatso-
ever. 
[424 US 311] 
[2cf 9b, 10a] To repeat: we hold 
that nothing in the Enabling Act 
apart, possibly, from the extent it 
may incorporate Arizona law by ref-
erence, prevents the usual applica-
tion of Fifth Amendment protection 
of the outstanding leasehold interest. 
SEPARATE 
Mr. Justice White with whom Mr. 
Justice Brennan joins, dissenting. 
The question in this case is 
whether, under § 28 of the 
[424 US 312] 
New Mexico-Arizona Enabling 
Act (Act), 36 Stat 574, the State of 
Arizona had the power to grant to 
We leave for determination on re-
mand the following: (1) whether, un-
der state law and the lease provi-
sions, Alamo could not possess a 
compensable leasehold interest upon 
the federal condemnation; (2) if 
Alamo did possess such an interest, 
how it is properly to be evaluated 
and calculated (with the subsidiary 
questions of the relevance of possible 
lease renewals'2 and of possible 
value additions by reason of Alamo's 
development of adjoining properties, 
cf. United States v Fuller, 409 US 
488, 35 L Ed 2d 16, 93 S Ct 801 
(1973)); and, (3) if that interest 
proves to be substantial, whether it 
is permissible to find from that fact 
a violation of the Enabling Act's 
requirement that a lease, when of-
fered, "shall be appraised at [its] 
true value" and be given at not less 
than that value. 
The judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Mr. Justice Stevens took no part 
in the consideration or decision of 
this case. 
OPINION 
petitioner a compensable leasehold 
interest in the property in issue. The 
question is solely one of statutory 
construction. As I agree with the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit that Congress intended that les-
sees of land covered by the Act 
should acquire a compensable inter-
est in leased land only to the extent 
12. [10b] We note in regard to the possible supra Therefore, although we do not foreclose 
value of renewal rights that leases of the kind 
in issue here are limited by statute to 10 
years in duration, and that the Act requires 
that rentals be adjusted to reflect current fair [haVfaTr'rtntaT val 
rental value before any renewal. See n 9, 
the relevance of possible renewals, the calcu-
lation of the lessee's interest cannot include 
the prospect of renewing the lease at less 
13 
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of " i m p r o v e m e n t s . . . p laced 
thereon by such lessee," United 
Stntps v 2562 92 Acres of Land, 495 
h i mm.Hut* .niioiii.ii ii ,II I v O|>UJI >.ut' 
or condemnation, is clearly an "en-
cumbrance." 7 G. Thompson, Real 
Property § 3183, p 277 (1962); 2 Bou-
vier's Law Dictionary 1530 (8th ed 
1914). A lease not so terminable is, 
therefore expressly prohibited by the 
Act. The majority opinion, however, 
finds implicit in the Act an excep-
tion to the express ban on encum-
brances in the case of leases for 
terms of 10 years or less. It points to 
the fact that 10-year leases of school 
trust lands are expressly permitted 
by the Act and states that to treat a 
lease as an "encumbrance" under 
the circumstances would be to 
"downgrade a 10-year grazing lease, 
fully recognized and permitted by 
the Act, into a lease terminable at 
will or into one automatically termi-
nated whenever the State sells the 
property or it is condemned." Ante, 
at 307, 47 L Ed 2d 11. Treating the 
lease as an encumbrance would cer-
tainly have the effect which the ma-
jority says it would. The majority 
does not disclose, however, why such 
an effect is contrary to the intent of 
the Act. Apparently, it simply finds 
illogical 
, [424 US 313] 
the notion 
that a lease could be terminable on 
sale or condemnation and still be a 
"10-year" lease, notwithstanding the 
fact that treating 10-year leases as 
being so terminable is the only way 
to square them with the Act's un-
qualified ban on encumbrances. 
ft jv CnMiT'*'^ ' policv, hovvover 
leases terminable at will or by sale 
or condemnation. In 1888 Congress 
provided, with respect to school trust 
lands granted to Wyoming, that the 
lands could be leased for 5-year peri-
ods but that such leases could be 
annulled at will by the Secretary of 
the Interior. 25 Stat 393. Of far 
more significance to this case was 
Congress' treatment of the lands 
granted to Oklahoma—the State to 
enter the Union most recently prior 
to the entry of Arizona and New 
Mexico—in the Oklahoma Enabling 
Act. C 3335, 34 Stat 267. In that Act, 
Congress expressly provided Okla-
homa with the authority to lease 
school trust lands for 10-year periods 
while also clearly providing that 
upon sale of the lands during the 
period of the lease, the lessee would 
receive only the value of its improve-
ments. That Act states with respect 
to sales of lands subject to a lease 
that "preference right to purchase at 
the highest bid [is] given to the les-
see at the time of such sale," ibid, 
(emphasis added); and then provides: 
"[I]n case the leaseholder does not 
become the purchaser, the pur-
chaser at said sale shall, under 
such rules and regulations as the 
legislature may prescribe, pay to 
or for the leaseholder the ap-
praised value of . . . improve-
ments, and to the State the 
amount bid for said lands, exclu-
14 
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sive of the appraised value The latter Act, passed only four 
[424 US 314] years after the Oklahoma Enabling 
iVloieo\ei, HI I lie hin^lr pieie ol leg 
islative history shedding any light 
on* the relevant portion of the Act, 
the Senate sponsor of the Act—Sena-
tor Beveridge—spoke approvingly of 
the restrictions placed on Oklahoma 
in dealing with school trust lands 
granted to it in the Oklahoma Ena-
bling Act and indicated his belief 
that the restrictions on Arizona and 
New Mexico were more stringent. 
He stated: 
"We took the position [in drafting 
the Act] that the United States 
owned this land, and in creating 
these States we were giving the 
lands to the States for specific pur-
poses, and that restrictions should 
be thrown about it which would 
assure its being used for those 
purposes." 45 Cong Rec 8227 
(1910). 
"We h a v e thrown condi t ions 
around land grants in several 
States heretofore, notably in the 
case of Oklahoma, but not so thor-
ough and complete as this." 
The Oklahoma Enabling Act pre-
vents the creation of a compensable 
interest in a lessee of school trust 
lands except to the extent of im-
provements placed thereon by him. 
A literal application of the New 
Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act at is-
sue here reaches the same result. 
discernible horn the Act and its leg 
islative history. Congress anticipated 
that the value of the school trust 
lands would increase over time and 
it intended that the schools, not lea-
seholders, benefit from this increase. 
Pursuing this end, the Act set a 
minimum sales price for school trust 
lands of $3 per acre, 36 Stat 574, the 
House committee report explaining: 
"The bill fixes a minimum price 
at which the lands granted for 
educational purposes subject to 
sale may be sold. . . . 
"It is recognized by the commit-
tee as well as by other earnest 
advocates of a minimum price, 
that practically none of these 
lands are worth now anything like 
the minimum price fixed. . . . It is 
believed, however, that the ad-
vance of science, the extension of 
public and private irrigation proj-
ects, and the tendency toward the 
higher development of smaller 
holdings will, in the case of Ari-
zona and New Mexico, as in the 
case of other States, result in a 
sure, although possibly slow, in-
crease of land values. 
"The educational lands which 
are subject to sale would probably 
not bring on the market now 
much more than 25 cents an acre, 
but if the history of other states in 
15 
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which minimum prices, which at 
the time were considered prohibi-
tive, were fixed shall be repeated 
in Arizona and New Mexico, it is 
of the utmost importance that 
some restriction be placed upon 
the sale of these lands. 
"The experience of other States 
and the importance of fixing a 
minimum selling price for educa-
tional lands is indicated in the 
following extract 
[424 U8 316] 
from a letter 
from former Secretary of the Inte-
rior Garfield addressed to the 
chairman of the committee in the 
last Congress: 
" The history of the public-land 
States in the matter of the dis-
posal of granted school lands has 
convinced me that those States 
which have a minimum price fixed 
on their lands granted for educa-
tional purposes get a much larger 
return from their lands. I am in-
formed that most States with no 
minimum have not disposed of 
their lands to the best advantage, 
thus seriously failing to derive the 
full benefit to which the schools 
are entitled. The States of North 
and South Dakota, Montana, Wyo-
ming, Idaho, and Washington have 
a $10 minimum fixed on their 
lands, and I am informed that 
none of these States, unless it is 
Wyoming, feels that this high min-
imum is harmful. 
" 'On the contrary, I find that 
officials of these States are zealous 
and proud of the splendid school 
funds which they are creating 
from the sale of school lands. 
North Dakota, which a few years 
ago seemed to contain immense 
areas of poor land, is, I am in-
formed, obtaining in many cases 
$15 or $20 per acre for its school 
sections. Colorado seems to have 
an exceedingly low minimum, 
$2 50; and nevertheless it has ad-
ministered its land grants unusu-
ally well, securing from them very 
large returns, both from sales and 
from leases. For these reasons, I 
urge that a minimum price be 
fixed for these proposed new 
States. They will be able to lease 
most of their land, if it is not 
worth to-day the minimum price, 
and will thereby obtain an 
income.'" HR Rep No. 152 61st 
Cong, 2d Sess, at 2-3 (1910). 
If leases were permitted to encum-
ber school trust lands 
[424 US 317] 
at a time 
when they were worth less than the 
minimum sales price, then when the 
land rose in value—as Congress an-
ticipated it would—and was sold for 
the minimum price or more, the 
State would have to give part of 
such sales price to the lessee. Such a 
result is utterly irreconcilable with 
the reasons for setting minimum 
sales prices. Plainly, Congress in-
tended the school trust to receive 
the full sales price and to prevent 
the States from disposing of the 
lands in any fashion which would 
result in its receiving any less. Les-
sees were to receive none of the 
proceeds of sale of the land itself 
even if the land had appreciated in 
value subsequent to the creation of 
the lease. 
To make its purpose even clearer, 
Congress, in dealing with the very 
question of whether the lessee 
should share in the proceeds when 
lands subject to the lease are sold, 
provided: 
"Nothing herein contained shall 
prevent . . . (4) the Legislature of 
the State of Arizona from provid-
16 
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ing by proper laws for the protec-
tion of lessees of said lands, 
whereby such lessees shall be pro-
tected in their rights to their im-
provements (including water 
rights) in such manner that in 
case of lease or sale of said lands 
to other parties the former lessee 
shall be paid by the succeeding 
lessee or purchaser the value of 
such improvements and rights 
placed thereon by such lessee." 65 
Stat 52. 
The Act provides for no other kind 
of compensation to the lessee of 
lands sold. Under the majority opin-
ion a lessee could, if the value of the 
lands increased after the lease was 
entered into, and if the lease had 
not expired at the time of any sale 
or condemnation, receive 
[424 US 318] 
a portion of the sale or condemna-
tion price over and above the value 
of any improvements. In Lassen v 
Arizona ex rel. Arizona Highway 
Dept. 385 US 458, 466, 17 L Ed 2d 
515, 87 S Ct 584 (1967), we said that 
Act "unequivocally demands . . . 
that the trust receive the full value 
of lands transferred from it." The 
majority now construes the Act to 
authorize a result contrary to the 
Act's "unequivocal demand" and, ac-
cordingly, I dissent. 
17 
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a dispute, however, over whether Malnar 
had notice of the amendment at the time of 
SAM Oil's ratification. In its findings of 
fact, after discussing the transmission of 
the ratification documents to be signed by 
SAM Oil and Robertson, the Board states, 
"SAM Oil maintains that the April 27, 1983 
amendment to the Unit Operating Agree-
ment was not included with these materi-
als.^ BHP maintains that it was stan-
dard procedure to include all amend-
ments." 8 Over the dissent of one member, 
the Board's conclusions of law state, "SAM 
Oil is subject to the 300% nonconsent penal-
ty provided in the Unit Operating Agree-
ment, as amended." We cannot find a 
logical connection between the Board's 
findings of fact and its conclusion of law. 
The Board's findings of fact do not ex-
pressly state whether SAM Oil received 
notice of the amendment prior to executing 
the ratification agreement; yet implicit in 
its conclusion of law is the premise that 
Malnar did have notice of the amendment 
We are unable to review the amount of 
the penalty imposed by the Board without a 
further finding.of fact regarding whether 
SAM Oil, through Malnar, had notice of the 
amendment Because this is a question 
depending in part on credibility, we remand 
for clarification. Depending on its finding 
regarding notice, the Board should enter an 
order holding that SAM Oil is subject to its 
proportionate share of the costs and the 
risk penalty (at either the 150 or the 300 
percent level) described in section 9 of the 
unit operating agreement The order 
should further provide that SAM Oil's 
working interest share of production from 
the well began to accrue on the first day of 
the month following the filing of the appro-
priate papers with the Bureau of Land 
Management pursuant to section 27 of the 
onshore, and the depth to which it is to be 
drilled. The well at issue in this case was a 
relatively deep, exploratory well. The 300 per-
cent risk compensation was therefore reason-
able under the circumstances, and at the hear-
ing, there was expert testimony to this effect. 
7. Although there is evidence that Malnar was 
subsequently made aware of the amount of the 
amended penalty, BHP presented no evidence to 
the Board that he knew of the amendment at 
the time of the ratification. The cover letter 
unit agreement Finally, based on the re-
vised date of accrual, the Board will need 
to reconsider whether the well has yet paid 
out the appropriate costs and penalty and 
therefore whether SAM Oil is owed any 
proceeds from production to date. 
HALL, CJ., HOWE, Associate CJ., and 
STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ„ concur. 
IWY NUMKR SYSHM 
^^% * ^ V 2> 
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Evan O. ROLLER and Marlene B. 
Roller, husband and wife, De-
fendants and Appellants. 
No. 880121. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 1, 1991. 
Town brought condemnation action to 
create protection zones around springs on 
landowners' property, which springs were 
source of water for town's culinary system. 
The First District Court, Cache County, 
VeNoy J. Christoffersen, J., rendered judg-
ment on special jury verdict for landowners 
and they appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Howe, Associate CJ., held that (1) court 
was not obligated to allow landowners to 
relitigate issue of necessity of proposed 
taking; (2) landowners were not entitled to 
jury determination of public necessity of 
dated January 4, 1984, does not refer to the 
1983 amendment 
8. The weight of this allegation is misleading 
because it was not BHP who corresponded with 
Malnar concerning SAM Oil's joinder of the 
unit; it was the unit operator, Rio Bravo. 
While perhaps enlightening on the subject of 
industry practice, BHFs standard procedure 
does not have any direct relevance to the ques-
tion in this case. 
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proposed taking; (3) landowners were not 
entitled to valuation of land as of date of 
first ordinance enacted to protect town's 
water supply; (4) court erred in refusing to 
admit evidence of existence of mineral de-
posits and their enhancement of value of 
land; and (5) town did not abandon condem-
nation action for purposes of award of at-
torney fees when it amended complaint to 
seek only perpetual easement 
Remanded. 
1. Eminent Domain «=»195 
Where trial court permitted both land-
owner and town to fully present and liti-
gate issue of necessity of proposed taking 
of landowner's property at hearing on mo-
tion for order of immediate occupancy and 
court entered written findings of fact sus-
taining town's right to condemn, court was 
not obligated to allow parties to again liti-
gate that issue at trial, even though order 
of immediate occupancy was interlocutory 
in nature. 
2. Jury «=>19<11) 
Landowner whose property was sub-
ject of condemnation action was not enti-
tled to jury determination of public necessi-
ty of proposed taking. U.C.A.1953, 78-34-
10. 
3. Jury <*=»19U1) 
Under federal law, there is no constitu-
tional right to trial by jury in condemnation 
cases. 
4. Eminent Domain <*»124 
Landowners whose property was sub-
ject of eminent domain action by town for 
purpose of creating protection zones 
around springs on property to reduce high 
nitrate level in spring water were not enti-
tled to have land valued as of effective date 
of first town ordinance enacted to protect 
town's culinary water supply, inasmuch 
neither ordinance nor its successors 
amounted to regulatory taking. 
U.C.A.1963, 78-34-11. 
5. Eminent Domain *»2(1) 
For purposes of recovering compensa-
tion for "regulatory taking" of one's prop-
erty, even "temporary" regulatory taking 
requires denial of all uses of property. 
6. Eminent Domain *»2(1) 
Mere diminution in property value is 
insufficient to meet burden of demonstrat-
ing taking by regulation. 
7. Eminent Domain <*»202(1) 
Trial court in condemnation action 
erred in refusing to admit evidence of exist-
ence of mineral deposits and their enhance-
ment of value of land sought to be con-
demned on basis that there had been no 
extraction of minerals to that date; court 
should have determined at time of trial 
whether deposits could be removed later by 
landowners without being impeded by ease-
ment taken by town, rather than requiring 
landowners to litigate question later, if and 
when they attempted to remove any miner-
al deposits. 
8. Eminent Domain <*»131 
Generally, existence of mineral depos-
its in or on land is element to be considered 
in determining market value of such land 
for condemnation purposes. 
9. Eminent Domain <*=>317(2), 319 
Only perpetual easement may be taken 
over surface of land sought to be con-
demned when land is underlaid with miner-
als sufficiently valuable to justify extrac-
tion, and in those instances, landowner re-
tains right to underlying minerals which 
condemning agency has not sought or can-
not afford to buy, and landowner is entitled 
to later recover those minerals. 
10. Eminent Domain *»131 
Where landowner will be unable to la-
ter remove mineral deposits underlying 
land sought to be condemned because oper-
ation of condemnor impedes their removal, 
value of minerals left in place should be 
considered in determining compensation to 
which landowner is entitled. 
11. Eminent Domain <*»265(5) 
Landowners whose property was sub-
ject of condemnation proceeding were not 
entitled to attorney fees and costs on basis 
of abandonment of action when town 
amended its complaint to seek only perpet-
ual easement over property, inasmuch as 
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town's condemnation action was not both 
totally abandoned and dismissed prior to 
conclusion. U.C.A.1958, 7&-34-16. 
12. Eminent Domain *»134 
Landowners whose property was sub-
ject of condemnation proceeding were not 
entitled to valuation of the use of the prop-
erty for hunting access permits indepen-
dently of, and as a separate calculation 
from, the land of which it was a part 
13. Eminent Domain e=»202(4) 
Evidence comparing business potential 
for hunting permits on property that was 
subject of condemnation with nearby land-
owner's use of hunting permits on its prop-
erty was properly excluded in condemna-
tion action due to dissimilarities in proper-
ties. 
14. Eminent Domain *»265(3) 
Trial court in condemnation action did 
not abuse its discretion in determining that 
expenses for preparation and presentation 
of photographic maps, graphic exhibits and 
transcripts of pretrial hearings that were 
used at trial were not taxable as costs. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 54(dXD; U.C.A.1953, 
21-5-8. 
M. Byron Fisher, Michelle Mitchell, Salt 
Uke City, for the Rollers. 
George W. Pratt, Jody K. Burnett, Salt 
Lake City, for Cornish Town. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
Defendants Evan 0. Roller and Marlene 
B. Roller, his wife, appeal from a judgment 
for $59,670 entered on a special jury ver-
dict in their favor and against plaintiff 
Cornish Town. 
FACTS 
Cornish Town commenced this action in 
July 1986 to condemn approximately one 
hundred acres pf Rollers' land for the pur-
pose of creating protection zones around 
Griffiths and Pearson Springs, which are 
on Rollers' property. The springs are a 
source of water for Cornish Town's culi-
nary system as well as for Rollers' house-
hold. Cornish sought protection zones 
which cover a 1,500-foot radius around the 
springs in an attempt to reduce the high 
nitrate level in the water. Cornish also 
sought rights-of-way and access to the 
springs over another seven acres of Rol-
lers' land. State water quality officials had 
advised Cornish that agricultural fertiliza-
tion contributed to the high nitrate level. 
In response, commencing on September 24, 
1981, Cornish enacted a series of ordi-
nances authorizing the creation of these 
protection zones and prohibiting within 
them the use of pesticides and fertilizers, 
the keeping or grazing of animals, and 
human habitation. 
After commencing the action, Cornish 
filed a motion for an order of immediate 
occupancy. After a three-day hearing 
where both parties presented evidence, the 
trial court granted the motion, concluding 
that there was competent evidence that it 
was "necessary and essential" that Cornish 
acquire the protection zones. The court 
further found that Cornish had not acted in 
bad faith and had not abused its discretion 
in bringing its action. Rollers filed a mo-
tion for partial summary judgment to fix 
the date of the taking of the property at 
September 24, 1981, when the first ordi-
nance, No. 81-1, took effect The motion 
was denied. 
At the outset of the trial, Cornish moved 
to amend its complaint to seek only a per-
petual easement over the one hundred 
acres after Rollers disclosed that they were 
going to claim that mineral deposits under-
lay the land. The amendment was granted. 
Rollers proffered evidence that deposits of 
zeolite underlay 94 acres of the property 
sought to be condemned, but the court 
would not admit that evidence or evidence 
that the estimated value of the deposits 
was $38 million, opining that their claim of 
mineral deposits was speculative. The 
court ruled that the issue of whether Rol-
lers had a right to extract the minerals 
should be determined if and when they 
decided to mine the zeolite. Rollers also 
presented evidence as to wildlife resources 
on the land, specifically, a deer herd pro-
tected by them. However, they were not 
allowed to present a mathematical calcula-
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tion of the potential monetary loss of fu-
ture sales of hunting access permits. 
Rollers attempted to present evidence 
that the taking would not improve the qual-
ity of the spring water. The trial court 
refused to hear the evidence, stating that 
public use and necessity had already been 
determined at the hearing on the motion 
for an order of immediate occupancy. The 
jury returned a special verdict in favor of 
Rollers for $59,670; they appeal. 
I 
[1] Rollers contend that the trial court 
erred in denying them the opportunity to 
present evidence at trial on the question of 
whether the taking by Cornish was neces-
sary and that they were entitled to have 
the jury determine that issue. Cornish re-
sponds that at the hearing on the motion 
for an order of immediate occupancy, the 
court properly determined, as a matter of 
law, that public use and necessity had been 
established by Cornish and that no showing 
had been made of bad faith, fraud, or 
abuse of discretion on its part 
A 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4 provides in 
part 
Before property can be taken it must 
appear: 
(1) That the use to which it is to be 
applied is a use authorized by law; 
(2) That the taking is necessary to 
such use . . . . 
Rollers' contention that they were enti-
tled to a trial on the issue of necessity is 
based upon Utah State Road Commission 
v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821, 832 (Utah 1984). 
In that case, this court primarily addressed 
the issue of the effect of delay in the 
prosecution of a condemnation action on 
the valuation of the property. We also 
determined that the hearing on the motion 
for an order of immediate occupancy was 
not a trial on the merits and thus res 
judicata did not operate. IcL at 833. 
An order of immediate occupancy is 
entered pendente lite and only autho-
rizes the State to take immediate posses-
sion until a final adjudication of the mer-
i t s . . . . 
The State's right to condemn, if chal-
lenged, can finally be determined only 
after a trial on the merits, not at a hear-
ing on the motion for immediate occupan-
cy. Since an order of immediate occu-
pancy only requires prima facie proof of 
the right to condemn, that order is not a 
final adjudication on the merits. Res 
judicata has no application in the absence 
of a final adjudication. 
Id. (footnote and citations omitted). 
There are important differences between 
the procedure followed by the trial court in 
Friberg and that followed by the trial court 
in the instant case. First, it appears that 
in Friberg, the state, the condemnor, 
presented only prima facie proof of the 
right to condemn at the hearing on the 
motion for an order of immediate occupan-
cy. It does not appear that the condemnee 
presented any evidence. However, at the 
hearing in the instant case, both Rollers 
and Cornish Town introduced testimony 
and evidence in a three-day hearing, with 
Rollers vigorously challenging the necessi-
ty for the proposed taking. Second, follow-
ing the hearing in Friberg, the order of 
immediate occupancy contained no findings 
or conclusions on the state's authority to 
condemn. The order stated that issues re-
lating to the state's authority to condemn 
were to be decided in a "further hearing" 
and that the order was issued "pending 
further hearing and trial on the issues that 
may be presented in the action." Id. In 
contrast, in the instant case the trial court 
made and entered written findings as to 
the state's authority to condemn: 
6. Although some experts may differ 
as to both the source of the nitrate con-
tamination and the recommendations 
with respect to action which should be 
taken to alleviate the problem, that is not 
for the court to decide and there is sub-
stantial support in the record for the 
conclusions reached by Cornish town 
based on valid recommendations in doing 
the best they could to protect and im-
prove the water supply. The Town has 
acted reasonably and in good faith in its 
plan to improve the System as outlined to 
the Court 
7. In order to carry out its plan for 
improving the water supply, it is neces-
sary and essential that Cornish acquire 
the protection zones in the watershed of 
the Griffiths Spring and Pearson Spring. 
We therefore conclude that under the 
facts of this case, where the trial court 
permitted both parties to fully present and 
litigate the issue of the necessity of the 
proposed taking at the hearing on the mo-
tion for an order of immediate occupancy 
and entered written findings of fact sus-
taining the condemnor's right to condemn, 
the trial court was not obligated to allow 
the parties to a#ain htignte that issue at 
trial. While it is true as pointed out in 
Friberg that an order of immediate occu-
pancy is interlocutory and is subject to 
change should the trial court become con-
vinced of the nefed to do so, it would be a 
waste of judicial resources to require a 
trial court to allow the condemnee to re-
present his evidence and arguments at tri-
al. Id 
B 
[2,3] Rollers contend that they are en-
titled to a jury trial on the issue of necessi-
ty of the proposed taking. Utah's statutes 
on eminent domain, Utah Code Ann. §§ 7&-
34-1 to -20 (1987), are silent regarding the 
manner of determining necessity, i.e., 
whether it is done by the court or the jury. 
Section 78-34-8 specifically mentions the 
powers of "the court or the judge thereof." 
Notably, the jury's power is not mentioned: 
The court or judge thereof shall have 
power 
(1) to hear and determine all adverse 
or conflicting claims to the property 
sought to be condemned, and to the dam-
ages therefor, and 
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(2) to determine the respective rights 
of different parties seeking condemna-
tion of the same property. 
Only section 78-S4-10 specifically men-
tions the jury: 
The court, jury or referee must hear 
such legal evidence as may be offered by 
any of the parties to the proceedings, and 
thereupon must ascertain and assess: 
(1) the value of the property sought to 
be condemned and all improvements 
thereon appertaining to the realty, and of 
each and every separate estate or inter-
est therein. 
Some jurisdictions specifically provide for 
jury trial of the issue of necessity. 1A J. 
Sackman & P. Rohan, Nichols* The Law of 
Eminent Domain § 4.11[4] (3d ed. 1990). 
Generally, however, the only question an 
owner is entitled to try to a jury is the 
amount of his compensation or damages, 
and he has no right to be heard by the jury 
on the necessity of the taking, which is a 
question of law for the court 27 Am. 
Jur.2d Eminent Domain § 408, at 292 
(1966); see also Coachella Valley Water 
Diet v. Western Allied Properties, Inc., 
190 Cal.App.3d 969, 235 Cal.Rptr. 725 
(1987) (pursuant to Cal. Const ar t I, § 19, 
the property owner in an eminent domain 
action is entitled to a jury trial on the 
question of just compensation; all other 
issues of fact and law must be decided by 
the court).1 
It does not appear that the precise ques-
tion which confronts us has been hereto-
fore presented to this court for determina-
tion. However, dicta in two cases give 
support to the proposition that a landowner 
is not entitled to a jury determination on 
the question of the necessity for a proposed 
taking. In Town of Perry v. Thomas, 82 
Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343 (1933), we stated, 
"Whether the property is being taken for a 
use authorized by law, that is a public use, 
is by statute in this state, and by the gener-
al rule of law, a judicial question and may 
1. Under federal law, there is no constitutional 
right to a trial by jury in condemnation cases. 
Wright Si Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 3051, rule 71A, at 120 n. 41 (Supp.1991). "Un-
der rule 71A(h) as finally adopted, therefore, 
trial of all issues is by the court, except for the 
issue of just compensation." Wright & Miller, 
§ 3051, at 122 n. 46; see also United States v. 
105.40 Acres of Land, 471 F.2d 207, 212 (7th 
Cir.1972); United States v. 21.54 Acres of Land, 
491 F.2d 301, 304 (4th Cir.1973). 
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be inquired into by the courts.'1 82 Utah at 
165-66, 22 P.2d at 346 (citations omitted). 
Later, in Bountiful v. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236 
(Utah 1975), we stated, 'The trial judge, 
among other things, is given the power to 
hear and decide if the conditions precedent 
to taking are met" Id. at 1238. In both 
cases, we found support for those state-
ments in a former subsection of section 78-
34-8 which provided that the "court or 
judge thereof' shall have power to deter-
mine if the conditions precedent to taking 
contained in section 78-34-4 have been 
met, including whether the use to which 
the property is to be applied is a use autho-
rized by law. That subsection was deleted 
from section 78-34-8 in 1981. See 1981 
Utah Laws ch. 161, § 2. No reason for the 
deletion is apparent, but we have no reason 
to think that there was any legislative in-
tent that the question of public use and 
necessity should be determined by a jury. 
We therefore conclude that based on what 
appears to be the majority rule in this 
country, on section 7&-34-10, which limits, 
the jury's role in condemnation cases, and 
dicta in former cases of this court, a land-
owner is not entitled to a jury determina-
tion of the public necessity of a proposed 
taking. 
II 
[4] Kollers next contend that the date 
of taking for purposes of assessing just 
compensation should be the effective date 
of Cornish's original ordinance, No. 81-1, 
which was September 24, 1981. Cornish 
counters that the date of the taking was 
appropriately held to be the date of service 
of summons, July 29, 1986, and that the 
enactment of town ordinances, including 
ordinances No. 81-1, No. 83-1, and No. 85-
1, which it argues were never enforced, did 
not rise to the status of a regulatory tak-
ing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11 (1987) pro-
vides that the right to damages is deemed 
to accrue at the date of the service of 
summons: 
For the purpose of assessing compen-
sation and damages, the right thereto 
shall be deemed to have accrued at the 
date of the service of summons, and its 
actual value at that date shall be the 
measure of compensation for all property 
to be actually taken, and the basis of 
damages to property not actually taken, 
but injuriously affected, in all cases 
where such damages are allowed 
See City of South Ogden v. Fujiki, 621 
P.2d 1254, 1255 (Utah 1980); State v. Ja-
cobs, 16 Utah 2d 167 n. 1, 397 P.2d 463 n. 1 
(1964) (service of summons is controlling 
date for valuation purposes); State ex rel 
Eng'g Comm'n v. Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265 
P.2d 630 (1953); Oregon Short Line R.R. 
v. Jones, 29 Utah 147, 80 P. 732 (1905). 
Kollers rely on Friberg, 687 P.2d at 833, 
to support their contention. They argue 
that the presumption—that the date to de-
termine valuation shall be the date of ser-
vice of process—is rebutted here "by a 
showing that a valuation as of the date of 
service of summons would result in an 
award that would not provide 'just compen-
sation' to a landowner." Id. However, the 
trial court specifically found that the spe-
cial circumstances and factors of Friberg 
were not present here. It also determined 
that the enactment of ordinance No. 81-1 
did not prohibit the use of Kollers' proper-
ty, but rather attempted to control pollu-
tion of the town's water supply and was 
therefore not a regulatory taking. 
In Friberg, the property owners argued 
that they were entitled to compensation 
and damages based on the value of their 
condemned property as of the date on 
which the state's right to condemn was 
finally determined—which was over seven 
years after service of summons. There 
was a substantial delay in the entry of a 
final decree, and the property had appreci-
ated in value in the interim. It was stated 
in part III of the plurality opinion that the 
delay in the condemnation proceedings, 
which was caused by suits in the federal 
court to enforce compliance with federal 
law, should not work a penalty on the 
owners by denying them the appreciated 
value of their property. Friberg, 687 P.2d 
at 835. In part II of the Friberg opinion, 
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Durham, 
stated: 
We are, of course, constrained to con-
strue § 78-34-11 within the limitations 
of constitutional requirements. When 
valuation is fixed at a date prior to the 
actual taking and the value of the prop-
erty increases during a prolonged con-
demnation proceeding so that the valua-
tion does not reflect a fair valuation of 
the property and does not therefore con-
stitute "just compensation," the statute 
fixing the time of valuation is unconstitu-
tional as applied. 
Id. at 829. Justice Oaks, concurring spe-
cially, disagreed with the necessity of a 
constitutional discussion in part II, but 
nevertheless concluded that the date of val-
uation was the later date. 
fn the instant case, ordinance 81-1 was 
effective immediately upon posting on Sep-
tember 24, 1981. Subsequent ordinances, 
all to protect Cornish's culinary water sup-
ply, were enacted in succeeding years 
through 1988. Upon the passage of each 
new ordinance, the prior ordinance was re-
pealed. There is no evidence in the record 
that Cornish enforced any of these ordi-
nances against Rollers prior to 1985. Evan 
Roller was contacted directly by letter dat-
ed June 11, 1985, and notified that he must 
comply with all terms of ordinance 85-1. 
However, not until July 29, 1986, was a 
summons and complaint in condemnation 
served on Rollers and the motion for an 
order of immediate occupancy filed with 
the court. 
Rollers point to numerous restrictions 
put upon their use of the land under each 
<?/ the ordinances. They argue that the 
value of the property in 1981 was signifi-
cantly greater than its value in 1986, be-
cause Cornish first devalued the property 
by regulatory restrictions and then five 
years later commenced this condemnation 
action. This contention is without merit 
Despite Rollers' argument, ordinance 81-1 
and the succeeding ordinances had little, if 
any, effect on Rollers until the service of 
summons. 
2. The appellant was unable to rebuild Luther-
glen, a retreat center and recreational area for 
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At trial, the court permitted Evan Roller 
to testify that crop production declined dur-
ing the post-ordinance years but before the 
service of summons. He also testified that 
there had been times when the Pearson and 
Griffiths zones yielded as much as 100 
bush^|s of wheat per acre, but this re-
quireti application of 20O-plus pounds per 
acre of nitrogen, which he was prohibited 
from doing. Nevertheless, Roller admitted 
that He continued to fertilize with nitrogen 
in the Pearson and Griffiths protection ar-
eas ft-om 1981 to 1986, with the exception 
of 1982, when he applied none. In fact, 
Rollers' appraiser testified that their farm 
had one of the highest agricultural yields in 
Utah during that five-year period. 
KoUers rely on First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 
L.Ed.2d 250 (1987), to support their claim 
that they are entitled to be compensated 
based on the September 1981 value of the 
property. First English involved a "tem-
porary regulatory taking" in which a sub-
sequently invalidated county ordinance de-
prive^ a property owner of all uses of his 
land.1 The court held that the landowner 
was entitled to compensation for the taking 
in th^t interim period of years before inval-
idation. 482 U.S. at 319, 107 S.Ct. at 2388, 
96 L.Ed.2d at 266-67. The Court stated: 
We merely hold that where the govern-
ment's activities have already worked a 
^king of all use of property, no subse-
quent action by the government can re-
lieve it of the duty to provide compensa-
tion for the period during which the tak-
ing was effective. 
We also point out that the allegation of 
the complaint which we treat as true for 
purposes of our decision was that the 
ordinance in question denied appellant all 
use of its property. 
482 Ij.s. at 321, 107 S.Ct at 2389, 96 
L.Ed.2d at 268. 
[5] That case can easily be distin-
guished. Although Rollers point to ordi-
nance 81-1, which authorized the town to 
handicapped children. 
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restrict their use of their property,, they 
continued their farming practices—albeit in 
apparent violation of that ordinance. Even 
a "temporary" regulatory taking would re-
quire a denial of "all uses" of their proper-
ty. First English, 482 U.S. at 318, 107 
S.Ct at 2387, 96 L.Ed.2d at 265-66. We 
agree with the trial court that such a denial 
did not occur here. 
Kollers also rely on Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 107 
S.Ct 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987), to argue 
that ordinance 81-1 amounted to a taking 
in denial of all beneficial and economically 
viable use of 85 percent of their total prop-
erty and decreased the value of their prop-
erty by 85-90 percent Nollan is unsup-
portive of that argument because the ma-
jority opinion did not address whether the 
ordinance denied the owners any economi-
cally viable uses of their land. 483 U.S. at 
841-42, 107 S.Ct at 3151, 97 L.EA2d at 
691-93. 
[6] In other case law on the subject, for 
there to be a taking under a zoning ordi-
nance, the landowner must show that he 
has been deprived of all reasonable uses of 
his land. See C.F. Lytle Co. v. Clark, 491 
P.2d 834, 838 (10th Cir.1974). For example, 
almost all zoning decisions have some eco-
nomic impact on property values. How-
ever, mere diminution in property value is 
insufficient to meet the burden of demon-
strating a taking by regulation. See Penn 
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 
(1978); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 
(1926); Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 
U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct 143, 60 L.EA 348 (1915). 
Ill 
[7] Kollers next contend that the value 
of zeolite deposits allegedly underlying 94 
acres should have been considered by the 
jury in determining just compensation. 
Their counsel proffered evidence of the de-
posits and that they had an estimated value 
of $38 million. The trial court denied Rol-
lers the right to present this evidence to 
the jury, opining that the evidence was 
speculative inasmuch as there had been no 
extraction of minerals to that date. How-
ever, the judge commented that Kollers 
retained the right to extract any minerals 
and, should that right ever be denied them 
because of the perpetual easement taken 
by Cornish, they would have tfie right to 
return to court to seek further damages. 
[8-10] As a general rule in this country, 
the existence of mineral deposits in or on 
land is an element to be considered in de-
termining the market value of such land. 4 
J. Sackman & P. Rohan, Nichols' The Law 
of Eminent Domain § 13.22, at 13-119 (3d 
ed. 1990); see also State v. Noble, 6 Utah 
2d 40, 44, 305 P.2d 495, 499 (1957) (it is 
proper to admit evidence that the land con-
tains valuable mineral deposits). Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-34-2 provides special pro-
tection to a landowner whose land contain-
ing valuable minerals is condemned: 
The following is & classification of the 
estates and rights in lands subject to 
being taken for public use: 
(1) a fee simple, when taken for public 
buildings or grounds or for permanent 
buildings, for reservoirs and dams and 
permanent flooding occasioned thereby, 
or for an outlet for a flow, or a place for 
the deposit of debris or tailings of a 
mine, mill, smelter or other place for the 
reduction of ores, or for solar evapo-
ration ponds and other facilities for the 
recovery of minerals in solution; provid-
ed that where surface ground is under-
laid with minerals, coal or other depos-
its sufficiently valuable to justify ex-
traction, only a perpetual easement 
may be taken over the surface ground 
over such deposits. 
(Italics added.) Thus, only a perpetual 
easement may be taken over the surface 
when it is underlaid with minerals "suffi-
ciently valuable to justify extraction.1' In 
those instances, the landowner retains the 
rights to the underlaid minerals which the 
condemning agency has not sought or can-
not afford to buy, and the landowner is 
entitled to later recover those minerals. 
However, where the landowner will be un-
able to later remove the mineral deposits 
because the operation of the condemnor 
impedes their removal, the value of the 
minerals left in place should be considered 
in determining the compensation to which 
the owner is entitled. 4 J. Sackman & P. 
Rohan, Nichols* The Law of Eminent Do-
main § 13.22[1], at 13-144 (3d ed. 1990). 
In Lomax v. Henderson, 559 S.W.2d 466, 
467 (Tex.Ct.App.1977), evidence was admit-
ted on the diminution of the mineral own-
er's estate due to the taking of an ease-
ment which restricted the recovery of oil 
and gas on the condemned land. The court 
stated Texas law to be that "the ownership 
of minerals in place carries with it, as a 
necessary appurtenance thereto, the right 
to reasonably use so much of the surface 
as may be necessary to enforce and enjoy 
the mineral estate." Id. The proper mea-
sure of loss of use of the surface of the 
land in question is the diminution in value 
of the landowner's mineral estate by the 
taking. 
The trial court denied the admission of 
evidence of minerals because of the specu-
lative nature of Rollers' counsel's offer of 
proof. Portions of the trial transcript show 
the discussion between counsel and the 
court on this issue: 
Mr. Preston [Rollers' counsel]: If the 
court feels this is speculative, let me 
redefine our offer of proof. We're going 
to prove that we've drilled test holes in 
this property under the protection zone 
and the test holes go down through the 
topsoil, go into bentonite soil which holds 
water, as the court Svell knows and then 
it goes into the zeolite in the bottom. 
Everything is wet all the way down to 
the bentonite because it holds the water. 
When you hit the zeolite, all of a sudden 
it's dry powdery just like the rock we've 
shown here. We drilled five holes in the 
subject property in the Pearson Spring 
area. In every case the hard rock sur-
face underneath was hit indicating that 
there is in fact throughout this area the 
zeolite that has been mentioned. 
We h%ve taken samples and we have 
had the samples tested and the samples 
show that they are of commercial quality 
where they have been selected in the 
protection zone. 
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Mr. Fisher [Rollers* co-counsel]: When 
the mine can't be built because the sur-
face will be destroyed by the taking, then 
you must compensate for the mineral. 
The Court But how do you know you 
must compensate him for mineral until 
you know whether if s going to do some-
thing to their rights? 
Mr. Fisher Because he has told me I 
cannot enter the property except the 
three locations that are shown on that 
map. He told me that himself, the may-
or on the stand yesterday. I cannot en-
ter the property except at those three 
locations. 
The Court* I think it's a question to be 
decided if and whenever this should come 
up. I don't see any of us will in our 
lifetime ever see any bulldozer or any-
thing out there. 
Mr. Fisher. I beg to differ, your Honor. 
I've already had two. 
The Court That's my opinion. 
Mr. Fisher. We've already had two min-
eral companies approach us to mine that 
product after they have known of the 
quality of the product that's there, two 
of them. 
The Court Okay. I'll believe it when I 
see ;t 
The trial court noted but distinguished Wil-
liam Russell Coal Co. v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 129 Colo. 330, 270 P.2d 
772, 775 (1954), where condemnation of an 
easement across realty underlaid with coal 
was sought Removal of the coal would 
allegedly impair support of the surface. 
The court held that the amount of damages 
sustained by the owner because coal was 
left in place was a question for a jury or a 
commission to determine, and the trial 
court had erred in refusing to admit such 
evidence. The trial court in the instant 
case distinguished William Russell Coal 
Co. because the extraction there was ongo-
ing, whereas no extraction had yet oc-
curred on Rollers' property. Such a dis-
tinction is unhelpful in light of Montana 
Railway Co. v. Warren, 137 U.S. 348, 352-
53, 11 S.Ct. 96, 98, 34 L.Ed. 681, 683 (1890), 
in which the Court held that evidence of "in 
place" minerals is admissible to determine 
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land value. The Court commented as fol-
lows with regard to a claim that the exist-
ence of minerals was "speculative": 
Until there has been full exploiting of the 
vein its value is not certain, and there is 
an element of speculation, it must be 
conceded, in any estimate thereof. And 
yet, uncertain and speculative as it is, 
such "prospect" has a market value; and 
the absence of certainty is not a matter 
of which the Railroad Company can take 
advantage, when it seeks to enforce a 
sale. Contiguous to a valuable mine, 
with indications that the vein within such 
mine extends into this claim, the Railroad 
Company may not plead the uncertainty 
in respect to such extension as a ground 
for refusing to pay the full value which it 
has acquired in the market by reason of 
its surroundings and possibilities. 
137 U.S. at 352-53, 11 S.Ct at 98, 34 L.Ed. 
at 683. 
This authority was recently noted with 
approval in Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 
605, 628 n. 3, 109 S.Ct 2037, 2051 n. 3, 104 
L.Ed.2d 696, 722 n. 3 (1989). The Tenth 
Circuit has also held that expert testimony 
regarding in-place minerals, limestone pre-
serves, although speculative, was clearly 
admissible. United States v. 179.26 Acres 
of Land in Douglas County, Kansas, 644 
F.2d 367, 372-73 (10th Cir.1981). 
It follows from what we have written 
that the trial court erred in refusing to 
admit evidence of the existence of the zeol-
ite deposits and their enhancement of the 
value of the land sought to be condemned 
without first determining whether the de-
posits could be removed later by Rollers 
without being impeded by the existence of 
the easement taken. The trial court should 
have determined that question at the time 
of trial rather than requiring Rollers to 
litigate it later, if and when they attempt to 
remove any of the deposits. The record 
before us does not contain any evidence as 
to the methods employed in mining zeolite 
or whether the mining would interfere with 
the utility of the protection zones. The 
case therefore must be remanded to the 
trial court for a new trial on the issue of 
damages if the trial judge preliminarily de-
termines that the existence of the easement 
taken by Cornish will either totally prevent 
or enhance the cost of removing the zeolite. 
The jury will then consider, in fixing Rol-
lers' damages, the existence of the mineral 
deposits. If the trial court finds that the 
zeolite may be mined and removed without 
being prevented or impeded by the ease-
ment, a new trial on the issue of damages 
will be unnecessary. 
However, preliminary to the determina-
tion of the question discussed above and a 
new trial, if necessary, the trial court 
should determine whether the existing wa-
ter rights held by Corsish prohibit the ex-
traction of minerals claimed by Rollers in 
the area of the protection zones. Both 
parties recognize the existence of the legal 
question of whether Rollers can, in any 
event, extract minerals from their land if in 
doing so it would destroy or diminish the 
water rights to the springs owned by Cor-
nish. This question will need to be re-
solved before Rollers can establish an en-
titlement to extract the zeolite. 
IV 
[11] When the trial commenced, Cor-
nish moved to amend its complaint to seek 
only a perpetual easement over the one 
hundred acres instead of a fee simple es-
tate therein. Cornish asserts that it was 
prompted to do so because it only then 
learned that Rollers intended to claim that 
their land was underlaid with valuable min-
eral deposits. In view of that claim, Cor-
nish decided that it was obligated under 
section 78-34-2(1), set out above, to seek 
only a perpetual easement. The motion to 
amend was granted by the trial court, and 
in the final order of condemnation, Cornish 
acquired only a perpetual easement. Rol-
lers contended in the trial court that by 
amending its complaint, Cornish had aban-
doned the condemnation and that under 
section 78-34-16, they were entitled to an 
award of attorney fees, expenses, and 
costs. The trial court denied that relief. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-16 provides for 
a condemnee's recovery of all damages sus-
tained and reasonable and necessary ex-
penses incurred when the condemnor aban-
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dons the proceedings and causes the action 
to be dismissed without prejudice: 
Condemnor, whether a public or private 
body, may, at any time prior to final 
payment of compensation and damages 
awarded the defendant by the court or 
jury, abandon the proceedings and 
cause the action to be dismissed with-
out prejudice, provided, however, that 
as a condition of dismissal condemnor 
first compensate condemnee for all dam-
ages he has sustained and also reimburse 
him in full for all reasonable and neces-
sary expenses actually incurred by con-
demnee because of the filing of the ac-
tion by condemnor, including attorneys 
fees. 
(Italics added.) We applied this statute in 
Provo City Corp. v. Cropper, 28 Utah 2d 
1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972), where the condemn-
ing agency withdrew and dismissed its con-
demnation action before trial because the 
land as appraised was too expensive to 
acquire. The plaintiff advised the court 
that the defendant's property was no long-
er needed for public use. Consequently, 
the case was stricken from the trial calen-
der, and the court made and entered an 
order dismissing the action without preju-
dice. The defendants were awarded ex-
penses and attorney fees. This court held 
that the statute was controlling, and upon 
abandonment and dismissal of the action to 
avoid a trial, the condemnee was entitled to 
recover expenses and attorney fees. 28 
Utah 2d at 3, 497 P.2d at 630. 
In contrast, Cornish proceeded with its 
acquisition and did not move for dismissal 
of the condemnation proceedings. We in-
terpret the statute as providing for pay-
ment of costs and fees only when the con-
demnation is totally abandoned and dis-
missed prior to a conclusion. Although the 
statute is quite liberal in covering every 
conceivable expense, damage, and cost in 
order to protect owners of private property 
from an unfair burden when the condemn-
or elects to abandon the action,3 an actual 
abandonment and dismissal must first oc-
cur. Although the case authority from oth-
er jurisdictions cited by the Rollers allows 
3. Note, The Condemnors Liability for Damages 
Arising Through Instituting, Litigating or Aban-
doning Eminent Domain Proceedings, 1967 Utah 
LRev. 548, 560. 
recovery of attorney fees and expenses for 
partial abandonment or for abandonment in 
the absence of a dismissal, those cases are 
inapplicable here because the statutory 
framework in Utah is different from those 
jurisdictions cited. 
[12] Rollers contend that they should 
have been permitted to introduce evidence 
of the value of hunting access permits in 
the determination of the value of the high-
est and best use of their property. Cornish 
responds that Rollers were permitted to 
present extensive evidence regarding the 
wildlife potential of the property, including 
evidence that the deer herd on the property 
added to its total value and was a factor to 
be considered in determining fair market 
value. 
[13] We find no abuse of discretion. 
The trial court excluded only evidence 
which compared the business potential for 
hunting permits on Rollers' property with 
Deseret Land and Livestock's use of hunt-
ing permits on its property.4 That exclu-
sion was proper. See State ex rel Road 
Comm'n v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 299, 
495 P.2d 817, 820 (1972) (court properly 
excluded evidence of sales of allegedly 
comparable property located on other inter-
changes of interstate highways because of 
dissimilarities in the properties). Cornish's 
counsel also objected to the presentation of 
Rollers' evidence as a disguised lost profits 
claim. See State v. Noble, 6 Utah 2d 40, 
44, 305 P.2d 495, 498 (1957) (courts have 
rejected with great unanimity the proposi-
tion that just compensation is the equiva-
lent of the total profits which would be 
realized from the future operations of the 
property; proper measure is the market 
value of property and not output thereof); 
State v. Ouzounian, 26 Utah 2d 442, 449, 
491 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1971) (business profits 
are not subject of independent compensa-
tion aside and apart from market value of 
land on which business has been conduct-
ed). Rollers are not entitled to a valuation 
4. Deseret Land & Livestock is located in Rich, 
Morgan, Weber, and Summit Counties in Utah 
and in western Wyoming, covering 200,000 
acres. 
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of the use of the property for hunting 
access permits independently, as a separate 
calculation, of the land of which it is a part. 
The land was properly valued giving the 
wildlife resource due consideration as a 
component part of the land. 
VI 
[14] Finally, Rollers contend that they 
should have been awarded costs of $2,252 
for preparation and presentation of photo-
graphic maps, graphic exhibits, and tran-
scripts of pretrial hearings that were used 
at trial. The court awarded Rollers only 
$74 in taxable costs for the jury fee and a 
witness fee. We find no error. In Framp-
ton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 
1980), we held that expenses for a model, 
photographs, and certified copies of doc-
uments which were necessary for litigation 
were not properly taxable as costs. Costs 
were defined by the court as "those fees 
which are required to be paid to the court 
and to witnesses, and for which the stat-
utes authorize to be included in the judg-
ment" Id.; Utah R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1); Utah 
Code Ann. § 21-5-8. Rollers argue that in 
Frampton we approved the costs of depo-
sitions in the taxing of costs and that the 
costs of transcripts of pretrial hearings 
should be similarly treated. In that case, 
however, this court warned that the taxing 
of costs of depositions is subject to limita-
tions, i.e., depositions must be taken in 
good faith and essential for the develop-
ment and presentation of the case. 
Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774. Further, the 
fact that we approved the taxing of deposi-
tion costs "was not intended and should not 
be taken as opening the door to other ex-
penses." Id. The trial court may exercise 
reasonable discretion in awarding taxable 
costs, and we conclude that no abuse of 
discretion has been shown here. 
This case is remanded to the trial court 
for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, DURHAM 
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
(o | KEY NUMBER SYSTEH> 
QUESTAR PIPELINE COMPANY, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent 
No. 900228. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 1, 1991. 
State Tax Commission issued findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and final deci-
sion holding that gas used to fuel pipeline 
company's compressors within state of 
Utah was subject to state's use tax. Com-
pany filed petition for review. The Su-
preme Court, Durham, J., held that Com-
mission did not violate commerce clause by 
applying use tax to compressor-fuel gas 
diverted from flowing gas in company's 
pipeline and consumed in fuel in company's 
compressors. 
Affirmed. 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s=>316, 796 
Constitutional Law <s=»44 
Constitutional questions are questions 
of law, and agency determinations of gen-
eral law, including interpretations of State 
and Federal Constitutions, are to be re-
viewed under correction of error standard, 
giving no deference to agency's decision. 
U.C.A.1953, 63-46b-l to 63-46b-22. 
2. Taxation e»1294 
Utah pipeline company, through its ac-
tivities in conducting operations of a pipe-
line and compressors, had substantial aex-
us with Utah, and thus gas used to fuel 
those compressors was subject to Utah's 
use tax; company had its corporate offices 
in state, owned and operated extensive net-
work of pipelines throughout state and con-
ducted transportation, sales, and storage 
U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 120 L Ed 2d 
DAVID H. LUCAS, Petitioner 
v 
SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL 
505 US —, 120 L Ed 2d 798, 112 S Ct 2886 
[No. 91-453] 
Argued March 2, 1992. Decided June 29, 1992. 
Decision: South Carolina court held to have applied wrong standard in 
determining whether state beachfront management statute, by barring 
construction, effected "taking" of property under Fifth Amendment. 
SUMMARY 
Under 1977 legislation, the state of South Carolina required owners of 
certain "critical area" coastal-zone land to obtain a permit from a coastal 
council before changing the use of the land. In 1986, a developer purchased 
two lots on a barrier island—which lots did not then qualify as a "critical 
area" and were zoned for single-family residential construction—and made 
plans to erect such residences on the lots. In 1988, however, the state 
enacted a Beachfront Management Act (BMA) which established a new 
baseline on the island and prohibited any construction of occupable im-
provements seaward of a hne parallel to and 20 feet landward of the 
baseline, thereby barring the developer's plans. The developer, filing suit 
against the council in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, did not 
challenge the validity of the BMA as an exercise of the state's police power, 
but contended that the BMA's complete extinguishment of the value of his 
property effected a "taking" of the property for which he was entitled to 
just compensation. The Court of Common Pleas found that the BMA decreed 
a permanent ban on construction on the developer's lots, where there had 
been no restrictions on such use before, and had thereby deprived the 
developer of any reasonable economic use of the lots, rendering the lots 
valueless; accordingly, the court ordered the council to pay just compensa-
tion of more than $1.2 million. While the case was pending before the 
Supreme Court of South Carolina, the BMA was amended to authorize the 
council, in certain circumstances, to issue special permits for construction of 
habitable structures seaward of the baseline. The Supreme Court of South 
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Carolina, reversing the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, held that 
(1) in the absence of an attack on the validity of the BMA as such, the court 
was bound to accept the state legislature's uncontested findings that new 
construction in the coastal zone threatened a public resource; and (2) when 
a regulation respecting the use of property is designed to prevent serious 
public harm, no compensation is owed regardless of the regulation's effect 
on the property s value <304 SC 376, 404 SE2d 895). 
On certiorari the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded. 
In an opinion by SCALIA, J., joined by REHN^UIST, Ch. J., and WHITE, 
O'CONNOR, and THOMAS, JJ., it was held that «1> the decision below was ripe 
for review, even though the EMA had been amended to allow the issuance 
of special permits and even though Supreme Court precedents reflect an 
insistence on knowing the nature and extent of permitted development 
before adjudicating the constitutionality of regulations purporting to limit 
such development, because although the above considerations would pre-
clude review had the court below rested its judgment on ripeness grounds, 
that court had instead disposed of the developer's claim on the merits; (2) 
where a state seeks to sustain a regulation that deprives land of all 
economically beneficial use. the state1 may resist an asserted right to 
compensation under the takings clause, on the theory that there has been 
no 'taking," only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the 
owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of the 
owner's title to begin with, so that the severe limitation on property use is 
not newly legislated or decreed, but inheres in the title itself through the 
restrictions that background principles of the state's law of property and 
nuisance already place upon land ownership; 'S) the court below therefore 
erred in rejecting the developer's claim on the merits on the basis of the 
state legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justification for the BMA; and 
• 4) the case would be remanded for a determination of the state-law question 
whether common-law principles would have prevented the erection of any 
habitable or productive improvements on the developer's land. 
KENNEDY, J., concurred in the judgment, expressing the view that (1) the 
issues presented in the case were ready for the Supreme Court's decision; (2) 
although the trial court's finding that the developer's property had been 
rendered valueless was questionable, the Supreme Court—unlike the court 
below on remand—had to accept the finding as entered; (3) nuisance preven-
tion accorded with the most common expectations of owners who faced 
regulation, but was not the sole source of state authority to impose severe 
restrictions; and s4) the court below erred by reciting thu general purposes 
for which the BMA was enacted without a determination that those pur-
poses were in accord with the owner's reasonable expectations, and there-
fore sufficient to support a severe restriction on specific parcels of property. 
BLACKMUN, J., dissented, expressing the view that (1) the case was not 
ripe for review; >.2) even if there were no jurisdictional barrier, it was 
unwise to decide issues based on the erroneous factual premise that regula-
tion had rendered the subject property entirely valueless; (3) the court's 
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decision improperly placed on state legislatures the burden of showing that 
their legislative judgments are correct; and (4) previous takings clause 
jurisprudence rested on the principle that a state has full power to prohibit 
an owner's use of property without compensation if such use is harmful to 
the public, with the determination of harmfulness resting on legislative 
judgment rather than on common-law nuisance principles. 
STEVENS, J., dissented, expressing the view that (1) the developer was not 
entitled to an adjudication of the merits of his permanent takings claim 
under the amended BMA until he exhausted his right to apply for a special 
permit; (2) it was not clear whether the developer had a viable "temporary 
taking" claim under the preamendment BMA; (3) the doctrine of judicial 
restraint, under which the Supreme Court will not anticipate a question of 
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding, properly applied 
to the case at hand; (4) a categorical rule that total regulatory takings must 
be compensated was unsupported by prior decisions, arbitrary and unsound 
in practice, and theoretically unjustified; and (5) the court's nuisance excep-
tion unwisely froze state common law and denied legislatures their tradi-
tional power to revise the law governing the rights and uses of property. 
SOUTER, J., would have dismissed the writ of certiorari in the case as 
improvidently granted, because the case came to the Supreme Court on an 
unreviewable assumption—that the BMA deprived the developer of his 
entire economic interest in the property at issue—that was both questiona-
ble as a conclusion of Fifth Amendment law and sufficient to frustrate the 
Supreme Court's ability to render certain the legal premises on which the 
court's holding rested. 
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right to compensation under the tak-
ings clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion's Fifth Amendment, on the the-
ory that there has been no "taking," 
only if the logically antecedent in-
quiry into the nature of the owner's 
estate shows that the proscribed use 
interests were not part of the own-
er's title to begin with, so that the 
severe limitation on property use is 
not newly legislated or decreed, but 
inheres in the title itself through the 
restrictions that background princi-
ples of the state's law of property 
and nuisance already place upon 
land ownership—based on an objec-
tively reasonable application of rele-
vant precedents, rather than artful, 
harm-preventing characterizations— 
and is merely duplicated by the reg-
ulation at issue; prior United States 
Supreme Court takings decisions 
which suggested that harmful or 
noxious uses of property may be 
proscribed by government regulation 
without the requirement of compen-
sation were merely an early formu-
lation of the police power justifica-
tion necessary to sustain, without 
compensation, any regulatory dimi-
nution in property value, and "nox-
ious use" logic cannot serve as a 
touchstone to distinguish regulatory 
"takings," which require compensa-
tion, from regulatory deprivations 
which do not require compensation; 
thus, a btate appellate court—in con-
sidering a developer's claim that a 
state . beachfront management stat-
ute, which prohibited any construc-
tion of occupable improvements on 
certain coastal lands, had deprived 
him of any economically viable use 
of beachfront lots which he had ac-
quired with the intention of building 
single-family residences thereon, and 
thereby effected a "taking" of the 
land for which he was entitled to 
just compensation—errs in rejecting 
S02 
the developer's claim on the merits, 
on the theory that no compensation 
is owing under the takings clause 
regardless of a regulation's effect on 
property values when the regulation 
is designed to prevent serious public 
harm, for the state legislatures reci-
tation of a noxious-use justification, 
in uncontested statutory findings 
that new coastal-zone construction 
threatened a public resource, cannot 
be the basis for departing from the 
categorical rule that total regulatory 
takings must always be compen-
sated. (Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., 
dissented from this holding.] 
Appeal §§386, 413; Eminent Do-
main § 98 — state court deci-
sion — review by Supreme 
Court — ripeness of federal 
question — land-use regula-
tion as taking — pleadings 
2a-2c. A state appellate court deci-
sion—which held that, since a state 
beachfront management statute was 
designed to protect a public re-
source, a developer whose beachfront 
property was allegedly rendered val-
ueless by the statute's barring con-
struction of habitable structures 
thereon was not entitled to just com-
pensation for an alleged "taking" of 
the property—is ripe for plenary re-
view by the United States Supreme 
Court on certiorari, even though the 
statute was amended after briefing 
and argument before the state appel-
late court to allow the issuance of 
special permits for construction of 
habitable structures on such prop-
erty under certain circumstances, 
and even though Supreme Court pre-
cedents reflect an insistence on 
knowing the nature and extent of 
permitted development before adju-
dicating the constitutionality of reg-
ulations purporting to limit such de-
velopment, because (1) although the 
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above considerations would preclude 
review had the state appellate court 
rested its judgment on ripeness 
grounds, the court instead disposed 
of the developer's takings claim on 
the merits; <2) this unusual disposi-
tion did not preclude the developer 
from applying for a permit under 
the amended statute and challenging 
any denial under the takings clause 
of the Federal Constitution's Fifth 
Amendment, but would practically 
and legally preclude any takings 
claim with respect to the loss of 
construction rights in the period be-
tween the statute's enactment and 
amendment; (3> the developer had no 
reason to proceed on such a "tempo-
rary taking" claim at trial, or to 
seek remand for that purpose prior 
to submission of the case to the htate 
appellate court, because prior to the 
amendment the taking was uncondi-
tional and permanent; (4) given the 
breadth of the state appellate court's 
holding and judgment, the developer 
would be unable, absent the Su-
preme Court's intervention, to ob-
tain further adjudication with re-
spect to the period between enact-
ment and amendment; and (5) in 
these circumstances, it would not 
accord with sound process to insist 
that the developer pursue the spe-
cial permit procedure before his tak-
ings claim could be considered ripe, 
given that he had properly alleged 
injury-in-fact under the Constitu-
tion's Article III with respect to both 
the preamendment and postamend-
ment constraints on the use of his 
property, and given that the state 
appellate court's dismissive foreclo-
sure of further pleading and adjudi-
cation with respect to the preamend-
ment component of the takings 
claim makes it appropriate to ad-
dress that component as if the case 
were before the Supreme Court on 
the pleadings alone, in which pos-
ture nothing more than a proper 
allegation of injury-in-fact can rea-
sonably be demanded. 'Blatkmun 
and Stevens, JJ. , dissented from this 
holding; Soutt r, J , dissented in part 
from this holding.) 
Appeal § 1892.5 — remand — emi-
nent domain — change in law 
3a, 3b. The United State.-. Supreme 
Court—in reviewing on certiorari a 
state appellate court decision which 
held that, since a state beachfront 
management statute was designed to 
protect a public resource, a devel-
oper whose beachfront property was 
allegedly rendered valueless by the 
statute's barring construction of hab-
itable structures thereon was not 
entitled to just compensation for an 
alleged "taking'* of the property—is 
not required by ' 'prudence" or any 
other principle of judicial restraint 
to vacate the judgment below and 
remand for reconsideration in the 
light of an amendment to the stat-
ute, which amendment allowed the 
issuance of special permits for con-
struction of habitable structures on 
euch property under certain circum-
stances, where the state appellate 
court rendered its categorical dispo-
sition of the case after the statute 
had been amended and after the 
state appellate court had been in-
vited to consider the effect of the 
amendment on the case. (Blackmun, 
J., dissented from this holding.) 
Eminent Domain §98 — taking — 
land-use regulation 
4a-4c. The takings clause of the 
Federal Constitution's Fifth Amend-
ment is violated when land-use regu-
lation does not substantially advance 
legitimate state interests or denies 
an owner economically viable use of 
his or her land. 
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Eminent Domain § 47 — interests 
in land 
5a, 5b. There are a number of 
noneconomic interests in land whose 
impairment will invite exceedingly 
close scrutiny under the takings 
clause of the Federal Constitution's 
Fifth Amendment. 
Appeal §§ 1087-5(2), 1088 — issue 
not raised in briefs — premise 
of certiorari petition 
6a, 6b. The United States Supreme 
Court—in reviewing on certiorari a 
state appellate court decision which 
held that a developer was not enti-
tled _ to just compensation for an al-
leged "taking" of his beachfront 
property by means of a state beach-
front management statute, which 
had been found by the trial court to 
have rendered the property value-
less by barring construction of habit-
able structures thereon—will not 
consider the argument in the respon-
dent coastal commission's brief on 
the merits that the trial court's find-
ing was erroneous, where the finding 
was the premise of the developer's 
petition for certiorari and was not 
challenged in the commission's brief 
in opposition to certiorari. 
Eminent Domain § 98 — taking — 
property-use regulation 
7a. 7b. The takings clause of the 
Federal Constitution's Fifth Amend-
ment applies to regulation of prop-
erty, as well as to physical depriva-
tion of property. 
Eminent Domain § 103 — taking 
— easement 
8. The government may assert a 
permanent easement that was a pre-
existing limitation on the landown-
ers title, without being required to 
provide compensation under the tak-
ings clause of the Federal Constitu-
tion's Fifth Amendment. 
Eminent Domain §§ 78, 103 — tak-
ing — lakebed — nuclear 
plant 
9. The owner of a lakebed is not 
entitled to compensation, under the 
takings clause of the Federal Consti-
tution's Fifth Amendment, when the 
owner is denied the requisite permit 
to engage in a landfilling operation 
that would have the effect of flooding 
others' lands, nor is the corporate 
owner of a nuclear power plant enti-
tled to compensation when the 
owner is directed to remove all im-
provements from the land upon the 
discovery that the plant sits astride 
an earthquake fault, because such 
regulatory action, while it may have 
the effect of eliminating the land's 
only economically productive use, 
does not proscribe a productive use 
that was previously permissible un-
der relevant property and nuisance 
principles. 
Eminent Domain § 105 — remedy 
for temporary taking 
10a, 10b. Under the takings clause 
of the Federal Constitution's Fifth 
Amendment, where a regulation has 
already worked a taking of all use of 
property, no subsequent action by 
the government, such as rescinding 
the regulation, can relieve the gov-
ernment of the duty to provide com-
pensation for the period during 
which the taking was effective. 
Eminent Domain § 98; Nuisances 
§ 1 — taking — noxious uses 
11. A "total taking" inquiry under 
the takings clause of the Federal 
Constitution's Fifth Amendment— 
which inquiry implements the rule 
that, where a state regulation de-
prives land of all economically bene-
ficial use, the state may resist an 
asserted right to compensation, on 
the theory that there is no "taking," 
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only if the proscribed use interests 
were not part of the owner's title to 
begin with due to restrictions im 
posed by background principles of 
the state's law of property and nui-
sance—will ordinarily entail, as the 
application of state nuisance law or-
dinarily entails, analysis of, among 
other things, (1) the degree of harm 
to public lands and resources, or 
adjacent private property, posed by 
the claimant's proposed activities on 
the property in question, (2) the so-
cial value of the claimant's activities 
and their suitability to the locality 
in question, and (3) the relative ease 
with which the alleged harm can be 
avoided through measures taken by 
the claimant and the government, or 
adjacent private homeowners, alike; 
for these purposes, the fact that a 
particular use has long been en-
gaged in by similarly situated own-
ers ordinarily imports a lack of any 
common-law prohibition—although 
changed c i r cums tances or new 
knowledge may make what was pre-
viously permissible no longer so— 
and so also does the fact that other 
landowners, similarly situated, are 
permitted to continue the use denied 
to the claimant. (Blackmun and Ste-
vens, J J., dissented in part from this 
holding.) 
In 1986, petitioner Lucas bought 
two residential lots on a South Caro-
lina barrier island, intending to 
build single-family homes such as 
those on the immediately adjacent 
parcels. At that time, Lucas's lots 
were not subject to the State's 
coastal zone building permit require-
ments. In 1988, however, the state 
legislature enacted the Beachfront 
Management Act, which barred Lu-
cas from erecting any permanent 
habitable structures on his parcels. 
Appeal § 1750 — remand — ques-
tion to be decided 
12. The United States Supreme 
Court—having reversed on certiorari 
a state appellate court decision 
which held that, since a state beach-
front management statute was de-
signed to protect a public resource, a 
developer whose beachfront property 
was allegedly rendered valueless by 
the statute's barring construction of 
habitable structures thereon was not 
entitled to just compensation for an 
alleged "taking" of the property— 
will remand the case to the state 
appellate court to determine the 
state-law question whether common-
law principles would have prevented 
the erection of any habitable or pro-
ductive improvements on the devel-
oper's land, where the Supreme 
Court rules that when a state regu-
lation deprives land ot all economi-
cally beneficial use, the state may 
resist an asserted right to compensa-
tion, on the theory that there is no 
"taking," only if the proscribed use 
interests were not part of the own-
er's title to begin with due to restric-
tions imposed by background princi-
ples of the state's law of property 
and nuisance. 
He filed suit against respondent 
state agency, contending that, even 
though the Act may have been a 
lawful exercise of the State's police 
power, the ban on construction de-
prived him of all "economicallv via-
ble use" of his property and there-
fore effected a "taking" under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
that requ ed the payment of just 
compensation See, e.g., Agins v Ti-
buron. 447 US 255, 261. 65 L Ed 2d 
SYLLABUS BY REPORTER OF DECISIONS 
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106, 100 S Ct 2138. The state 
trial court agreed, finding that the 
ban rendered Lucas's parcels "value-
less/' and entered an award exceed-
ing $1.2 million. In reversing, the 
State Supreme Court held itself 
bound, in light of Lucas's failure to 
attack the Act's validity, to accept 
the legislature's "uncontested . 
findings" that new construction in 
the coastal zone threatened a valu-
able public resource. The court ruled 
that, under the Mugler v Kansas, 
123 US 623, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273, 
line of cases, when a regulation is 
designed to prevent "harmful or 
noxious uses" of property akin to 
public nuisances, no compensation is 
owing under the Takings Clause re-
gardless of the regulations effect on 
the property's value. 
Held: 
1. Lucas's takings claim is not 
rendered unripe by the fact that he 
may yet be able to secure a special 
permit to build on his property un-
der an amendment to the Act passed 
after briefing and argument before 
the State Supreme Court, but prior 
to issuance of that court's opinion. 
Because it declined to rest its judg-
ment on ripeness grounds, prefer-
ring to dispose of the case on the 
merits, the latter court's decision 
precludes, both practically and le-
gally, any takings claim with respect 
to Lucas's preamendment depriva-
tion. .Lucas has properly alleged in-
jury-in-fact with respect to this 
preamendment deprivation, and it 
would not accord with sornd process 
in these circumstances to insist that 
he pursue the late-created procedure 
before that component of his takings 
claim can be considered ripe. 
2. The State Supreme Court erred 
in applying the ''harmful or noxious 
uses" principle to decide this case. 
(a) Regulations that deny the prop-
erty owner all "economically viable 
use of his land" constitute one of the 
discrete categories of regulatory dep-
rivations that require compensation 
without the usual case-specific in-
quiry into the public interest ad-
vanced in support of the restraint. 
Although the Court has never set 
forth the justification for this cate-
gorical rule, the practical—and eco-
nomic— equivalence of physically 
appropriating and eliminating all 
beneficial use of land counsels its 
preservation. 
(b) A review of the relevant deci-
sions demonstrates that the "harm-
ful or noxious use" principle was 
merely this Court's early formula-
tion of the police power justification 
necessary to sustain (without com-
pensation) any regulatory diminu-
tion in value; that the distinction 
between regulation that "prevents 
harmful use" and that which "con-
fers benefits" is difficult, if not im-
possible, to discern on an objective, 
value-free basis; and that, therefore, 
noxious-use logic cannot be the basis 
for departing from this Court's cate-
gorical rule that total regulatory 
takings must be compensated. 
(c) Rather, the question must turn, 
in accord with this Court's "takings" 
jurisprudence, on citizens' historic 
understandings regarding the con-
tent of, and the State's power over, 
the "bundle of rights" that they ac-
quire when they take title to prop-
erty. Because it is not consistent 
with the historical compact embod-
ied in the Takings Clause that title 
to real estate is held subject to the 
State s subsequent decision to elimi-
nate all economically beneficial use, 
a regulation having that effect can-
not be newly decreed, and sustained, 
without compensation's being paid 
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the owner. However, no compensa-
tion is owed—in this setting as with 
all takings claims—if the State's af-
firmative decree simply makes ex-
plicit what already inheres in the 
title itself, in the restrictions »hat 
background principles of the State's 
law of property and nuisance al-
ready place upon land ownership. Cf. 
Scranton / Wheeler, 179 US 141, 
163, 45 L Ed 128, 21 S Ct 48. 
(d) Although it seems unlikely 
chat common-law principles would 
have prevented the erection of any 
habitable or productive improve-
ments on Lucas's land, this state-law 
question must be dealt with on re-
mand. To win its case, respondent 
cannot simply proffer the legisla-
ture's declaration that the uses Lu-
Justice Scalia delivered the opin-
ion of the Court. 
[1a] In 1986, petitioner David H. 
Lucas paid 8975,000 for two residen-
tial lots on the Isle of Palms in 
Charleston County. South Carolina, 
on which he intended to build single-
family homes. In 1988, however, the 
South Carolina Legislature enacted 
the Beachfront Management Act, SC 
Code § 48-39-250 et seq. (Supp 1990) 
(Act), which had the direct effect of 
barring petitioner from erecting any 
permanent habitable structures on 
his two parcels. See § 48-39-290(A). A 
state trial court found that this pro-
hibition rendered Lucas's parcels 
"valueless." App to Pet for Cert 37. 
This case requires us to decide 
whether the Act's dramatic effect on 
the economic value of Lucas's lots 
accomplished a taking of private 
cas desires are inconsistent with the 
public interest, or the conciusory 
assertion that they violate a com-
mon-law maxim such as sic utere 
tuo ut alienum non iaedas, but must 
identify background principles of 
nuisance and pioperty law that pro-
hibit the uses Luca.-; now intends in 
the p rope r ty ' s p resent c i rcum 
stances. 
304 SC 376, 404 SE2d 895, re-
versed and remanded. 
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of 
the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., 
and White, O'Connor, and Thomas, 
JJ. , joined. Kennedy, J., filed an 
opinion concurring in the judgment. 
Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., filed 
dissenting opinions. Souter, J., filed 
a separate statement. 
property under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments requiring the 
payment of "just compensation." US 
Const, Amdt 5 
I 
A 
South Carolina's expressed inter-
est in intensively managing develop-
ment activities in the so-called 
"coastal zone" dates from 1977 
when, in the aftermath of Congress's 
passage of the federal Coastal Zone 
Management Act of 1972, 86 Stat 
1280, as amended, 16 USC § 1451 et 
seq. [16 USCS §§ 1451 et seq.], the 
legislature enacted a Coastal Zone 
Management Act of its own. See SC 
Code §48-39-10 et seq. (1987). In its 
original form, the South Carolina 
x\ct required owners of coastal zone 
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL 
A. Camden Lewis argued the cause for petitioner. 
C. C. Harness, III argued the cause for respondent. 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
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land that qualified as a "critical 
area" (defined in the legislation to 
include beaches and immediately ad-
jacent sand dunes, § 48-39-KXJ)) to 
obtain a permit from the newly cre-
ated South Carolina Coastal Council 
(respondent here) prior to commit-
ting the land to a "use other than 
the use the critical area was devoted 
to on [September 28, 1977]." § 48-39-
13CXA). 
In the late 1970's, Lucas and oth-
ers began extensive residential de-
velopment of the Isle of Palms, a 
barrier island situated eastward of 
the City of Charleston. Toward the 
close of the development cycle for 
one residential subdivision known as 
"Beachwood East," Lucas in 1986 
purchased the two lots at issue in 
this litigation for his own account. 
No portion of the lots, which were 
located approximately 300 feet from 
the beach, qualified as a "critical 
area" under the 1977 Act; accord-
ingly, at the time Lucas acquired 
these parcels, he was not legally 
obliged to obtain a permit from the 
Council in advance of any develop-
ment activity. His intention with 
respect to the lots was to do what 
the owners of the immediately adja-
cent parcels had already done: erect 
single-family residences. He commis-
sioned architectural drawings for 
this purpose. 
The Beachfront Management Act 
brought Lucas's plans to an abrupt 
1. This specialized historical method of de-
termining the baseline applied because the 
Beachwood East subdivision is located adja-
cent to a so-called "inlet erosion zone" 
defined in the Act to mean Ma segment of 
shoreline along or adjacent to tidal inlets 
wnich is influenced directly by the inlet and 
its associated shoals," SC Code §48-39-270(7) 
Supp 1988)) that is "not stabilized by jetties, 
terminal groins, or other structures," § 48-39-
280(AK2). For areas other than these unstabi-
end. Under that 1988 legislation, the 
Council was directed to establish a 
"baseline" connecting the landward-
most "point[s] of erosion . . . during 
the past forty years" in the region of 
the Isle of Palms that includes Lu-
cas's lots. § 48-39-280(A)(2) <Supp 
1988).1 In action not challenged here, 
the Council fixed this baseline land-
ward of Lucas's parcels. That was 
significant, for under the Act con-
struction of occupable improve-
ments2 was flatly prohibited seaward 
of a line drawn 20 feet landward of, 
and parallel to, the baseline, § 48-39-
290(A) (Supp 1988). The Act provided 
no exceptions. 
B 
Lucas promptly filed suit in the 
South Carolina Court of Common 
Pleas, contending that the Beach-
front Management Act's construc-
tion bar effected a taking of his 
property without just compensation. 
Lucas did not take issue with the 
validity of the Act as a lawful exer-
cise of South Carolina's police power, 
but contended that the Act's com-
plete extinguishment of his proper-
ty's value entitled him to compensa-
tion regardless of whether the legis-
lature had acted in furtherance of 
legitimate police power objectives. 
Following a bench trial, the court 
agreed. Among its factual determi-
nations was the finding that "at the 
time Lucas purchased the two lots, 
lized inlet erosion zones, the statute directs 
that the baseline be established "along the 
crest of the primary oceanfront sand dune." 
§48-39-28CHArtl). 
2. The Act did allow the construction of 
certain nonhabitable improvements, e.g., 
"wooden walkways no larger in width than 
six feet," and "small wooden decks no larger 
than one hundred forty-four 3quare feet." 
§§48-39-2901 AX 1) and i2) (Supp 1988). 
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both were zoned for singlefamily res-
idential construction and . . . there 
were no restrictions imposed upon 
such use of the property by either 
the State of South Carolina, the 
County of Charleston, or the Town 
of the Isle of Palms." App to Pet for 
Cert 36. The trial court further 
found that the Beachfront Manage-
ment Act decreed a permanent ban 
on construction insofar as Lucas's 
lots were concerned, and that this 
prohibition "deprive[dj Lucas of any 
reasonable economic use of the lots, 
. . . eliminated the unrestricted 
right of use, and renderfed] them 
valueless." Id., at 37. The court thus 
concluded that Lucas's properties 
had been "taken" by operation of 
the Act, and it ordered respondent 
to pay "just compensation" in the 
amount of $1,232,387.50. Id., at 40. 
The Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina reversed. It found dispositive 
what it described as Lucas's conces-
sion "that the Beachfront Manage-
ment Act [was] properly and validly 
designed to preserve . . . South Car-
olina's beaches." 304 SC 376, 379, 
404 SE2d 895, 896 (1991). Failing an 
attack on the validity of the statute 
as such, the court believed itself 
bound to accept the "uncontested 
. . . findings" of the South Carolina 
legislature that new construction in 
the coastal zone—such as petitioner 
intended—threatened this public re-
source. Id., at 383, 404 SE2d, at 898. 
The Court ruled that when a regula-
tion respecting the use of property is 
designed "to prevent serious public 
harm," id., at 383, 404 SE2d, at 899 
(citing, inter alia, Mugler v Kansas, 
123 US 623, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 
(1887)), no compensation is owing 
under the Takings Clause regardless 
of the regulation's effect on the prop-
erty's value 
Two justices dissented. They ac-
knowledged that our Mugler line of 
cases recognizes governmental power 
to prohibit "noxious" uses of prop-
erty—i.e., uses of property akin to 
"public nuisances"—without having 
to pay compensation. But they would 
not have characterized the Beach-
front Management Acts "primary 
purpose [as] the prevention of a nui-
sance." 304 SC, at 395, 404 3E2d, at 
906 (Harwell, J., dissenting). To the 
dissenters, the chief purposes of the 
legislation, among them the promo-
tion of tourism and the creation of a 
"habitat for indigenous flora and 
fauna," could not fairly be compared 
to nuisance abatement. Id., at 396, 
404 SE2d, at 906. As a consequence, 
they would have affirmed the trial 
court's conclusion that the Act's 
obliteration of the value of petition-
er's lots accomplished a taking. 
We granted certiorari. 502 US 
, 116 L Ed 2d 455, 112 S Ct 436 
(1991). 
II 
[2a] As a threshold matter, we 
must briefly address the Council's 
suggestion that this case is inappro-
priate for plenary review. After 
briefing and argument before the 
South Carolina Supreme Court, but 
prior to issuance of that court's opin-
ion, the Beachfront Management 
Act was amended to authorize the 
Council, in certain circumstances, to 
issue "special permits" for the con-
struction or reconstruction of habit-
able structures seaward of the base-
line. See SC Code § 48-39-290(D)(l> 
(Supp 1991). According to the Coun-
cil, this amendment renders Lucas's 
claim of a permanent deprivation 
unripe, as Lucas may yet be able to 
secure permission to build on his 
property. "[The Court's] cases," we 
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are reminded, "uniformly reflect an 
insistence on knowing the nature 
and extent of permitted development 
before adjudicating the constitution-
ality of the regulations that purport 
to limit it." MacDonald, Sommer & 
Frates v County of Yolo, 477 US 340, 
351, 91 L Ed 2d 285, 106 S Ct 2561 
(1986). See also Agins v Tiburon, 447 
US 255, 260, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 S 
Ct 2138 (1980). Because petitioner 
'has not yet obtained a final deci-
sion regarding how [he] will be al-
lowed to develop [his] property," Wil-
liamson County Regional Planning 
Comrn'n of Johnson Citv v Hamilton 
Bank, 473 US 172, 190, 87 L Ed 2d 
126, 105 S Ct 3108 (1985), the Coun-
cil argues that he is not yet entitled 
to definitive adjudication of his tak-
ings claim in this Court. 
We think these considerations 
would preclude review had the 
South Carolina Supreme Court 
rested its judgment on ripeness 
grounds, as it was (essentially) in-
vited to do by the Council, see Brief 
for Respondent 9, n 3. The South 
Carolina Supreme Court shrugged 
off the possibility of further adminis-
trative and trial proceedings, how-
ever, preferring to dispose of Lucas's 
takings claim on the merits. Com-
pare, e.g., San Diego Gas & Electric 
Co., 450 US 621, 631-632, 67 L Ed 2d 
551, 101 S Ct 1287 (1981). This unu-
sual disposition does not preclude 
Lucas from applying for a permit 
under the 1990 amendment for fu-
ture construction, and challenging, 
on takings grounds, any denial. But 
it does preclude, both practically and 
legally, any takings claim with re-
spect to Lucas's past deprivation, i. 
e., for his having been denied con-
3. [2c] Justice Blackmun insists that this 
aspect of Lucas's claim is "not justiciable." 
struction rights during the period 
before the 1990 amendment. See 
generally First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v 
Countv of Los Angeles, 482 US 304, 
96 L Ed 2d 250, 107 S Ct 2378 (1987) 
(holding that temporary deprivations 
of use are compensable under the 
Takings Clause). Without even so 
much as commenting upon the con-
sequences of the South Carolina Su-
preme Court's judgment in this re-
spect, the Council insists that per-
mitting Lucas to press his claim of a 
past deprivation on this appeal 
would be improper, since "the issues 
of whether and to what extent [Lu-
cas] has incurred a temporary tak-
ing . . . have simply never been ad-
dressed." Brief for Respondent 11. 
Yet Lucas had no reason to proceed 
on a "temporary taking" theory at 
trial, or even to seek remand for 
that purpose prior to submission of 
the case to the South Carolina Su-
preme Court, since as the Act then 
read, the taking was unconditional 
and permanent. Moreover, given the 
breadth of the South Carolina Su-
preme Court's holding and judg-
ment, Lucas would plainly be unable 
(absent our intervention now) to ob-
tain further state-court adjudication 
with respect to the 1988-1990 period. 
[2b, 3a] In these circumstances, we 
think it would not accord with sound 
process to insist that Lucas pursue 
the late-created "special permit" 
procedure before his takings claim 
can be considered ripe. Lucas has 
properly alleged Article III injury-in-
fact in this case, with respect to both 
the pre-1990 and post-1990 con-
straints placed on the use of his 
parcels by the Beachfront Manage-
ment Act.3 That there is a discre-
post. at . 120 L Ed 2d, at 829, because 
Lucas never fulfilled his obligation under Wil-
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rionary "special permit" procedure 
by which he may regain—for the 
future, at least—beneficial use of his 
land goes only to the prudential 
''ripeness" of Lucas's challenge, and 
for the reasons discussed we do not. 
think it prudent to apply that pru-
dential requirement here. See Espo-
hamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 US 172, 
87 L fid 2d 126. 105 S Ct 3108 (1985), *o 
"--.ubmijtj a plan for development of jhisj prop-
erty ' to the proper state authorities. Id., at 
187, 87 L Ed 2d 126, 105 S Ct 3108. See post, 
at , 120 L Ed 2d, at 830. But such a 
submission would have been pointless, as the 
Council stipulated below that no building per-
mit would have been issued under the 1988 
Act, application or no application. Record 14 
(Stipulations). Nor does the peculiar posture ot 
this case mean that we are without Article III 
jurisdiction, as Justice Blackmun apparently 
believes, see post, at , 120 L Ed 2d, at 830, 
and n 5. Given the South Carolina Supremo 
Court's dismissive foreclosure of further 
pleading and adjudication with respect to the 
p re 1990 component of Lucas's taking claim, 
it is appropriate for us to address that compo-
nent as if the case were here on the pleadings 
alone. Lucas properly alleged injury-in-fact in 
his com plaint, see App to Pet for Cert 154 
•complaint;; id., at 156 (asking "damages for 
the temporary taking of his property" from 
the date of the 1988 Act's passage to "such 
time as this matter is finally resolved"). No 
more can reasonably be demanded. Cf. First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church ox 
Glendale v Countv of Los Angeles, 482 US 
304, 312-313, 96 L Ed 2d 250, 107 S Ct 2378 
1987). Justice Blackmun finds it "battling," 
post, at , n 5. 120 L Ed 2d, at 830. that we 
grant standing here, whereas "just a lew days 
ago. in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 
119 L Ed 2d 351. 112 S Ct (1992)," 
we denied standing. He sees in that strong 
evidence to support his repeated imputations 
that the Court "presses" to take this case, 
post, at , 120 L Ed 2d. at 826, is 'V-ager to 
decide' it, post, at , 120 L Ed 2d, at 831, 
and is unwilling to "be denied," post, at . 
i20 L Ed 2d, at 829. He has a point: The 
decisions are indeed very close in time, yet 
one grants standing and the other denies it. 
Hie distinction, however, rests in law rather 
than chronology. Lujan. since it involved the 
establishment of injury-in-fact at the sum-
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sito v South Carolina Coastal Coun 
cil, 939 F2d 165, 168 (CA4 1991), cert 
pending. No. 91-941.4 We leave for 
decision on remand, of course, the 
questions left unaddressed by the 
South Carolina Supreme Court as a 
consequence of its categorical dispo-
sition.* 
marv judgment stage, required specific facts 
to be adduced by sworn testimony; had the 
same challenge to a generalized allegation of 
injury-m-fact been made at the pleading 
stage, it would have been unsuccessful. 
4. In that case, the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit reached the merits of a tak-
ings challenge to the 1988 Beachfront Man-
agement Act identical to the one Lucas brings 
here even though the Act was amended, and 
the special permit procedure established, 
while :he case was under submission. The 
court observed: 
"The enactment of the 1990 Act during the 
pendency of this appeal, with its provisions 
for special permits and other changes that 
may affect the plaintiffs, does not relieve us of 
the need to address the plaintiffs' claims un-
der the provisions of the 1988 Act. Even if the 
amended Act cured all of the plaintiffs' con-
cerns, the amendments would not foreclose 
the possibility that a taking had occurred 
during the years when the 1988 Act was in 
effect/' Esposito v South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 939 F2d 165, 168 (CA4 1991). 
5. [3b] Justice Blackmun states that our 
"intense interest in Lucas' plight . . . would 
have been more prudently expressed by vacat-
ing the judgment below and remanding for 
further consideration in light of the 1990 
amendments' ' to the Beachfront Management 
Act. Post, at , n 7, 120 L Ed 2d, at 831. 
That is a strange suggestion, given that the 
South Carolina Supreme Court rendered its 
categorical disposition m this case after the 
Act had been amended, and after it had been 
invited to consider the effect of those amend-
ments on Lucas's case. We have no reason to 
believe that the justices of the South Carolina 
Supreme Court are any more desirous of us-
ing a narrower ground now than they were 
then; and neither "prudence' ' nor any other 
principle of judicial restraint requires that we 
remand to find out. whether they have 
changed their mind. 
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A 
Prior to Justice Holmes' exposi-
tion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Ma-
hon, 260 US 393, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S 
Q 158, 28 ALR 1321 (1922), it was 
generally thought that the Takings 
Clause reached only a "direct appro-
priation " of property, Legal Tender 
Cases, 12 Wall 457, 551, 20 L Ed 287 
(1871), or the functional equivalent 
of a "practical ouster of [the owner's] 
possession." Transportation Co. v 
Chicago, 99 US 635, 642, 25 L Ed 
336 (1879). See also Gibson v United 
States, 166 US 269, 275-276, 41 L Ed 
996, 17 S Ct 578 (1897). Justice 
Holmes recognized in Mahon, how-
ever, that if the protection against 
physical appropriations of private 
property was to be meaningfully en-
forced, the government's power to 
redefine the range of interests in-
cluded in the ownership of property 
was necessarily constrained by con-
stitutional limits. 260 US, at 414-
415, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158, 28 
ALR 1321. If, instead, the uses of 
private property were subject to un-
bridled, uncompensated qualification 
under the police power, "the natural 
tendency of human nature [would 
bel to extend the qualification more 
and more until at last private prop-
erty disappeared]." Id., at 415, 67 L 
Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158, 28 ALR 1321. 
These considerations gave birth in 
that case to the oft-cited maxim 
that, "while property may be regu-
lated to a certain extent, if regula-
tion goes too far it will be recognized 
as a taking." Ibid. 
Nevertheless, our decision in Ma-
hon offered little insight into when, 
and under what circumstances, a 
ijiven regulation would be seen as 
going "too far" for purposes of the 
Fifth Amendment. In 70-odd years of 
succeeding "regulatory takings" ju-
risprudence, we have generally es-
chewed any " 'set formula' " for de-
termining how far is too far, prefer-
ring to "engagfel in . . . essentially 
ad hoc, factual inquiries," Penn Cen-
tral Transportation Co. v New York 
City, 438 US 104, 124, 57 L Ed 2d 
631, 98 S Ct 2646 (1978) (quoting 
Goldblatt v Hempstead, 369 US 590, 
594, 8 L Ed 2d 130, 82 S Ct 987 
(1962)). See Epstein, Takings: De-
scent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup Ct 
Rev 1, 4. We have, however, de-
scribed at least two discrete catego-
ries of regulatory action as compen-
sable without case-specific inquiry 
into the public interest advanced in 
support of the restraint. The first 
encompasses regulations that compel 
the property owner to suffer a physi-
cal "invasion" of his property. In 
general (at least with regard to per-
manent invasions), no matter how 
minute the intrusion, and no matter 
how weighty the public purpose be-
hind it, we have required compensa-
tion. For example, in Loretto v Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
458 US 419, 73 L Ed 2d 868, 102 S 
Ct 3164 (1982), we determined that 
New York's law requiring landlords 
to allow television cable companies 
to emplace cable facilities in their 
apartment buildings constituted a 
taking, id., at 435-440, 73 L Ed 2d 
868, 102 S Ct 3164, even though the 
facilities occupied at most only 1^ 2 
cubic feet of the landlords' property, 
see id., at 438, n 16, 73 L Ed 2d 868, 
102 S Ct 3164. See also United 
States v Causby, 328 US 256, 265, 
and n 10, 90 L Ed 1206, 66 S Ct 1062 
(1946) (physical invasions of air-
space); cf. Kaiser Aetna v United 
States, 444 US 164, 62 L Ed 2d 332, 
100 S Ct 383 (1979) (imposition of 
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navigational servitude upon private 
marina). 
[4a] The second situation in which 
• /e have found categorical treatment 
appropriate is where regulation de-
nies all economically beneficial or 
productive use of land. See Agins, 
447 US, at 260, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 
S Ct 2138; see also Nollan v Califor-
nia Coastal Comm'n, 483 US 825, 
834, 97 L Ed 2d 677, 107 S Ct 3141 
11987); Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Assn. v DeBenedictis, 480 US 470, 
6. We will net attempt to respond to all of 
Justice Blackmun's mistaken citation of case 
precedent. Characteristic of its nature is his 
assertion that the cases we discuss here stand 
merely for the proposition "that proof that a 
regulation does not deny an owner economic 
use of his property is sufficient to defeat a 
facial taking challenge" and not for the point 
that "denial of such use is sufficient to estab-
lish a taking claim regardless of any other 
consideration. ' Post, at , n 11, 120 L Ed 
2d. at 835. The cases say. repeatedly and 
unmistakably, that " *[t]he test to be applied 
in considering [a] facial [takings] challenge is 
fairly straightforward. A statute regulating 
the uses that can be made of property effects 
a taking if it 'denies an owner economically 
•viable use of bis land." ' " Keystone, 480 US, 
at 495, 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232 (quoting 
Hodel, 452 US, at 295-296, 69 L Ed 2d i. 101 
S Ct 2352 (quoting Agins. 447 US. at 160)) 
(emphasis added). 
[4b] Justice Blackmun describes that rule 
•which v e Jo not invent but merely apply 
today* as "al ter ing] the long-settled rules of 
review" by foisting on the State "the burden 
of showing [its] regulation is not a taking." 
Post, at . . 120 L Ed 2d. at 832. This 
ia of course wrong. Lucas had to do more than 
simpiy rile a lawsuit to establish his constitu-
tional entitlement; he had to show that the 
Beachfront Management Act denied him eco-
nomically beneficial use of his land. Our anal-
ysis presumes the unconstitutionality of state 
land-use regulation only in the sense that any 
rule-with-exceptions presumes the invalidity 
of a law that violates it—for example, the 
rule generally prohibiting content-based re-
strictions on speech. See, e.g., Simon & Schus-
ter, Inc. v New York Crime Victims Board, 
502 US . . 116 L Ed 2d 476, 112 S Ct 
495, 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232 
(1987); Hodel v Virginia Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 
452 US 264, 295-296, 69 L Ed 2d 1, 
101 S Ct 2352 (1981 .^  As we have 
said on numerous occasions, the 
Fifth Amendment is violated when 
landuse regulation 'fdoes not sub-
stantially advance legitimate state 
interests or denies an owner econom-
ically viable use of his land." Agins, 
supra, at 260, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 S 
Ct 2138 (citations omitted) t emphasis 
added).7 
501 (1991) ("A statute is presumptively incon-
sistent with the First Amendment if it im-
poses a financial hurden on speakers because 
of the content of their speech'*). Justice Black-
mun's real quarrel ih with the substantive 
standard of liability we apply in this case, a 
long-established standard we ^ee no need to 
repudiate. 
7. Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our 
"deprivation ot all economically feasible use" 
rule : gTeater than its precision, since the 
rule does not make clear the "property inter-
est ' against which the loss of value is to be 
measured When, for example, a regulation 
requires a developer to leave 909c of a rural 
tract in its natural state, it is unclear 
whether we would analyze the situation as 
one m which the owner has been deprived of 
all economically beneficial use of the bur-
dened poition of the tract, or as one in which 
the owner has suffered a mere diminution in 
value of the tract as a whole. >For an extreme 
—and, we think, unsupportable—view of the 
relevant calculus, see Penn Central Transpor-
tation Co. v New York City, 42 NrY2d 324. 
333-334. 366 NE2d 1271, 1276-1277 <1977i, 
alfd, 438 US 104, 57 L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct 
2646 (I97e>, where the state court examined 
the diminution in a particular parcel's value 
produced by a municipal ordinance in light of 
total value of the taking claimant's other 
holdings in the vicinity.) Unsurprisingly, this 
uncertainty regarding the composition of the 
denominator in our "deprivation" fraction has 
produced inconsistent pronouncements by the 
Court. Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Ma-
nor., 260 US 393. 414, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 
158, 28 ALR 1321 (1922) ilaw restricting sub-
surface extraction of coal held to effect a 
taking;, with Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. 
v DeBf netHctis. 480 US 470. 497-502, 94 L Ed 
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We have never set forth the justifi-
cation for this rule. Perhaps it is 
simply, as Justice Brennan sug-
gested, that total deprivation of ben-
eficial use is, from the landowner's 
point of view, the equivalent of a 
physical appropriation. See San Di-
ego Gas & Electric Co. v San Diego, 
450 US, at 652, 67 L Ed 2d 551, 101 
S Ct 1287 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
"[F]or what is the land but the 
profits thereof]?]" 1 E. Coke, Insti-
tutes ch 1, §1 (1st Am ed 1812). 
Surely, at least, in the extraordinary 
circumstance when no productive or 
economically beneficial use of land is 
permitted, it is less realistic to in-
dulge our usual assumption that the 
legislature is simply "adjusting the 
benefits and burdens of economic 
life," Penn Central Transportation 
Co., 438 US, at 124, 57 L Ed 2d 631, 
98 S Ct 2646, in a manner that 
secures an "average reciprocity of 
advantage" to everyone concerned. 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 
US, at 415, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158, 
28 ALR 1321. And the functional 
basis for permitting the government, 
by regulation, to affect property val-
ues without compensation—that 
"Government hardly could go on if 
to some extent values incident to 
property could not be diminished 
without paying for every such 
change in the general law," id., at 
413, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158, 28 
ALR 1321—does not apply to the 
2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232 (1987) (nearly identical 
law held not to effect a taking); see also id., at 
515-520. 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232 
< Rehnquist, C.J , dissenting;; Rose, Mahon Re-
constructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a 
Muddle, 57 S Cal L Rev 561, 566-569 (1984). 
The answer to this difficult question may lie 
:n how the owner's reasonable expectations 
have been shaped by the State's law of prop-
-ty—i. e., whether and to what degree the 
, mate's law has accorded legal recognition and 
relatively rare situations where the 
government has deprived a land-
owner of all economically beneficial 
uses. 
On the other side of the balance, 
affirmatively supporting a compensa-
tion requirement, is the fact that 
regulations that leave the owner of 
land without economically beneficial 
or productive options for its use— 
typically, as here, by requiring land 
to be left substantially in its natural 
state—carry with them a heightened 
risk that private property is being 
pressed into some form of public 
service under the guise of mitigating 
serious public harm. See, e.g., Anni-
celli v South Kingstown, 463 A2d 
133, 140-141 (RI 1983) (prohibition 
on construction adjacent to beach 
justified on twin grounds of safety 
and "conservation of open space"); 
Morris County Land Improvement 
Co. v Parsippany-Troy Hills Town-
ship, 40 NJ 539, 552-553, 193 A2d 
232, 240 (1963) (prohibition on filling 
marshlands imposed in order to pre-
serve region as water detention ba-
sin and create wildlife refuge). As 
Justice Brennan explained: "From 
the government's point of view, the 
benefits flowing to the public from 
preservation of open space through 
regulation may be equally great as 
from creating a wildlife refuge 
through formal condemnation or in-
creasing electricity production 
protection to the particular interest in land 
with respect to which the takings claimant 
alleges a diminution in (or elimination of) 
value. In any event, we avoid this difficulty in 
the present case, since the interest in land" 
that Lucas has pleaded (a fee simple interest) 
is an estate with a rich tradition of protection 
at common law, and since the South Carolina 
Court of Common Pleas found that the Beach-
front Management Act left each of Lucas's 
beachfront lots without economic value. 
814 
LUCAS v SO. CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL 
«1992i 120 L Ed 2d 798 
through a dam project that floods 
private property." San Diego Gas & 
Elec. Co., supra, at 652, 67 L Ed 2d 
551, 101 S Ct 1287 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). The many statutes on 
the books, both state and federal, 
that provide for the use of eminent 
domain to impose servitudes on pri-
vate scenic lands preventing develop 
mental uses, or to acquire such 
lands altogether, suggest the practi-
cal equivalence in this setting of 
negative regulation and appropria-
tion. See, e.g., 16 USC § 410ff-l(a) [16 
USCS § 410ff-l(a)] (authorizing acqui-
sition of "lands, waters, or interests 
[within Channel Islands National 
Park] (including but not limited to 
scenic easements)"); § 460aa-2(a) (au-
thorizing acquisition of ' 'any lands, 
or lesser interests therein, including 
mineral interests and scenic ease-
ments" within Sawtooth National 
Recreation Area); §§3921-3923 (au-
thorizing acquisition of wetlands); 
NC Gen Stat § 113A-38 (1990: (au-
8. Justice Stevens criticizes the "deprivation 
of all economically beneficial use" rule as 
"wholly arbitrary ', in that "[the] landowner 
whose property is diminished in value 95% 
recovers nothing." while the landowner who 
suffers a complete elimination of value "re-
covers the land's full value." Post, at . 
120 L Ed 2d, at 844. This analysis errs in its 
assumption that the landowner whose depri-
vation is one step short of complete is not 
entitled to compensation. Such an owner 
might not be able to claim the benefit of our 
categorical formulation, but, as we have ac-
knowledged time and again. "[t]he economic 
impact of the regulation on the claimant and 
. . . the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed ex-
pectations" are keenly relevant to takings 
analysis generally Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v New York City, 438 US 104, 124, 57 
L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct 2646 (1978). It is t iue 
that in at least some cases the landowner 
with 95<?c loss will get nothing, while the 
landowner with total loss will recover in full. 
But that occasional result is no more strange 
thorizing acquisition of, inter alia, 
" 'scenic easements ' " within the 
North Carolina natural and scenic 
rivers system); Tenn Code Ann §§ 11 
15-101—11-15-108 (1987) (authorizing 
acquisition of "protective easements' ' 
and other rights in real property 
adjacent to State's historic, architec-
tural, archaeological, or cultural re-
sources). 
[4c, 5a] We think, in short, that 
there are good reasons for our fre-
quently expressed belief that when 
the owner of real property has been 
called upon to sacrifice all economi-
cally beneficial uses in the name of 
the common good, that is, to leave 
his property economically idle, he 
has suffered a taking.8 
B 
[6a] The trial court found Lucas's 
two beachfront lots to have been 
rendered valueless by respondent's 
enforcement of the coastal-zone con-
than the gross disparity between the land-
owner whose premises are taken for a high-
way (who recovers in full) and the landowner 
whose property is reduced to 5% of its former 
value by the highway 'who recovers nothing). 
Takings law is full of these "all-or-nothing" 
situations. 
[5b] Justice Stever.h similarly misinter-
prets our focus on "developmental" uses of 
property ;the uses proscribed by the Beach-
front Management Act) as betraying an "as-
sumption that the only uses of property cogni-
zable under the Constitution are developmen-
tal uses." Post, at , n 3, 120 L Ed 2d, at 
844. We make no such assumption. Though 
our prior takings cases evince an abiding 
concern tor the productive uee of, and eco-
nomic investment in, land, there are plainly a 
number of noneconomic interests in land 
whose impairment will invite exceedingly 
close scrutiny under the Takings Ciause. See. 
e g., Ix)retto v Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 458 US 419, 436, 73 L Ed 2d 
868. 102 S Ct 3164 (1982) (interest in exclud-
ing strangers from one's land). 
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struction ban.9 Under Lucas's theory 
of the case, which rested upon our 
"no economically viable use" state-
ments, that finding entitled him to 
compensation. Lucas believed it un-
necessary to take issue with either 
the purposes behind the Beachfront 
Management Act, or the means cho-
sen by the South Carolina Legisla-
ture to effectuate those purposes. 
The South Carolina Supreme Court, 
however, thought otherwise. In its 
9. [6b] This finding was the premise of the 
Petition for Certiorari, and since it was not 
challenged in the Brief in Opposition we de-
cline to entertain the argument in respon-
dent's brief on the merits, see Brief for Re-
spondent 45-50, that the fending was errone-
ous Instead, we decide the question presented 
under the same factual assumptions as did 
the Supreme Court of South Carolina. See 
Oklahoma City v Tuttle, 471 US 808, 816, 85 
L fid 2d 791, 105 S Ct 2427 (1985) 
10. The legislature's express findings in-
clude the following 
' The General Assembly finds that* 
"(1) The beach/dune system along the coast 
of South Carolina is extremely important to 
the people of this State and serves the follow-
ing functions. 
"(a) protects life and property by serv-
ing as a storm barrier which dissipates 
wave energy and contributes toshorehne 
stability in an economical and effective 
manner. 
"(b) provides the basis for a tourism 
industry that generates approximately 
two-thirds of South Carolina's annual 
tourism industrv revenue which consti-
tutes a significant portion of the state's 
economy The tourists who come to the 
South Carolina coast to enjoy the ocean 
and dry sand beach contribute significant-
ly to state and local tax revenues; 
"(c) provides habitat for numerous spe-
cies of plants and animals, several of 
which are threatened or endangered Wa-
ters adjacent to the beach/dune system 
also provide habitat for many other ma-
rine species, 
,T,d) provides a natural health environ-
ment for the citizens of South Carolina to 
spend leisure time which serves their 
physical and mental well-being 
view, the Beachfront Management 
Act was no ordinary enactment, but 
involved an exercise of South Caroli-
na's "police powers" to mitigate the 
harm to the public interest that peti-
tioner's use of his land might occa-
sion. 304 SC, at 384, 404 SE2d, at 
899 By neglecting to dispute the 
findings enumerated in the Act10 or 
otherwise to challenge the legisla-
ture's purposes, petitioner "conced-
e[d] that the beach/dune area of 
"<2) Beach/dune system vegetation is 
unique and extremely important to the vital-
ity and preservation of the system 
'(3) Many miles of South Carolina's beaches 
have been identified as critically eroding. 
"(4) [Development unwisely has been 
sited too close to the [beach/dune] system 
This type of development has jeopardized the 
stability of the beach/dune system, acceler-
ated erosion, and endangered adjacent prop-
erty. It is in both the public and private 
interests to protect the system from this un-
wise development. 
"(5) The use of armoring in the form of 
hard erosion control devices such as seawalls, 
bulkheads, and rip-rap to protect erosion-
threatened structures adjacent to the beach 
has not proven effective These armonng de-
vices have given a false sense of security to 
beachfront property owners In reality, these 
hard structures, in many instances, have in-
creased the vulnerability of beachfront prop-
erty to damage from wind and waves while 
contributing to the deterioration and loss of 
the dry sand beach which is so important to 
the tourism industry 
"(6) Erosion is a natural process which 
becomes a significant problem for man only 
when structures are erected in close proxim-
ity to the beach/dune system It is in both the 
public and private interests to afford the 
beach/dune system space to accrete and erode 
in its natural cycle This space can be pro-
vided only by discouraging new construction 
in close proximity to the beach/dune system 
and encouraging those who have erected 
structures too close to the system to retreat 
from it 
"(8) It is in the state's best interest to 
protect and to promote increased public ac-
cess to South Carolina's beaches for out-of-
state tourists and South Carolina residents 
alike " SC Code § 48-39-250 (Supp 1991) 
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South Carolina's shores is an ex-
tremely valuable public resource; 
that the erection of new construc-
tion, inter alia, contributes to the 
erosion and destruction of this pub-
lic resource; and that discouraging 
new construction in close proximity 
to the beach/ dune area is necessary 
to prevent a great public harm." Id., 
at 382-383. 404 SE2d, at 898. In the 
cour t ' s view, these concessions 
brought petitioner's challenge within 
a long line of this Court's cases sus-
taining against Due Process and 
Takings Clause cha l l enges the 
State's use of its "police powers" to 
enjoin a property owner from activi-
ties akin to public nuisances. See 
Mugier v Kansas, 123 US 623, 31 L 
Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 (1887) (law pro-
hibiting manufacture of alcoholic 
beverages); Hadacheck v Sebastian, 
239 US 394, 60 L Ed.348, 36 S Ct 
143 (1915) (law barring operation of 
brick mill in residential area); Miller 
v Schoene, 276 US 272, 72 L Ed 568. 
48 3 Ct 246 11928) (order to destroy 
diseased cedar trees to prevent infec-
tion of nearbv orchards); Goldblatt v 
Hempstead. 369 US 590, 8 L Ed 2d 
130, 82 S Ct 987 (1962) (law effec-
tively preventing continued opera-
tion of quarry in residential area*. 
[1b] It is correct that many of our 
prior ooinions have suggested that 
' harmful or noxious uses" of prop-
erty maj be proscribed by govern-
ment regulation without the require-
ment of compensation. For a number 
of reasons, however, we think the 
South Carolina Supreme Court was 
too quick to conclude that that prin-
ciple decides the present case. The 
"harmful or noxious uses" principle 
was the Court's early attempt to 
describe in theoretical terms why 
government may, consistent with 
the Takings Clause, affect property 
values by regulation without incur-
ring an obligation to compensate—a 
reality sve nowadays acknowledge 
explicitly with respect to the full 
scope of the State's police power. 
See; e.g., Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co , 438 US, at 125. 57 L Ed 2d 
631, M S Ct 2646 (where State "rea-
sonably concludefsj that 'the health, 
safety, morals, or general welfare' 
would be promoted by prohibiting 
particular contemplated uses of 
land." compensation need not accom-
pany prohibition); see also Nollan v 
California Coastal Commission, 483 
US, at 834-835, 97 L Ed 2d 677, 107 
S Ct 3141 ( 'Our cases have not elab-
orated on the standards for deter-
mining what constitutes a f legit i 
mate state interest[,]' |but) ft]he> 
have made clear . . . that a broad 
range of governmental purposes and 
regulations satisfy these require-
ments"). We made this very point in 
Penn Central Transportation Co., 
where, in the course of sustaining 
New York City's landmarks preser-
vation program against a takings 
challenge, we rejected the petition-
er's suggestion that Mugier and the 
cases following it were premised on, 
and thus limited by, some objective 
conception of "noxiousness": 
"(T]he uses in issue in Hadacheck, 
Miller, and Goldblatt were per-
fectly lawtul in themselves. They 
involved no 'blameworthiness, . . . 
moral wrongdoing or conscious act 
of dangerous risk-taking which in-
ducefd society] to shift the cost to 
a pafrt]icular individual.' Sax, 
Takings and the Police Power, 74 
Yale LJ 36, 50 (1964). These cases 
are better understood as resting 
not on any supposed 'noxious' 
quality of the prohibited uses but 
rather on the ground that the re-
strictions were reasonably related 
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to the implementation of a policy 
—not unlike historic preservation 
—expected to produce a wide-
spread public benefit and applica-
ble to all similarly situated prop-
erty." 438 US, at 133-134, n 30, 57 
L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct 2646. 
"Harmful or noxious use" analysis 
was, in other words, simply the pro-
genitor of our more contemporary 
statements that "land-use regulation 
does not effect a taking if it 'substan-
tially advancefs] legitimate state in-
terests' . . . ." Nollan, supra, at 834, 
97 L Ed 2d 677, 107 S Ct 3141 
(quoting Agins v Tiburon, 447 US, at 
260, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 S Ct 2138); 
see also Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co., supra, at 127, 57 L Ed 2d 
631, 98 S Ct 2646; Euclid v Ambler 
Realty Co., 272 US 365, 387-388, 71 
L Ed 303, 47 S Ct 114, 54 ALR 1016 
(1926). 
[1c] The transition from our early 
focus on control of "noxious'' uses to 
our contemporary understanding of 
the broad realm within which gov-
ernment may regulate without com-
pensation was an easy one, since the 
distinction between ''harm-prevent-
11. In the present case, in fact, some of the 
"[South Carolina] legislature's 'findings' " to 
which the South Carolina Supreme Court 
purported to defer in characterizing the pur-
pose of the Act as "harm-preventing," 304 SC 
376, 385, 404 SE2d 895, 900 (1991), seem to us 
phrased in "benefit-conferring" language in-
stead. For example, they describe the impor-
tance of a construction ban in enhancing 
"South Carolina's annual tourism industry 
revenue," SC Code § 48-39-250(1 Kb) (Supp 
1991», in "providing] habitat for numerous 
species cf plants and animals, several of 
which are threatened or endangered," § 48-39-
250(1 Kc), and in "provid[ingJ a natural 
healthy environment for the citizens of South 
Carolina to spend leisure time which serves 
their physical and mental well-being." § 48-39-
250(lXd). It would be pointless to make the 
outcome of this case hang upon this terminol-
ogy, since the same interests could readily be 
ing" and "benefit-conferring" regula-
tion is often in the eye of the be-
holder. It is quite possible, for exam-
ple, to describe in either fashion the 
ecological, economic, and aesthetic 
concerns that inspired the South 
Carolina legislature in the present 
case. One could say that imposing a 
servitude on Lucas's land is neces-
sary in order to prevent his use of it 
from "harming" South Carolina's 
ecological resources; or, instead, in 
order to achieve the "benefits" of an 
ecological preserve.11 Compare, e.g., 
Claridge v New Hampshire Wet-
lands Board, 125 NH 745, 752, 485 
A2d 287, 292 (1984) (owner may, 
without compensation, be barred 
from filling wetlands because land-
tilling would deprive adjacent coastal 
habitats and marine fisheries of eco-
logical support), with, e.g., Bartlett v 
Zoning Comm'n of Old Lyme, 161 
Conn 24, 30, 282 A2d 907, 910 (1971) 
(owner barred from filling tidal 
marshland must be compensated, de-
spite municipality's "laudable" goal 
of "preserving] marshlands from en-
croachment or destruction' '). 
Whether one or the other of the 
competing characterizations will 
described in "harm-preventing" fashion. 
Justice Blackmun, however, apparently in-
sists that we must make the outcome hinge 
(exclusively) upon the South Carolina Legisla-
ture's other, "harm-preventing" characteriza-
tions, focusing on the declaration that "prohi-
bitions on building in front of the setback line 
are necessary to protect people and property 
from storms, high tides, and beach erosion." 
Post, at , 120 L Ed 2d, at 828. He says 
"[n)othing in the record undermines [this] 
assessment," ibid., apparently seeing no 
significance in the fact that the statute per-
mits owners of existing structures to remain 
land even to rebuild if their structures are 
not "destroyed beyond repair," SC Code Ann 
§ 48-39-290(B)), and in the fact that the 1990 
amendment authorizes the Council to issue 
permits for new construction in violation of 
the uniform prohibition, see SC Code § 48-39-
290tDXl) (Supp 1991). 
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come to one's lips in a particular 
case depends primarily upon one's 
evaluation of the worth of competing 
uses of reai estate. See Restatement 
'Second) of Torts §822, Comment g, 
p 112 1979) ("[practically all hu-
man activities unless carried on in a 
wilderness interfere to some extent 
with others or involve some risk of 
interference^. A given restraint will 
be seen as mitigating "harm" to the 
adjacent parcels or securing a "ben-
efit" for them, depending upon the 
observer's evaluation of the relative 
importance of the use that the re-
straint favors. See Sax, Takings and 
the Police Power, 74 Yale LJ 36, 49 
<1964) ("[T]he problem [in this area | 
is not one of noxiousness or harm-
creating activity at all; rather it is a 
problem of inconsistency between 
perfectly innocent and indepen-
dently desirable uses"'. Whether Lu-
cas's construction of single-family 
residences on his parcels should be 
describee as bringing "harm" to 
South Carolina's adjacent ecological 
resources thus depends principally 
upon whether the describer believes 
that the State's use interest in nur-
turing those resources is so impor-
tant that any competing adjacent 
use must yield.12 
When it is understood that "pre-
vention of harmful use" was merely 
12. [1d] In Justice Blackmun's view, even 
with respect to regulations that deprive an 
owner of all developmental or economically 
beneficial land uses, the test tor required 
compensation is whether the legislature has 
recited a harm-preventing justification tor its 
action See post, at . . 120 L Ed 
2d, at 828. 833-836. Since such a justification 
can be formulated in practically every case, 
this amounts to a test of whether the legisla 
ture has a stuDid staff. We think the Takings 
Clause requires courts to do more than insist 
upon artful harm-preventing characterisa-
tions 
our early formulation of the police 
power justification necessary to sus-
tain (without compensation) any reg-
ulatory diminution in value; and 
that the distinction between regula-
tion that "prevents harmful iibe" 
and that which 'confers benefits" is 
difficult, if not impossible, to discern 
on an objective, value-free basis: it 
becomes self-evident that noxious-
use logic cannot serve as a touch-
stone to distinguish regulatory "tak-
ings"—which require compensation 
—from regulatory deprivations that 
do not require compensation. A forti-
ori the legislature's recitation of a 
noxious-use justification cannot be 
the basis for departing from our ca-
tegorical rule that total regulatory 
takings must be compensated. If it 
were, departure would virtually al-
ways be allowed. The South Carolina 
Supreme Court's approach would es-
sentially nullify Mahon's affirmation 
of limits to the noncompensable ex-
ercise of the police power. Our cases 
provide no support for this: None of 
them that employed the logic of 
"harmful use" prevention to sustain 
a regulation involved an allegation 
that the regulation wholly elimi-
nated the value of the claimant's 
land. See Keystone Bituminous Coal 
Assn., 480 US, at 513-514, 94 L Ed 
2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting).13 
13. E.g, Mugler v Kansas 123 US 623, 31 L 
Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 (1887) (prohibition jpon 
use of a building as a brewery; other uses 
permitted); Plymouth Coal Co v Pi nnsylva-
nia. 232 US 531. 58 L Ed 713 34 S Ct 359 
(1914' (requirement that "pillar" of coal be 
lelt in ground to safeguard mine workers, 
mineral rights could otherwise be exploited); 
Remman v Little ROCK, 237 US 171, 59 L Ed 
900. J5 S Ct 511 (1915) (declaration tnat 
livery stable constituted a public nuisance, 
other uses ot the property permitted); Hadu-
check v Sebastian. 239 US 394, 60 L Ed 348, 
36 S Ct 143 (1915) (prohibition of brick rnanu-
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[1e, 7a] Where the State seeks to 
sustain regulation that deprives land 
of all economically beneficial use, we 
think it may resist compensation 
only if the logically antecedent in-
quiry into the nature of the owner s 
estate shows that the proscribed use 
interests were not part of his title to 
begin with.14 This accords, we think, 
with our "takings" jurisprudence, 
which has traditionally been guided 
by the understandings of our citizens 
regarding the content of, and the 
State's power over, the "bundle of 
rights" that they acquire when they 
obtain title to property. It seems to 
us that the property owner necessar-
ily expects the uses of his property 
to be restricted, from time to time, 
by various measures newly enacted 
by the State in legitimate exercise of 
its police powers; "[a]s long recog-
nized, some values are enjoyed un-
der an implied limitation and must 
yield to the police power." Pennsyl-
factunng in residential area, other uses per-
mitted) Goldblatt v Hempstead, 369 US 590, 
3 L Ed 2d 130, 82 S Ct 987 (1962) (prohibition 
on excavation, other uses permitted) 
14. Drawing on our First Amendment juris-
prudence, see, e g, Employment Division, De-
partment of Human Resources ot Oregon v 
Smith. 494 US 872. ^78-879, 108 L Ed 2d 876, 
110 S Ct 1595 (1990i, Justice Stevens would 
Tloo(k] to the generality of a regulation of 
property" to determine whether compensation 
is owing Post, at 120 L Ed 2d, at 849 
The Beachfront Management Act is general, 
in his view because it "regulates the use of 
the coastline of the entire state" Post, at 
120 L Ed 2d, at 850 There may be some 
validity to the principle Justice Stevens pro-
poses, but it does not properly appiy to the 
present case The equivalent of a law of gen-
eral application that inhibits the practice of 
religion without being aimed at religion, see 
Oregon v Smith, supra, is a law that destroys 
the value of land without being aimed at 
land Perhaps such a law—the generally ap-
plicable criminal prohibition on the manufac-
turing jf alcoholic beverages challenged in 
Mugler comes to mind—cannot constitute a 
vania Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 US, at 
413, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158. And 
in the case of personal property, by 
reason of the State's traditionally 
high degree of control over commer-
cial dealings, he ought to be aware 
of the possibility that new regulation 
might even render his property eco-
nomically worthless (at least if the 
property's only economically produc-
tive use is sale or manufacture for 
sale), bee Andrus v Allard, 444 US 
51, 66-67, 62 L Ed 2d 210, 100 S Ct 
318 (1979) (prohibition on sale of 
eagle feathers). In the case of land, 
however, we think the notion 
pressed by the Council that title is 
somehow held subject to the "im-
plied limitation" that the State may 
subsequently eliminate all economi-
cally valuable use is inconsistent 
with the historical compact recorded 
in the Takings Clause that has be-
come part of our constitutional cul-
ture.15 
compensable taking See 123 US, at 656-656, 
31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 But a regulation 
specifically directed to land use no more ac-
quires immunity by plundering landowners 
generally than does a law specifically directed 
at religious practice acquire immunity by 
prohibiting all religions Justice Stevens' ap-
proach renders the Takings Clause little more 
than a particularized restatement of the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
15. [7b] After accusing us of "launching] a 
missile to kill a mouse," post, at , 120 L 
Ed 2d, at 825, Justice Biackmun expends a 
good deal of throw-weight of his own upon a 
noncombatant, arguing that our description of 
the "understanding" of land ownership that 
informs the Takings Clause is not supported 
by early American experience That is largely 
true, but entirely irrelevant The practices of 
the States prior to incorporation of the Tak-
ings and Just Compensation Clauses, see Chi-
cago, D & Q R C o v Chicago, 166 US 226, 41 
L Ed 979, 17 S Ct 581 U897V-which, as 
Justice Biackmun acknowledges, occasionally 
included outright physical appropriation of 
lana without compensation, see post, at , 
120 L Ed Id, at 839—were out of accord with 
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[1f, 8] Where "permanent physical 
occupation" of land is concerned, we 
have refused to allow the govern-
ment to decree it anew (without 
compensa t ion) , no m a t t e r how 
weighty the asserted "public inter-
ests" involved. Loretto v Telepromp-
ter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 US, 
at 425, 73 L Ed 2d 868, 102 S Ct 
3164—though we assuredly would 
permit the government to assert a 
permanent easement that was a pre-
existing limitation upon the land-
owner's title. Compare Scranton v 
Wheeler, 179 US 141, 163, 45 L Ed 
126, 21 S Ct 48 '1900) (interests of 
"riparian owner in the bubmerged 
iands . . . bordering on a public nav-
igable water" held subject to Gov-
ernment's navigational servitude), 
with Kaiser Aetna v United States. 
444 US, at 178-180, 62 L Ed 2d 332, 
100 S Ct 383 (imposition of naviga-
tional servitude on marina created 
and rendered navigable at private 
expense held to constitute a taking). 
We believe similar treatment must 
be accorded confiscatory regulations, 
l. e., regulations that prohibit all 
economically beneficial use of land: 
Any limitation no severe cannot be 
newly legislated or decreed (without 
compensation), but must inhere in 
iha title itself, in the restrictions 
that background principles of the 
J/IV plausible interpretation of those provi-
sions «Ju=tice B'ackmun is correct that early 
constitutional theorists did not believe the 
l ik ings Oiau.se embraced regulations ot prop-
erty at all, see post, at , 120 L Ed 2d, at 
**39. and n 23. but even he does not suggest 
explicitly, at least) rhat v\e renounce the 
Jourt's contrary conclusion in Mahon Since 
the text of th * Clause can be read to encom 
pass reguiaioiv as well as physical depriva-
tions un contrast to the text originally pro-
posed by Madron, see Speech Proposing Bill 
J Rights ' June *. 17"*9). in 12 .1. Madison. 
The Papers ct James Madison 201 «C. riobson. 
R. Rutland. W Rachai & J Sisson ed 1979) 
State's law of property and nuisance 
already place upon land ownership. 
A law or decree with such an effect 
must, in other words, do no more 
than duplicate the result that could 
have been achieved in the courts--
by adjacent landowners lor other 
uniquely affected persons) under the 
State's law of private nuisance, or by 
the State under its complementary 
power to abate nuisances that affect 
the public generally, or otherwise.18 
[1g, 9, 10a] On this analysis, the 
owner of a lake bed. for example, 
would not be entitled to compensa-
tion when he is denied the requisite 
permit to engage in a landfilling 
operation that would have the effect 
of flooding others' land. Nor the cor-
porate owner of a nuclear generat-
ing plant, when it is directed to 
remove all improvements from its 
land upon discovery that the plant 
sits astride an earthquake fault. 
Such regulatory action may well 
have the effect of eliminating the 
land's only economically productive 
use, but it does not proscribe a pro-
ductive use that was previously per-
missible under relevant property 
and nuisance principles. The use of 
these properties for what are now 
expressly prohibited purposes was 
always unlawful, and (subject to 
other constitutional limitations) it 
'"No person shall be . . obliged to relinquish 
his property, where it may be necessary lor 
public iiae, without a just compensation"), we 
decline to do no as well. 
16. The principal "otherwise" that we have 
>n mind is litigation absolving the State lor 
private parties) of liabilit> for the destruction 
of "real and personal property, in cases of 
actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a 
lire" or to forestall other grave threats IO the 
lives and property of others. Bow ditch v Bos-
ton. 101 US \6, 18-iy, 25 L Ed 980 <1880i; see 
United States v Pacific Kaiiioad. 120 US 227, 
238-23U 30 I. LM (334. 7 S Ct -lyo < 1887' 
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was open to the State at any point 
to make the implication of those 
background principles of nuisance 
and property law explicit. See Mi-
chelman, Property, Utility, and Fair-
ness, Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of "Just Compensation" 
Law, 80 Harv L Rev 1165, 1239-1241 
(1967). In light of our traditional 
resort to "existing rules or under-
standings that stem from an inde-
pendent source such as state law" to 
define the range of interests that 
qualify for protection as "property" 
under the Fifth -and Fourteenth) 
Amendments, Board of Regents of 
State Colleges v Roth, 408 US 564, 
577, 33 L Ed 2d 548, 92 S Ct 2701 
(1972); see, e.g., Ruckelshaus v Mon-
santo Co., 467 US 986, 1011-1012, 81 
L Ed 2d 815, 104 S Ct 2862 (1984); 
Hughes v Washington, 389 US 290, 
295, 19 L Ed 2d 530, 88 S Ct 438 
(1967) (Stewart, J., concurring), this 
recognition that the Takings Clause 
does not require compensation when 
an owner is barred from putting 
land to a use that is proscribed by 
those "existing rules or understand-
ings" is surely unexceptional. When, 
however, a regulation that declares 
"off-limits" all economically produc-
tive or beneficial uses of land goes 
beyond what the relevant back-
ground principles would dictate, 
compensation must be paid to sus-
tain it.17 
[11] The "total taking" inquiry we 
require today will ordinarily entail 
(as the application of state nuisance 
law ordinarily entails) analysis of, 
among other things, the degree of 
17. [10b] Of course, the State may elect to 
rescind its regulation and thereby avoid hav-
ing to pay compensation for a permanent 
deprivation. See First English Evangelical Lu-
theran Church, 482 US, at 321, 96 L Ed 2d 
250, 107 S Ct 2378 But "where the [reguia-
harm to public lands and resources, 
or adjacent private property, posed 
by the claimant's proposed activities, 
see, e.g., Restatement (Second) of 
Torts §§ 826, 827, the social value of 
the claimant's activities and their 
suitability to the locality in question, 
see, e.g., id., §§ 828(a) and (b), 831, 
and the relative ease with which the 
alleged harm can be avoided 
through measures taken by the 
claimant and the government (or 
adjacent private landowners) alike, 
see, e.g., id., §§ 827(e), 828(c), 830. 
The fact that a particular use has 
long been engaged in by similarly 
situated owners ordinarily imports a 
lack of any common-law prohibition 
(though changed circumstances or 
new knowledge may make what was 
previously permissible no longer so, 
see Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
supra, § 827, comment g). So also 
does the fact that other landowners, 
similarly situated, are permitted to 
continue the use denied to the claim-
ant. 
[1h, 12] It seems unlikely that 
common-law principles would have 
prevented the erection of any habit-
able or productive improvements on 
petitioner's land; they rarely support 
prohibition of the "essential use" of 
land, Curtin v Benson, 222 US 78, 
86, 56 L Ed 102, 32 S Ct 31 (1911). 
The question, however, is one of 
state law to be dealt with on re-
mand. We emphasize that to win its 
case South Carolina must do more 
than proffer the legislature's decla-
ration that the uses Lucas desires 
are inconsistent with the public in-
tion has] already worked a taking of all use of 
property, no subsequent action by the govern-
ment can relieve it of the duty to provide 
compensation for the period during which the 
taking was effective." Ibid. 
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terest, or the conclusory assertion 
that they violate a common-law 
maxim such as sic utere tuo ut alie-
num non laedas. As we have said, a 
"State, by ipse dixit, may not trans-
form private property into public 
p rope r ty wi thout compensa t ion 
. . ." Webbs Fabulous Pharmacies, 
Inc. v Beckwith. 449 US 155, 164, 66 
L Ed 2d 358. 101 S Ct 446 (1980). 
Instead, as it would be required to 
do if it sought to restrain Lucas in a 
common-law action for public nui-
sance, South Carolina must identify 
background principles of nuisance 
Justice Kennedy, concurring in 
the judgment. 
The case comes to the Court in an 
unusual posture, as all my col-
leagues observe. Ante, at , 120 L 
Ed 2d, at 810; post, at , 120 L Ed 
2d. at 829 (BUckmun, J., dissenting); 
post, at , 120 L Ed 2d, at 842 
• Stevens, J., dissenting); post, at 
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 851-852 
'Statement of Souter, J.). After the 
suit was initiated but before it 
reached us, South Carolina amended 
its Beachfront Management Act to 
authorize the issuance of special per-
mits at variance with the Act's gen-
eral limitations. See SC Code § 48-39-
290tDXD (Supp 1991). Petitioner has 
not applied for a special permit but 
may still do so. The availability of 
this alternative, if it can be invoked, 
may dispose of petitioner's claim of a 
permanent taking. As I read the 
18. [11] Justice Blackmun decries our reli-
ance on background nuisance principles at 
ieast in part because he believes those princi-
ples to be as maniDulable as we find the 
"harm prevention" "benefit conferral" dicho-
tomy, see post, at 120 L Ed 2d. at 
837-^38 fhere is no doubt some leeway in a 
court s interpretation of what existing state 
law permits—but not remotely as much, we 
and property law that prohibit the 
uses he now intends in the circum-
stances in wnich the property is 
presently found. Only on this show-
ing can the State fairly claim that, 
in proscribing all such beneficial 
uses, the Beachfront Management 
Act is taking nothing.18 
The judgment is reversed and the 
cause remanded for proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
So ordered. 
Court's opinion, it does not decide 
the permanent taking claim, but nei-
ther does it foreclose the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina from consid-
ering the claim or requiring peti-
tioner to pursue an administrative 
alternative not previously available. 
The potential for future relief does 
not control our disposition, because 
whatever may occur in the future 
cannot undo what has occurred in 
the past. The Beachfront Manage-
ment Act was enacted in 1988. SC 
Code § 48-39-250 et seq. (Supp 19901 
It may have deprived petitioner of 
the use of his land in an interim 
period. § 48-39-290(A). If this depri-
vation amounts to a taking, its lim-
ited duration will not bar constitu-
tional relief. It is well established 
that temporary takings are as pro-
tected by the Constitution as are 
think, as in a legislative crafting of the rea-
sons for its confiscatory regulation We stress 
that an affirmative decree eliminating ail 
economically benehcial uses may be defended 
only if an objectively reasonable application 
of relevant precedents would exclude those 
beneficial uses in the circumstances m which 
the land is presently loand 
SEPARATE OPINIONS 
823 
U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 120 L Ed 2d 
permanent ones. First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church of Glendaie 
v County of Los Angeles, 482 US 
304, 318, 96 L Ed 2d 250, 107 S Ct 
2378(1987). 
The issues presented in the case 
are ready for our decision. The Su-
preme Court of South Carolina de-
cided the case on constitutional 
grounds, and its rulings are now 
before us. There exists no jurisdic-
tional bar to our disposition, and 
prudential considerations ought not 
to militate against it. The State can-
not complain of the manner in 
which the issues arose. Any uncer-
tainty in this regard is attributable 
to the State, as a consequence of its 
amendment to the Beachfront Man-
agement Act. If the Takings Clause 
is to protect against temporary dep-
rivations as well as permanent ones, 
its enforcement must not be frus-
trated by a shifting background of 
state law. 
Although we establish a frame-
work for remand, moreover, we do 
not decide the ultimate question of 
whether a temporary taking has oc-
curred in this case. The facts neces-
sary to the determination have not 
been developed in the record. Among 
the matters to be considered on re-
mand must be whether petitioner 
had the intent and capacity to de-
velop the property and failed to do 
so in the interim period because the 
State prevented him. Any failure by 
petitioner to comply with relevant 
administrative requirements will be 
part of that analysis. 
The South Carolina Court of Com-
mon Pleas found that petitioner's 
real property has been rendered val-
ueless by the State's regulation. App 
to Pet for Cert 37. The finding ap-
pears to presume that the property 
has no significant market value or 
resale potential. This is a curious 
finding, and I share the reservations 
of some of my colleagues about a 
finding that a beach front lot loses 
all value because of a development 
restriction. Post, at , 120 
L Ed 2d, at 830-831 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting); post, at , n 3, 120 L 
Ed 2d, at 844 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); post, at , 120 L Ed 2d, at 
851-852 (Statement of Souter, J.). 
While the Supreme Court of South 
Carolina on remand need not con-
sider the case subject to this con-
straint, we must accept the finding 
as entered below. See Oklahoma 
City v Tuttle, 471 US 808, 816, 85 L 
Ed 2d 791, 105 S Ct 2427 (1985). 
Accepting the finding as entered, it 
follows that petitioner is entitled to 
invoke the line of cases discussing 
regulations that deprive real prop-
erty of all economic value. See Agins 
v Tiburon, 447 US 255, 260, 65 L Ed 
2d 106, 100 S Ct 2138 (1980). 
The finding of no value must be 
considered under the Takings Clause 
by reference to the owner's reason-
able, investment-backed expecta-
tions. Kaiser Aetna v United States, 
444 US 164, 175, 62 L Ed 2d 332, 100 
S Ct 383 (1979); Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v New York City, 438 
US 104, 124, 57 L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct 
2646 (1978); see also W. B. Worthen 
Co. v Kavanaugh, 295 US 56, 79 L 
Ed 1298, 55 S Ct 555, 97 ALR 905 
(1935). The Takings Clause, while 
conferring substantial protection on 
property owners, does not eliminate 
the police power of the State to en-
act limitations on the use of their 
property. Mugler v Kansas, 123 US 
623, 669, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 
(1887). The rights conferred by the 
Takings Clause and the police power 
of the State may coexist without 
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conflict. Property is bought and 
sold, investments are made, subject 
to the State's power to regulate. 
Where a taking is alleged from regu 
lations which deprive the property 
of all value, the test must be 
whether the deprivation is contrary 
to reasonable, investment-backed ex-
pectations. 
There is an inherent tendency to-
wards circularity in this synthesis, 
of course: for if the owner's reason-
able expectations are shaped by 
what courts allow as a proper exer-
cise of governmental authority, prop-
erty tends to become what courts 
say it is. Some circularity must be 
tolerated in these matters, however, 
as it is in other spheres. E g , Katz v 
United States, 389 US 347, 19 L Ed 
2d 576, 88 S Ct 507 (1967) (Fourth 
Amendment protections defined by 
reasonable expectations of privacy). 
r he definition moreover, is not cir-
cular in its entirety The expecta-
tions protected by the Constitution 
are based on objective rules and cus-
coms that can be understood as rea-
sonable by all parties involved. 
In my view, reasonable expecta-
tions must be understood in light of 
the whole of our legal tradition The 
common law of nuisance is too nar-
row a confine for the exercise of 
regulatory power in a complex and 
interdependent society Goldblatt v 
Hempstead, 369 US 590. 593, 8 L Ed 
2d 130, 82 S Ct 987 (1962^ The State 
should not be prevented from enact-
ing new regulatory initiatives in re-
sponse to changing conditions, and 
^ourts must consider all reasonable 
-xpeetations whatever their source. 
The Takings Clause does not require 
static body of state property law, it 
protects private expectations to en-
are private investment I agree 
ith the Court that nuisance pre-
vention accords with the most com-
mon expectations of property owners 
who face regulation, but I do not 
believe this can be the soie source of 
btate authority to impose severe re-
strictions. Coastal property may 
present such unique concerns for a 
fragile land system that the Stale 
can go further in regulating its de-
velopment and use than the common 
law of nuisance might otherwise per-
mit. 
The Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina erred, in my view, by reciting 
the general purposes for which the 
state regulations were enacted with-
out a determination that they were 
in accord with the owner's reason-
able expectations and therefore suffi-
cient to support a severe restriction 
on specific parcels of property. See 
304 SC 376, 383, 404 SE2d 895, 899 
11991^ The promotion of tourism, for 
instance, ought not to suffice to de-
prive specific property of all value 
without a corresponding duty to 
compensa te F u r t h e r m o r e , the 
means as well us the ends of regula-
tion must accord with the owner's 
reasonable expectations. Here, the 
State did not act until after the 
property had been zoned for individ-
ual lot development and most other 
parcels had been improved, throwing 
the whole burden of the regulation 
on the remaining lots. This too must 
be measured in the balance. See 
Pennsylvania Ccai Co. v Mahon, 260 
US 393, 416, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 
158(1922). 
With these observations, I concur 
in the judgment of the Couit. 
Justice Blackmun, dissenting 
Today the Court launches a mis-
sile to kill a moube 
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The State of South Carolina pro-
hibited petitioner Lucas from build-
ing a permanent structure on his 
property from 1988 to 1990. Relying 
on an unreviewed (and implausible) 
state trial court finding that this 
restriction left Lucas* property val-
ueless, this Court granted review to 
determine whether compensation 
must be paid in cases where the 
State prohibits all economic use of 
real estate. According to the Court, 
such an occasion never has arisen in 
any of our prior cases, and the Court 
imagines that it will arise "rela-
tively rarely" or only in "extraordi-
nary circumstances.'' Almost cer-
tainly it did not happen in this case. 
Nonetheless, the Court presses on 
to decide the issue, and as it does, it 
ignores its jurisdictional limits, re-
makes its traditional rules of review, 
and creates simultaneously a new 
categorical rule and an exception 
(neither of which is rooted in our 
prior case law, common law, or com-
mon sense). I protest not only the 
Court's decision, but each step taken 
to reach it. More fundamentally, I 
question the Court's wisdom in issu-
ing sweeping new rules to decide 
such a narrow case. Surely, as Jus-
tice Kennedy demonstrates, the 
Court could have reached the result 
it wanted without inflicting this 
damage upon our Taking Clause ju-
risprudence. 
My fear is that the Court's new 
policies will spread beyond the nar-
1. The country has come to recognize that 
uncontrolled beachfront development can 
cause serious damage to life and property. See 
Brief for Sierra Club, et al. as Amici Curiae 2-
5. Hurricane Hugo's September 1989 attack 
upon South Carolina's coastline, for example, 
caused 29 deaths and approximately $6 billion 
n property damage, much of it the result of 
uncontrolled beachfront development. See 
Zalkin, Shifting Sands and Shifting Doctrines: 
row confines of the present case. For 
that reason, I, like the Court, will 
give far greater attention to this 
case than its narrow scope suggests 
—not because I can intercept the 
Court's missile, or save the targeted 
mouse, but because I hope perhaps 
to limit the collateral damage. 
I 
A 
In 1972 Congress passed the 
Coastal Zone Management Act. 16 
USC § 1451 et seq. [16 USCS §§ 1451 
et seq.]. The Act was designed to 
provide States with money and in-
centives to carry out Congress' goal 
of protecting the public from shore-
line erosion and coastal hazards. In 
the 1980 Amendments to the Act, 
Congress directed States to enhance 
their coastal programs by "[prevent-
ing or significantly reducing threats 
to life and the destruction of prop-
erty by eliminating development and 
redevelopment in high-hazard ar-
eas."1 16 USC § 1456b(a)(2) (1988 ed, 
Supp ID [16 USCS § 1456b(aX2)]. 
South Carolina began implement-
ing the congressional directive by 
enacting the South Carolina Coastal 
Zone Management Act of 1977. Un-
der the 1977 Act, any construction 
activity in what was designated the 
"critical area" required a permit 
from the Council, and the construc-
tion of any habitable structure was 
The Supreme Court's Changing Takings Doc-
trine and South Carolina's Coastal Zone Stat-
ute, 79 Cal L Rev 205, 212-213 (1991). The 
beachfront buildings are not only themselves 
destroyed in such a storm, "but they are often 
driven, like battering rams, into adjacent in-
land homes." Ibid. Moreover, the development 
often destroys the natural sand dune barriers 
that provide storm breaks. Ibid. 
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prohibited. The 1977 critical area 
was relatively narrow. 
This effort did not stop the loss of 
shoreline. In October 1986, the 
Council appointed a "Blue Ribbon 
Committee on Beachfront Manage-
ment" to investigate beach erosion 
and propose possible solutions. In 
March 1987, the Committee found 
that South Carolina's beaches were 
"critically eroding," and proposed 
land-use restrictions. Report of the 
South Carolina Blue Ribbon Com-
mittee on Beachfront Management i, 
6-10 (March 1987). In response, 
South Carolina enacted the Beach-
front Management Act on July 1, 
1988. SC Code §48-39-250 et seq. 
(Supp 1990). The 1988 Act did not 
change the uses permitted within 
the designated critical areas. Rather, 
it enlarged those areas to encompass 
the distance from the mean high 
watermark to a setback line estab-
lished on the basis of "the best scien-
tific and historical data" available.2 
SC Code § 48-39-280 (Supp 1991). 
B 
Petitioner Lucas is a contractor, 
manager, and part owner of the 
Wild Dune development on the Isle 
of Palms. He has lived there since 
1978. In December 1986, he pur-
chased two of the last four pieces of 
vacant property in the development.1 
The area is notoriously unstable. In 
roughly half of the last 40 years, all 
or part of petitioners property was 
part of the beach or flooded twice 
2. The setback line was determined by cal-
culating the distance landward from the crest 
of an ideal oceanfront sand dune which is 
forty times the annual erosion rate. SC Code 
§48-39-280 (Supp 1991). 
3. The properties were sold frequently at 
rapidly escalating prices before Lucas pur-
chased them. Lot 22 was first sold in 1979 for 
daily by the ebb and flow of the tide. 
Tr 84. Between 1957 and 1963, peti-
tioner's property was under water. 
Id., at 79, 81-82. Between 1963 and 
1973 the shoreline was 100 to 150 
feet onto petitioner's proper .y. Ibid. 
In 197;j the first line of stable vege-
tation was about halfway through 
the property. Id., at 80. Between 
1981 and 1983, the Isle of Palm's 
issued 12 emergency orders for sand-
bagging to protect property in the 
Wild Dune development. Id., at 99. 
Determining that local habitable 
structures were in imminent danger 
of collapse, the Council issued per-
mits for two rock revetments to pro-
tect condominium deve lopments 
near petitioner's property from ero-
sion; one of the revetments extends 
more than halfway onto one of his 
lots. Id., at 102. 
C 
The South Carolina Supreme 
Court found that the Beach Manage-
ment Act did not take petitioner's 
property without compensation. The 
decision rested on two premises that 
until today were unassailable—that 
the State has the power to prevent 
any use of property it finds to be 
harmful to its citizens, and that a 
state statute is entitled to a pre-
sumption of constitutionality. 
The Beachfront Management Act 
includes a finding by the South Caro-
lina General Assembly that the 
beach/dune system serves the pur-
$96,660. sold in 1984 for $187,500, then in 
1985 for $260,000, and, finally, to Lucas in 
1986 for $475,000. lie estimated i's worth in 
1991 at $650,000. Ix>t 24 had a similar past. 
The record does not indicate who purchased 
the properties prior to Lucas, or why none of 
the purchasers held on to the lots and buiit 
on them. Tr 44-46. 
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pose of "protecting] life and prop-
erty by serving as a storm barrier 
which dissipates wave energy and 
contributes to shoreline stability in 
an economical and effective man-
ner." § 48-39-250(1 )(aj. The General 
Assembly also found that "develop-
ment unwisely has been sited too 
close to the [beach/dune] system. 
This type of development has jeop-
ardized the stability of the beach/ 
dune system, accelerated erosion, 
and endangered adjacent property." 
§ 48-39-250(4); see also § 48-39-250(6) 
(discussing the need to "afford the 
beach/dune system space to accrete 
and erode"). 
If the state legislature is correct 
that the prohibition on building in 
front of the setback line prevents 
serious harm, then, under this 
Court's prior cases, the Act is consti-
tutional. "Long ago it was recog-
nized that all property in this coun-
try is held under the implied obliga-
tion that the owner's use of it shall 
not be injurious to the community, 
and the Takings Clause did not 
transform that principle to one that 
requires compensation whenever the 
State asserts its power to enforce it." 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v 
DeBenedictis, 480 US 470, 491-492, 
94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232 (1987) 
(internal quotations omitted); see 
also id., at 488-489, and n 18, 94 L 
Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232. The Court 
consistently has upheld regulations 
imposed to arrest a significant 
threat to the common welfare, what-
ever their economic effect on the 
owner. See e.g., Goldblatt v Hemp-
stead, 369 US 590, 592-593, 8 L Ed 
2d 130, 82 S Ct 987 (1962); Euclid v 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, 71 L 
Ed 303, 47 S Ct 114, 54 ALR 1016 
(1926); Gorieb v Fox, 274 US 603, 
608, 71 L Ed 1228, 47 S Ct 675, 53 
ALR 1210 (1927); Mugler v Kansas, 
123 US 623, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 
(1887). 
Petitioner never challenged the 
legislature's findings that a building 
ban was necessary to protect prop-
erty and life. Nor did he contend 
that the threatened harm was not 
sufficiently serious to make building 
a house in a particular location a 
"harmful" use, that the legislature 
had not made sufficient findings, or 
that the legislature was motivated 
by anything other than a desire to 
minimize damage to coastal areas. 
Indeed, petitioner objected at trial 
that evidence as to the purposes of 
the setback requirement was irrele-
vant. Tr 68. The South Carolina Su-
preme Court accordingly understood 
petitioner not to contest the State's 
position that "discouraging new con-
struction in close proximity to the 
beach/dune area is necessary to pre-
vent a great public harm," 304 SC 
376, , 404 SE2d 895, 898 (1991), 
and "to prevent serious injury to the 
community." Id., at , 404 SE2d, 
at 901. The court considered itself 
"bound by these uncontested legisla-
tive findings . . . [in the absence of] 
any attack whatsoever on the statu-
tory scheme." Id., at , 404 SE2d, 
at 898. 
Nothing in the record undermines 
the General Assembly's assessment 
that prohibitions on building in 
front of the setback line are neces-
sary to protect people and property 
from storms, high tides, and beach 
erosion. Because that legislative de-
termination cannot be disregarded 
in the absence of such evidence, see, 
e.g., Euclid, 272 US, at 388, 71 L Ed 
303, 47 S Ct 114, 54 ALR 1016; 
O'Gorman & Young v Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co, 282 US 251, 257-258, 75 L 
Ed 324, 51 S Ct 130, 72 ALR 1163 
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(1931) (Brandeis, J.), and because its 
determination of harm to life and 
property from building is sufficient 
to prohibit that use under this 
Court's cases, the South Carolina 
Supreme Court correctly found no 
takmg. 
II 
My disagreement with the Court 
begins with its decision to review 
this case. This Court has held consis-
tently that a land-use challenge is 
not ripe for review until there is a 
final decision about what uses of the 
property will be permitted. The ripe-
ness requirement is not simply a 
gesture of good-will to land-use plan-
ners. In the absence of "a final and 
authoritative determination of the 
type and intensity of development 
legally permitted on the subject 
property," MacDonald, Sommer & 
Frates v Yolo County, 477 US 340, 
348, 91 L Ed 2d 285, 106 S Ct 2561 
•1986), and the utilization of state 
procedures for just compensation, 
there is no final judgment, and in 
the absence of a final judgment 
;here is no jurisdiction. See San Di-
ego Gas & Electric Co. v San Diego, 
450 US 621, 633, 67 L Ed 2d 551, 101 
S Ct 1287 (1981); Agins v Tiburon. 
447 US 255, 260, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 
SCt 2138(1980). 
This rule is "compelled by the 
very nature of the inquiry required 
by the Just Compensation Clause," 
because the factors applied in decid-
ing a takings claim "simply cannot 
oe evaluated until the administra-
•». The Court's reliance, ante, at . 120 L 
Sd 2d, at SI 1. en Esposito v South Carolina 
Coasta* Council. 939 F2d 165, 168 <CA4 1991» 
ceii pending, No 91-941. in support oi its 
decision io consider Lucas temporary taking 
uim ripe is misplaced In Esposito the plam-
iifs brought a facial challenge to the mere 
tive agency has arrived at a final, 
definitive position regarding how it 
will apply the regulations at issue to 
the particular land in question." 
Williamson County Regional Plan-
ning Comm'n v Han ilton Bank of 
Johnson City, 473 US 172, 190, 191, 
87 L Ed 2d 126, 105 S Ct 3108 (1985). 
See also MacDonald, Sommer & 
Frates, 477 US, at 348, 91 L Ed 2d 
285, 106 S Ct 2561 ("A court cannot 
determine whether a regulation has 
gone too far' unless it knows how 
far the regulation goes") (citation 
omitted). 
The Court admits that the 1990 
amendments to the Beachfront Man-
agement Act allowing special per-
mits preclude Lucas from asserting 
that his property has been perma-
nently taken. See ante, at 
,"l20 L Ed 2d, at 810. The Court 
agrees that such a claim would not 
be ripe because there has been no 
final decision by respondent on what 
uses will be permitted. The Court, 
however, will not be denied: it deter-
mines that petitioner's "temporary 
takings" claim for the period from 
July 1, 1988, to June 25, 1990, is 
ripe. But this claim also is not justi-
ciable.4 
From the very beginning of this 
litigation, respondent has argued 
that the courts: 
"lac[kj jurisdiction in this matter 
because the Plaintiff has sought no 
authorization from Council for use 
of his property, has not challenged 
the location of the baseline or set-
enactment of the Act. Hete, of course, Lucas 
has brought an nsapplied challenge See Bnet 
fur Petitioner 16 Facial challenges are ripe 
when the \c t is passed; applied challenges 
require a r.nai decision on the Act's applica-
tion to the property in question 
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back line as alleged in the Com-
plaint and because no final agency 
decision has been rendered con-
cerning use of his property or loca-
tion of said baseline or setback 
line." 
Tr 10 (answer, as amended). Al-
though the Council's plea has been 
ignored by every court, it is undoubt-
edly correct. 
Under the Beachfront Manage-
ment Act, petitioner was entitled to 
challenge the setback line or the 
baseline or erosion rate applied to 
his property in formal administra-
tive, followed by judicial, proceed-
ings. SC Code § 48-39-28CXE) (Supp 
1991). Because Lucas failed to pur-
sue this administrative remedy, the 
Council never finally decided 
whether Lucas' particular piece of 
property was correctly categorized as 
a critical area in which building 
would not be permitted. This is all 
the more crucial because Lucas ar-
gued strenuously in the trial court 
that his land was perfectly safe to 
build on. and that his company had 
studies to prove it. Tr 20, 25, 36. If 
he was correct, the Council's final 
decision would have been to alter 
the setback line, eliminating the 
construction ban on Lucas* property. 
5. Even more baffling, given its decision, 
just a few days ago, in Lujan v Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 US , 119 L Ed 2d 351, 112 S 
Ct 2130 (1992), the Court decides petitioner 
has demonstrated injury in fact. In his com-
plaint, petitioner made no allegations that he 
had any definite plans for using his property. 
App to Pet for Cert 153-156 At trial, Lucas 
testified that he had house plans drawn up, 
but that he was "in no hurry" to build "be-
cause the lot was appreciating in value." Tr 
28-29 The trial court made no findings of fact 
that Lucas had any plans to use the property 
from 1988 to 1990 " '[S]ome day' intentions— 
without any description of concrete plans, or 
That petitioner's property fell 
within the critical area as initially 
interpreted by the Council does not 
excuse petitioner's failure to chal-
lenge the Act's application to his 
property in the administrative pro-
cess. The claim is not ripe until 
petitioner seeks a variance from that 
status. "[W]e have made it quite 
clear that the mere assertion of reg-
ulatory jurisdiction by a governmen-
tal body does not constitute a regula-
tory taking." United States v River-
side Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 US 
121, 126, 88 L Ed 2d 419, 106 S Ct 
455 (1985). See also Williamson 
County, 473 US, at 188, 87 L Ed 2d 
126, 105 S Ct 3108 (claim not ripe 
because respondent did not seek var-
iances that would have allowed it to 
develop the property, notwithstand-
ing the Commission's finding that 
the plan did not comply with the 
zoning ordinance and subdivision 
regulations).5 
Even if I agreed with the Court 
that there were no jurisdictional 
barriers to deciding this case, I still 
would not try to decide it. The Court 
creates its new taking jurisprudence 
based on the trial court's finding 
that the property had lost all eco-
indeed even any specification of when the 
some day will be—do not support a finding of 
the 'actual or imminent* injury that our cases 
require " 504 US, at , , 119 L Ed 2d 351, 
112 S Ct 2130 The Court circumvents Defend-
ers of Wildlife by deciding to resolve this case 
as if it arrived on the pleadings alone. But it 
did not. Lucas had a full trial on his claim for 
"damages for the temporary taking of his 
property from the date of the 1988 Act's 
passage to such time as this matter is finally 
resolved," ante, at , n 3, 120 L Ed 2d, at 
811, quoting the Complaint, and failed to 
demonstrate any immediate concrete olans to 
build or sell 
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nomic value.6 This finding is almost 
certainly erroneous. Petitioner still 
can enjoy other attributes of owner-
ship, such as the right to exclude 
others, "one of the most essential 
sticks in the bundle of rights that 
are commonly characterized as prop-
erty." Kaiser Aetna v United States. 
444 US 164, 176, 62 L Ed 2d 332, 100 
S Ct 383 (1979) Petitioner can pic-
nic, swim, camp in a tent, or live on 
the property in a movable trailer. 
State courts frequently have recog-
nized that land has economic value 
where the only residual economic 
uses are recreation or camping. See, 
e.g.. Turnpike Realty Co. v Dedham, 
362 Mass 221, 284 NE2d 891 (1972); 
Turner v County of Del Norte, 24 
Cal App 3d 311, 101 Cal Rptr 93 
<1972), cert denied, 409 US 1108, 34 
L Ed 2d 689, 93 S Ct 908 (1973); Hail 
v Board of Environmental Protec-
tion, 528 A2d 453 (Me 1987). Peti-
tioner also retains the right to alien-
ate the land, which would have 
value for neighbors and for those 
prepared to enjoy proximity wO the 
ocean without a house. 
Yet the trial court, apparently be-
lieving that "less value" and "value-
less" could be used interchangeably, 
found the property "valueless/' The 
court accepted no evidence from the 
6. Respondent contested the findings of fact 
at the trial court in the South Carolina Su-
preme Court, but that court did not reso1 e 
the issue. This Courts decision to assume ^ r 
its purposes that petitioner had been denied 
all economic use of his land does not, of 
course, dispose of the issue on remand. 
7. The Court overlooks the lack of a ripe 
and justiciable claim apparently oat of con-
cern that in the absence of its intervention 
Lucas will be unable to obtain further adjudi-
ration of his temporary-taking claim. The 
rourt chastises respondent for arguing that 
Lucas's temporary-taking claim is premature 
because it failed "so mucn as [to] commen[tj" 
upon the effect of the South Carolina Su-
State on the property's value with-
out a home, and petitioner's ap-
praiser testified that he never had 
considered what the value would be 
absent a residence. Tr 54-55. The 
appraiser's value was based on the 
fact that the "highest and best use 
of these lots . . . [is] luxury single 
family detached dwellings." Id., at 
48. The trial court appeared to be-
lieve that the property could be con-
sidered "valueless" if it was not 
available for its most profitable use. 
Absent that erroneous assumption, 
see Goldblatt, 369 13S, at 592, 8 L Ed 
2d 130, 82 S Ct 987, I find no evi-
dence in the record supporting the 
trial court's conclusion that the 
damage to the lots by virtue of the 
restrictions was "total." Record 128 
(findings of fact). I agree with the 
Court, ante, at , n 9, 120 L Ed 
2d, at 816, that it has the power to 
decide a case that turns on an erro-
neous finding, but I question the 
wisdom of deciding an issue based on 
a factual premise that does not exist 
in this case, and in the judgment of 
the Court will exist in the future 
only in "extraordinary circum-
stancejs]." Ante, at , 120 L Ed 
2d, at 814. 
Clearly, the Court was eager to 
decide this case.7 But eagerness, in 
preme Court's decision on petitioner's ability 
to obtain relief for the 2-year period, and it 
frets that Lucas would "be unable (absent our 
intervention now) to obtain further state-
court adjudication with respect to the 1988-
1990 period." Ante, at , 120 L Ed 2d. at 
810. Whatever the explanation for the Court's 
intense interest in Lucas' plight when ordi-
narily we are more cautious in granting dis-
cretionary review, the concern would have 
been more prudently expressed bv vacating 
the judgment below and remanding for fur-
ther consideration in iight of the 1990 amend-
ments. At that point, petitioner could have 
brought a temporary-taking claim in the state 
courts 
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the absence A proper jurisdiction, 
must—and in this case should have 
been—met with restraint. 
Ill 
The Court's willingness to dis-
pense with precedent in its haste to 
reach a result is not limited to its 
initial jurisdictional decision. The 
Court also alters the long-settled 
rules of review. 
The South Carolina Supreme 
Court's decision to defer to legisla-
tive judgments in the absence of a 
challenge from petitioner comports 
with one of this Court's oldest max-
ims: "the existence of facts support-
ing the legislative judgment is to be 
presumed.'' United States v Carolene 
Products Co., 304 US 144, 152, 82 L 
Ed 1234, 58 S Ct 778 (1938). Indeed, 
we have said the legislature's judg-
ment is "well-nigh conclusive." Ber-
man v Parker, 348 US 26, 32, 99 L 
Ed 27, 75 S Q 98 (1954). See also 
Sweet v Rechel, 159 US 380, 392, 40 
L Ed 188, 16 S Ct 43 (1895); Euclid, 
272 US, at 388, 71 L Ed 303, 47 S Ct 
114, 54 ALR 1016 ("If the validity of 
the legislative classification for zon-
ing purposes be fairly debatable, the 
legislative judgment must be allowed 
to control"). 
Accordingly, this Court always has 
required plaintiffs challenging the 
constitutionality of an ordinance to 
provide "some factual foundation of 
record" that contravenes the legisla-
tive findings. O'Gorman & Young, 
282 US, at 258, 75 L Ed 324, 51 S Ct 
130, 72 ALR 1163. In the absence of 
such proof, "the presumption of con-
stitutionality must prevail." Id., at 
257, 75 L Ed 324, 51 S Ct 130, 72 
ALR 1163. We only recently have 
reaffirmed that claimants have the 
burden of showing a state law consti-
tutes a taking. See Keystone Bitumi-
nous Coal, 480 US, at 485, 94 L Ed 
2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232. See also 
Goldblatt, 369 US, at 594, 8 L Ed 2d 
130, 82 S Ct 987 (citing "the usual 
presumption of constitutionality" 
that applies to statutes attacked as 
takings). 
Rather than invoking these tradi-
tional rules, the Court decides the 
State has the burden to convince the 
courts that its legislative judgments 
are correct. Despite Lucas' complete 
failure to contest the legislature's 
findings of serious harm to life and 
property if a permanent structure is 
built, the Court decides that the leg-
islative findings are not sufficient to 
justify the use prohibition. Instead, 
the Court "emphasize[sj" the State 
must do more than merely proffer 
its legislative judgments to avoid 
invalidating its law. Ante, at , 
120 L Ed 2d, at 822. In this case, 
apparently, the State now has the 
burden of showing the regulation is 
not a taking. The Court offers no 
justification for its sudden hostility 
toward state legislators, and I doubt 
that it could. 
IV 
The Court does not reject the 
South Carolina Supreme Court's de-
cision simply on the basis of its dis-
belief and distrust of the legisla-
ture's findings. It also takes the op-
portunity to create a new scheme for 
regulations that eliminate all eco-
nomic value. From now on, there is 
a categorical rule finding these regu-
lations to be a taking unless the use 
they prohibit is a background com-
mon-law nuisance or property princi-
ple. See ante, at , 120 L 
Ed 2d, at 821-823. 
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A 
I first question the Court's ratio-
nale in creating a category that obvi-
ates a "case-specific inquiry into the 
public interest advanced/' ante, at 
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 812, if all 
economic value has been lost. If one 
fact about the Court's taking juris-
prudence can be stated without con-
tradiction, it is that "the particular 
circumstances of each case" deter-
mine whether a specific restriction 
will be rendered invalid by the gov-
ernment's failure to pay compensa-
tion. United States v Central Eureka 
Mining Co., 357 US 155, 168, 2 L Ed 
2d 1228, 78 S Ct 1097 (1958). This is 
so because although we have articu-
lated certain factors to be consid-
ered, including the economic impact 
on the property owner, the ultimate 
conclusion "necessarily requires a 
weighing of private and public inter-
ests." Agins, 447 US, at 261, 65 L Ed 
2d 106, 100 S Ct 2138. When the 
government regulation prevents the 
owner from any economically valu-
able use of his property, the private 
interest is unquestionably substan-
tial, but we have never before held 
that no public interest can outweigh 
it. Instead the Court's prior decisions 
"uniformly reject the proposition 
that diminution in property value, 
standing alone, can establish a 
'taking/ " Penn Central Transp. Co. 
v New York City, 438 US 104, 131, 
57 L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct 2646 (1978). 
This Court repeatedly has recog-
nized the ability of government, in 
certain circumstances, to regulate 
property without compensation no 
8. Prior to Mugler. the Court had held that 
owners whose real property is wholly de-
stroyed to prevent the bpread of a fire are not 
entitled to compensation. Bowditch v Boston. 
101 US 16. 18-19, 25 L Ed 980 (1879) And the 
matter how adverse the financial 
effect on the owner may be. More 
than a century ago, the Court explic-
itly upheld the right of States to 
prohibit uses of property injurious to 
public health, safety, or welfare 
without paying compensation. "A 
prohibition simply upon the use of 
property for purposes that are de-
clared, by valid legislation, to be 
injurious to the health, morals, or 
safety of the community, cannot, in 
any just sense, be deemed a taking 
or an appropriation of property" 
Mugler v Kansas, 123 US 623, 668-
669, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 (1887). 
On this basis, the Court upheld an 
ordinance effectively prohibiting op-
eration of a previously lawful brew-
ery, although the ''establishments 
will become of no value as proper-
ty." Id., at 664, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 
273; see also id., at 668, 31 L Ed 205, 
8 S Ct 273. 
Mugler was only the beginning in 
a long line of cases.8 In Powell v 
Pennsylvania, 127 US 678, 32 L Ed 
253, 8 S Ct 992 Q888), the Court 
upheld legislation prohibiting the 
manufacture of oleomargarine, de-
spite the owner's allegation that "if 
prevented from continuing it, the 
value of his property employed 
therein would be entirely lost and he 
be deprived of the means of liveli-
hood." Id., at 682, 32 L Ed 253, 8 S 
Ct 992. In Hadacheck v Sebastian, 
239 US 394, 60 L Ed 348. 36 S Ct 
143 (1915), the Court upheld an ordi-
nance prohibiting a brickyard, al-
though the owner had made excava-
tions on the land that prevented it 
Court recognized in The License Cases. 5 How 
504, 589. 12 L Ed 256 (1847) (opinion of Mc-
Lean. J i. that "jtjhe acknowledged police 
power of a State extends often to the destruc-
tion of property " 
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from being utilized for any purpose 
but a brickyard. Id., at 405, 60 L Ed 
348, 36 S a 143. In Miller v 
Schoene, 276 US 272, 72 L Ed 568, 
48 S Ct 246 (1928), the Court held 
that the Fifth Amendment did not 
require Virginia to pay compensa-
tion to the owner of cedar trees 
ordered destroyed to prevent a dis-
ease from spreading to nearby apple 
orchards. The "preferment of [the 
public interest] over the property 
interest of the individual, to the ex-
tent even of its destruction, is one of 
the distinguishing characteristics of 
every exercise of the police power 
which affects property." Id., at 280, 
72 L Ed 568, 48 S Ct 246. Again, in 
Omnia Commercial Co. v United 
States, 261 US 502, 67 L Ed 773, 43 
S Q 437 (1923), the Court stated 
that "destruction of, or injury to, 
property is frequently accomplished 
without a 'taking1 in the constitu-
tional sense." Id., at 508, 67 L Ed 
773, 43 S Ct 437. 
More recently, in Goldblatt, the 
Court upheld a town regulation that 
barred continued operation of an 
existing sand and gravel operation 
in order to protect public safety. 369 
US, at 596, 8 L Ed 2d 130, 82 S Ct 
987. "Although a comparison of val-
9. That same year, an appeal came to the 
Court asking "[wjhether zoning ordinances 
which altogether destroy the worth of valu-
able land by prohibiting the only economic 
use of which it is capable effect a taking of 
real property without compensation." Juris 
Statement, OT 1962, No. 307, p 5. The Court 
dismissed the appeal for lack of a substantial 
federal question. Consolidated Rock Products 
Co. v Los Angeles, 57 Cal 2d 515, 370 P2d 342, 
appeal dism'd, 371 US 36, 9 L Ed 2d 112, 83 S 
Ct 145 (1962). 
10. On remand, the California court found 
no taking in part because the zoning regula-
tion "involves this highest of public interests 
—the prevention of death and injury." First 
Lutheran Church v Los Angeles, 210 Cal App 
ues before and after is relevant," the 
Court stated, "it is by no means 
conclusive."9 Id., at 594, 8 L Ed 2d 
130, 82 S Ct 987. In 1978, the Court 
declared that ffin instances in which 
a state tribunal reasonably con-
cluded that 'the health, safety, mor-
als, or general welfare' would be 
promoted by prohibiting particular 
contemplated uses of land, this 
Court has upheld land-use regula-
tion that destroyed . . . recognized 
real property interests.,, Penn Cen-
tral Transp. Co., 438 US, at 125, 57 
L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct 2646. In First 
Lutheran Church v Los Angeles 
County, 482 US 304, 96 L Ed 2d 250, 
107 S Ct 2378 (1987), the owner 
alleged that a floodplain ordinance 
had deprived it of "all use" of the 
property. Id., at 312, 96 L Ed 2d 250, 
107 S Ct 2378. The Court remanded 
the case for consideration whether, 
even if the ordinance denied the 
owner all use, it could be justified as 
a safety measure.10 Id., at 313, 96 L 
Ed 2d 250, 107 S Ct 2378. And in 
Keystone Bituminous Coal, the 
Court summarized over 100 years of 
precedent: "the Court has repeatedly 
upheld regulations that destroy or 
adversely affect real property inter-
ests."11 480 US, at 489, n 18, 94 L Ed 
2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232. 
3d 1353. 1370, 258 Cal Rptr 893, (1989), 
cert denied, 493 US 1056, 107 L Ed 2d 950, 
110 S Q 866 (1990). 
11. The Court's suggestion that Agins v 
Tiburon, 447 US 255, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 S 
Ct 2138 (1980), a unanimous opinion, created 
a new per se rule, only now discovered, is 
unpersuasive. In Agins, the Court stated that 
"no precise rule determines when property 
has been taken" but instead that "the ques-
tion necessarily requires a weighing of public 
and private interest." Id., at 260-262, 65 L Ed 
2d 106, 100 S Ct 2138. The other cases cited 
by the Court, ante, at , 120 L Ed 2d, at 
812, repeat the Agins sentence, but in no way 
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The Court recognizes that f<our 
prior opinions have suggested that 
'harmful or noxious uses' of property 
may be proscribed by government 
regulation without the requirement 
of compensation/' ante, at , 120 
L Ed 2d, at 817, but seeks to recon-
cile them with its categorical rule by 
claiming that the Court never has 
upheld a regulation when the owner 
alleged the loss of all economic 
value. Even if the Court's factual 
premise were correct, its under-
standing of the Court's cases is dis-
torted. In none of the cases did the 
Court suggest that the right of a 
State to prohibit certain activities 
suggest that the public interest is irrelevant if 
total value has been taken. The Court has 
indicated that proof that a regulation does 
r.ot deny an owner economic use of his prop-
erty is sufficient to defeat a facial taking 
challenge. See Hodei v Virginia Surface Min-
ing & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 US 264, 
295-297, 69 L Ed 2d 1. 101 S Ct 2352 (1981). 
But the conclusion that a regulation is not on 
its face a taking because it allows the land-
owner some economic use of property is a far 
cry from the proposition that denial of such 
use is sufficient to establish a taking claim 
regardless of any other consideration. The 
Court never has accepted the latter proposi-
tion. 
The Court relies today on dicta in Agins, 
Hodei. Nollan v California Coastal Comm'n, 
483 US 825, 97 L Ed 2d 677, 107 S Ct 3141 
1987), and Keystone Bituminous Coal v De-
Benedictis. 480 US 470. 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S 
Ct 1232 11987), for its new categorical rule. 
Ante, at , 120 L Ed 2d. at 813. I prefer to 
rely on the directly contrary holdings in cases 
such as Mugler and Hadacheck. not to men-
tion contrary statements in the very cases on 
which the Court relies. See Agins. 447 US, at 
260-262, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 S Ct 2138; 
Keystone Bituminous Coal, 480 US, at 489 n 
18, 491-492, 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232. 
12. Miller v Schoene. 276 US 272, 72 L Ed 
568, 48 S Ct 246 tl923>, is an example. In the 
course of demonstrating that apple trees are 
more valuable than red cedar trees, the Court 
noted that red cedar has "occasional use and 
value as lumber." Id., at 279, 72 L Ed 568. 48 
S Ct 246 But the Court did not discuss 
without paying compensation turned 
on the availability of some residual 
valuable use.12 Instead, the cases de-
pended on whether the government 
interest was sufficient to prohibit the 
activity, given the significant private 
cost.13 
These cases rest on the principle 
that the State has full power to 
prohibit an owner's use of property 
if it is harmful to the public. "[Sjince 
no individual has a right to use his 
property so as to create a nuisance 
or otherwise harm others, the State 
has not 'taken' anything when it 
asserts its power to enjoin the nui-
vvhether the timber owned by the petitioner 
in that case was commercially saleable, and 
nothing in the opinion suggests that the 
State's right to require uncompensated felling 
of the trees depended on any such salvage 
value. To the contrary, it is clear from its 
unanimous opinion that the Schoene Court 
would have sustained a law requiring the 
burning of cedar trees if that had been neces-
sary to protect apple trees in which there was 
a public interest: the Court spoke of prefer-
ment of the public interest over the property 
interest of the individual, "to the extent even 
of its destruction." Id., at 280, 72 L Ed 568, 48 
S Ct 246. 
13. The Court seeks to disavow the holdings 
and reasoning of Mugler and subsequent 
cases by explaining that they were the 
Court's early efforts to define the scope of the 
police power. There is language in the earliest 
taking cases suggesting that the police power 
was considered to be the power simply to 
prevent harms. Subsequently, the Court ex 
panded its understanding of what were gov-
ernment's legitimate interests. But it does not 
follow that the holding of those early cases— 
that harmful and noxious uses of property 
can be forbidden whatever the harm to the 
property owner and without the payment of 
compensation—was repudiated. To the con-
trary, as the Court consciously expanded the 
scope of the police power beyond preventing 
harm, it clarified that there was a core of 
public interests that overrode any private 
interest. See Kevstone Bituminous Coal, 480 
US, at 491, n 20, 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 
1232. 
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sance-like activity." Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal, 480 US, at 491, n 20, 
94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232. It 
would make no sense under this 
theory to suggest that an owner has 
a constitutionally protected right to 
harm others, if only he makes the 
proper showing of economic loss.14 
See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon, 
260 US 393, 418, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S 
Ct 158, 28 ALR 1321 (1922) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting) ("Restriction 
upon [harmful] use does not become 
inappropriate as a means, merely 
because it deprives the owner of the 
only use to which the property can 
then be profitably put"). 
B 
Ultimately even the Court cannot 
embrace the full implications of its 
per se rule: it eventually agrees that 
there cannot be a categorical rule 
for a taking based on economic value 
that wholly disregards the public 
need asserted. Instead, the Court 
decides that it will permit a State to 
regulate all economic value only if 
the State prohibits uses that would 
not be permitted under ''background 
principles of nuisance and property 
law."15 Ante, at , 120 L Ed 2d, at 
823. 
Until today, the Court explicitly 
had rejected the contention that the 
government's power to act without 
paying compensation turns on 
whether the prohibited activity is a 
common-law nuisance.18 The brewery 
closed in Mugler itself was not a 
common-law nuisance, and the Court 
specifically stated that it was the 
role of the legislature to determine 
what measures would be appropriate 
for the protection of public health 
and safety. See 123 US, at 661, 31 L 
Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273. In upholding the 
state action in Miller, the Court 
found it unnecessary to "weigh with 
nicety the question whether the in-
fected cedars constitute a nuisance 
according to common law; or 
whether they may be so declared by 
statute." 276 US, at 280, 72 L Ed 
568, 48 S Ct 246. See also Goldblatt, 
14. "Indeed, it would be extraordinary to 
construe the Constitution to require a govern-
ment to compensate private landowners be-
cause it denied them 'the right' to use prop-
erty which cannot be used without risking 
injury and death." First Lutheran Church, 
210 Cal App 3d. at 1366, 258 Cal Rptr, at 
15. Although it refers to state nuisance and 
property law, the Court apparently does not 
mean just any state nuisance and property 
law. Public nuisance was first a common-law 
creation, see Newark. The Boundaries of Nui-
sance, 65 LQ Rev 480, 482 (1949) (attributing 
development of nuisance to 1535), but by the 
1800s in both the United States and England, 
legislatures had the power to define what is a 
public nuisance, and particular uses often 
have been selectively targeted. See Prosser, 
Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 Va L 
Rev 997, 999-1000 .1966); J.F. Stephen, A 
General View of the Criminal Law of England 
105-107 »2d ed 1890). The Court's references 
to "common-law" background principles, how-
ever, indicate that legislative determinations 
do not constitute "state nuisance and prop-
erty law" for the Court. 
16. Also, until today the fact that the regu-
lation prohibited uses that were lawful at the 
time the owner purchased did not determine 
the constitutional question. The brewery, the 
brickyard, the cedar trees, and the gravel pit 
were all perfectly legitimate uses prior to the 
passage of the regulation. See Mugler v Kan-
sas. 123 US 623, 654, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 
(1887); Hadacheck v Sebastian, 239 US 394, 
60 L Ed 348, 36 S Ct 143 (1915); Miller. 276 
US, at 272, 72 L Ed 568, 48 S Ct 246; Gold-
blatt v Hempstead, 369 US 590, 8 L Ed 2d 
130, 82 S Ct 987 (1962). This Court explicitly 
acknowledged in Hadacheck that "[a] vested 
interest cannot be asserted against [the police 
power] because of conditions once obtaining. 
To so. hold would preclude development and 
fix a city forever in its primitive conditions." 
239 US, at 410, 60 L Ed 348, 36 S Ct 143 
(citation omitted). 
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369 US, at 593, 8 L Ed 2d 130, 82 S 
Ct 987; Hadacheck, 239 US, at 411, 
60 L Ed 348, 36 S Ct 143. Instead 
the Court has relied in the past, as 
the South Carolina Court has done 
here, on legislative judgments of 
what constitutes a harm.17 
The Court rejects the notion that 
the State always can prohibit uses it 
deems a harm to the public without 
granting compensation because "the 
distinction between 'harm-prevent-
ing' and 'benefit-conferring' regula-
tion is often in the eye of the be-
holder." Ante, at , 120 L Ed 2d, 
at 818. Since the characterization 
will depend "primarily upon one's 
evaluation of the worth of competing 
uses of real estate," ante, at , 
120 L Ed 2d, at 819, the Court de-
cides a legislative judgment of this 
kind no longer can provide the de-
sired "objective, value-free basis" for 
upholding a regulation. Ante, at 
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 819. The Court, 
however, fails to explain how its 
proposed common law alternative 
escapes the same trap. 
The threshold inquiry for imposi-
tion of the Court's new rule, "depri-
vation of all economically valuable 
use," itself cannot be determined 
objectively. As the Court admits, 
whether the owner has been de-
17. The Court argues that finding no taking 
when the legislature prohibits a harmful use, 
such as the Court did in Mugler and the 
South Carolina Supreme Court did in the 
instant case, would nullify Pennsylvania Coal. 
See ante, at , 120 L Ed 2d, at 817. Justice 
Holmes, the author of Pennsylvania Coal, 
joined Miller v Schoene, 276 US 272. 72 L Ed 
568, 48 S Ct 246 1928), six years later. In 
Miller, the Court adopted the exact approach 
of the South Carolina Court: It found the 
tedar trees harmful, and their destruction not 
a taking, whether or not they were a nui-
sance. Justice Ho:mes apparently believed 
that such an approach did not repudiate his 
earlier opinion. Moreover, this Court already 
prived of all economic value ot his 
property will depend on how "prop-
erty" is defined. The 'composition of 
the denominator in our 'deprivation' 
fraction,*' ante, at , n 7, 120 L 
Ed 2d, at 813, is the dispositive in-
quiry. Yet there is no "objective'* 
way to define what that denominator-
should be. "We have long understood 
that any land-use regulation can be 
characterized as the 'total' depriva-
tion of an aptly defined 
entitlement. . . . Alternatively, the 
same regulation can always be char-
acterized as a mere 'partial' with-
drawal from full, unencumbered 
ownership of the landholding af-
fected by the regulation. . . /',fl Mi-
chelman, Takings, 1987, 88 Colum L 
Rev 1600, 1614 (1988). 
The Court's decision in Keystone 
Bituminous Coal illustrates this 
principle perfectly. In Keystone, the 
Court determined that the "support 
estate" was "merely a part of the 
entire bundle of rights possessed by 
the owner." 480 US, at 501, 94 L Ed 
2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232. Thus, the 
Court concluded that the support 
estate's destruction merely elimi-
nated one segment of the total prop-
erty. Ibid. The dissent, however, 
characterized the support estate as a 
distinct property interest that was 
has been over this ground live years ago, and 
at that point rejected the assertion that Penn-
sylvania Coal was inconsistent with Mugler, 
Hadacheck. Miller, or the others in the string 
of "noxious use ' cases, recognizing instead 
that the nature of the State's action is critical 
in takings analysis. Keystone Bituminous 
Coal. 480 US, at 490, 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 
1232. 
18. See also Michelman. Property, Utility, 
and Fairness, Comments on the Ethical Foun-
dations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv 
L Rev 1165, 1192-1193 U967i; Sax, Takings 
and the Police Power, 74 Yale LJ 36, 60 
(1964). 
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wholly destroyed. Id., at 519, 94 L 
Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232. The Court 
could agree on no "value-free basis" 
to resolve this dispute. 
Even more perplexing, however, is 
the Court's reliance on common-law 
principles of nuisance in its quest for 
a value-free taking jurisprudence. In 
determining what is a nuisance at 
common law, state courts make ex-
actly the decision that the Court 
finds so troubling when made by the 
South Carolina General Assembly 
today: they determine whether the 
use is harmful. Common-law public 
and private nuisance law is simply a 
determination whether a particular 
use causes harm. See Prosser, Pri-
vate Action for Public Nuisance, 52 
Va L Rev 997, 997 (1966) ("Nuisance 
is a French word which means noth-
ing more than harm"). There is 
nothing magical in the reasoning of 
judges long dead. They determined a 
harm in the same way as state 
judges and legislatures do today. If 
judges in the 18th and 19th centu-
ries can distinguish a harm from a 
benefit, why not judges in the 20th 
century, and if judges can, why not 
legislators? There simply is no rea-
son to believe that new interpreta-
tions of the hoary common law nui-
sance doctrine will be particularly 
"objective" or "value-free."19 Once 
one abandons the level of generality 
of sic utere tuo ut alienum non lae-
das, ante, at , 120 L Ed 2d, at 
823, one searches in vain, I think, 
for anything resembling a principle 
in the common law of nuisance. 
19. "There is perhaps no more impenetrable 
jangle in the entire law than that which 
surrounds the word 'nuisance.' It has meant 
ail things to all people, and has been applied 
indiscriminately to everything from an alarm-
ing advertisement to a cockroach baked in a 
pie." W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, D. 
Owen, Prosser and Keeton on The Law of 
Torts 616 i5th ed 1984) (footnotes omitted). It 
c 
Finally, the Court justifies its new 
rule that the legislature may not 
deprive a property owner of the only 
economically valuable use of his 
land, even if the legislature finds it 
to be a harmful use, because such 
action is not part of the "long 
recognized" "understandings of our 
citizens." Ante, at , 120 L Ed 2d, 
at 820. These "understandings" per-
mit such regulation only if the use is 
a nuisance under the common law. 
Any other course is "inconsistent 
with the historical compact recorded 
in the Takings Clause." Ante, at 
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 820. It is not 
clear from the Court's opinion where 
our "historical compact" or "citizens' 
understanding" comes from, but it 
does not appear to be history. 
The principle that the State 
should compensate individuals for 
property taken for public use was 
not widely established in America at 
the time of the Revolution. 
"The colonists . . . inherited . . . a 
concept of property which permit-
ted extensive regulation of the use 
of that property for the public 
benefit—regulation that could 
even go so far as to deny all pro-
ductive use of the property to the 
owner if, as Coke himself stated, 
the regulation 'extends to the pub-
lic benefit . . . for this is for the 
is an area of law that "straddles the legal 
universe, virtually defies synthesis, and gener-
ates case iaw to suit every taste." W Rodgers, 
Environmental Law §2.4, at 48 (1986) (foot-
notes omitted). The Court itself has noted that 
"nuisance concepts" are "often vague and 
indeterminate." Milwaukee v Illinois, 451 US 
304. 317, 68 L Ed 2d 114, 101 S Ct 1734 
(1981). 
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public, and every one hath benefit 
by it.' " 
F. Bosselman, D. Callies & J. Banta, 
The Taking Issue 80-81 (1973), quot-
ing The Case of the King's Preroga-
tive in Saltpetre, 12 Co Rep 12-13 
tl606) (hereinafter Bosselman). See 
also Treanor, The Origins and Origi-
nal Significance of the Just Compen-
sation Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, 94 Yale LJ 694, 697, n 9 
U985).20 
Even into the 19th century, state 
governments often felt free to take 
property for roads and other public 
projects without paying compensa-
tion to the owners.21 See M. Horwitz, 
The Transformation of American 
Law, 1780-1860, pp 63-64 (1977) 
(hereinafter Horwitz); Treanor, 94 
Yale LJ, at 695. As one court de-
clared in 1802, citizens "were bound 
to contribute as much of [land], as 
by the laws of the country, were 
deemed necessary for the public con-
venience." M'Clenachan v Curwin, 3 
20. See generally Sax. 74 Yale LJ, at 56-59 
"The evidence certainly seems to indicate 
that the mere fact that government activity 
destroyed existing economic advantages and 
power did not disturb [the English theorists 
who formulated the compensation notion) at 
all." Id., at 56 Professor Sax contends that 
even Blackstone, 'remembered champion of 
the language ot private property," did not 
believe that the compensation clause was 
meant to preserve economic value. Id., at 58-
59 
21. In 1796, the Attorney General of South 
Carolina responded to property holders' de-
mand for compensation when the State took 
their land to build a load by arguing that 
"there is not one instance on record, and 
certainly none within the memory of the 
oldest man now living, o( any demand being 
made for compensation tor the soil or freehold 
of the lands " Lindsav v Commissioners, 2 SC 
L38. 49(1796) 
22. Only the constitutions •>! Vermont and 
Massachusetts required that compensation be 
paid ,vhen private property was taken for 
Yeates 362, 373 (Pa 1802). There was 
an obvious movement toward estab-
lishing the just compensation princi-
ple during the 19th century, but 
"there continued to be a strong cur-
rent in American legal thought that 
regarded compensation simply as a 
'bounty given . . . by the State' out 
of 'kindness' and not out of justice." 
Horwitz 65 (quoting Commonwealth 
v Fisher, 1 Pen & W 462, 465 (Pa 
1830)). See also State v Dawson, 3 
Hill 100, 103 (SC 1836)).22 
Although, prior to the adoption of 
the Bill of Rights, America was re-
plete with land use regulations de-
scribing which activities were con-
sidered noxious and forbidden, see 
Bender, The Takings Clause: Princi-
ples or Politics?, 34 Buffalo L Rev 
735, 751 (1985); L. Friedman, A His-
tory of American Law 66-68 (1973), 
the Fifth Amendment's Taking 
Clause originally did not extend to 
regulations of property, whatever 
the effect.23 See ante, at , 120 L 
Ed 2d, at 812. Most state courts 
public use: and although eminent domain was 
mentioned in the Pennsylvania constitution, 
its sole requirement was that property not be 
taken without the consent of the legislature 
See Grant. The "Higher Law" Background of 
the Law ot Eminent Domain, in 2 Selected 
Essays on Constitutional Law 912, 915-916 
(1938) By 1868, live of the original States still 
had no just compensation clauses in their 
constitutions Ibid. 
23. James Madison, author of the Taking 
Clause, apparently intended it to apply only 
to direct, physical takings ot property by the 
Federal Government. See Treanor. The Ori-
gins and Original Significance of the Just 
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, 94 Yale LJ, 694, 711 (1985) Professor 
Sax argues that although "contemporaneous 
commentary upon the meaning ot the com-
pensation clause is in very short supply," 74 
Yale LJ at 58, the "few authorities that are 
available ' indicate that the clause was "de-
signed to prevent arbitrary government ac-
tion." not to protect economic value Id , at 
58-60 
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agreed with this narrow interpreta-
tion of a taking. "Until the end of 
the nineteenth century . . . jurists 
held that the constitution protected 
possession only, and not value." Sie-
gel, Understanding the Nineteenth 
Century Contract Clause: The Role 
of the Property-Privilege Distinction 
and "Takings" Clause Jurispru-
dence, 60 S Cal L Rev 1, 76 (1986); 
Bosselman 106. Even indirect and 
consequential injuries to property 
resulting from regulations were ex-
cluded from the definition of a tak-
ing. See Bosselman 106; Callender v 
Marsh, 1 Pick 418, 430 (Mass 1823). 
Even when courts began to con-
sider that regulation in some situa-
tions could constitute a taking, they 
continued to uphold bans on particu-
lar uses without paying compensa-
tion, notwithstanding the economic 
impact, under the rationale that no 
one can obtain a vested right to 
injure or endanger the public.24 In 
the Coates cases, for example, the 
Supreme Court of New York found 
no taking in New York's ban on the 
interment of the dead within the 
city, although "no other use can be 
made of these lands." Coates v City 
of New York, 7 Cow 585, 592 (NY 
1827). See also Brick Presbyterian 
Church v City of New York, 5 Cow 
538 (NY 1826); Commonwealth v Al-
ger, 7 Cush 53, 59, 104 (Mass 1851); 
St. Louis Gunning Advertisement 
Co. v St. Louis, 235 Mo 99, , 137 
SW 929, 942 (1911), appeal dism'd, 
24. For this reason, the retroactive applica-
tion of the regulation to formerly lawful uses 
was not a controlling distinction in the past. 
"Nor can it make any difference that the 
right is purchased previous to the passage of 
the by-law," for "[ejvery right, from an abso-
lute ownership in property, down to a mere 
easement, is purchased and holden subject to 
the restriction, that it shall be so exercised as 
231 US 761, 58 L Ed 470, 34 S Ct 
325 (1913). More recent cases reach 
the same result. See Consolidated 
Rock Products Co. v Los Angeles, 57 
Cal 2d 515, 370 P2d 342, appeal 
dismU 371 US 36, 9 L Ed 2d 112, 83 
S Ct 145 (1962); Nassr v Common-
wealth, 394 Mass 767, 477 NE2d 987 
(1985); Eno v Burlington, 125 Vt 8, 
209 A2d 499 (1965); Turner v County 
of Del Norte, 24 Cal App 3d 311, 101 
Cal Rptr 93 (1972). 
In addition, state courts histori-
cally have been less likely to find 
that a government action constitutes 
a taking when the affected land is 
undeveloped. According to the South 
Carolina court, the power of the leg-
islature to take unimproved land 
without providing compensation was 
sanctioned by "ancient rights and 
principles." Lindsay v Commission-
ers, 2 SC L 38, 57 (1796). "Except for 
Massachusetts, no colony appears to 
have paid compensation when it 
built a stateowned road across unim-
proved land. Legislatures provided 
compensation only for enclosed or 
improved land." Treanor, 94 Yale 
LJ, at 695 (footnotes omitted). This 
rule was followed by some States 
into the 1800s. See Horwitz 63-65. 
With similar result, the common 
agrarian conception of property lim-
ited owners to "natural" uses of 
their land prior to and during much 
of the 18th century. See id., at 32. 
Thus, for example, the owner could 
not to injure others. Though, at the time, it 
be remote and inoffensive, the purchaser is 
bound to know, at his peril, that it may 
become otherwise." Coates v City of New 
York, 7 Cow 585, 605 (NY 1827). See also 
Brick Presbyterian Church v City of New 
York, 5 Cow 538, 542 (NY 1826); Common-
wealth v Tewksbury, 11 Mete 55 (Mass 1846); 
State v Paui, 5 RI 185 (1858). 
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build nothing on his land that would 
alter the natural flow of water. See 
id., at 44; see also, e.g., Merritt v 
Parker, 1 Coxe 460. 463 (NJ 1795). 
Some more recent state courts still 
follow this reasoning. See, e.g., Just 
v Marinette Countv. 56 Wis 2d 7, 
201 NW2d761, 768'1972). 
Nor does history indicate any com-
mon-law limit on the State's power 
to regulate harmful uses even to the 
point of destroying all economic 
value. Nothing in the discussions in 
Congress concerning the Taking-
Clause indicates that the Clause was 
limited by the common-law nuisance 
doctrine. Common law courts them-
selves rejected such an understand-
ing. They regularly recognized that 
it is "for the legislature to interpose, 
and by positive enactment to pro-
hibit a use of property which would 
be injurious to the public." Tewks-
bury, 11 Mete, at S7.25 Chief Justice 
Shaw explained in upholding a regu-
lation prohibiting construction of 
wharves, the existence of a taking 
did not depend on "whether a cer-
tain erection in tide water is a nui-
sance at common law or not." Alger, 
7 Cush, at 104; see also State v Paul, 
5 RI 185, 193 (1858); Commonwealth 
v Parks, 155 Mass 531, 532, 30 NE 
174 '1892) (Holmes, J.i i"[T]he legis-
lature may change the common law 
as to nuisances, and may move the 
iine either way, so as to make things 
nuisances which were not so, or to 
make things lawful which were nui-
sances"). 
25. Mure recent state court decisions agree. 
See e g . L^ne v Mr Vernon. 38 NY2d 344, 
342 NEid 571, 573 <1976>: Commonwealth v 
Baker 160 Pa Super 640. 53 A2d 829. 830 
1947) 
26. The Court asserts that ail early Ameri-
can experience, prior to and after passage of 
:ne Bill of Rights, and any case law prior to 
1897 are "entirely irrelevant" in determining 
vnat is ' the historical compact recorded in 
"ie Takings Clause " Ante, at . n 15. 120 
In short, I find no clear and ac-
cepted "historical compact" or "un-
derstanding of our citizens'* justify 
ing the Court's new taking doctrine. 
Instead, the Court seems to treat 
history as a grab-bag of principles, to 
be adopted where they support the 
Court's theory, and ignored where 
they do not. If the Court decided 
that the early common law provides 
the background principles tor inter-
preting the Taking Clause, then reg-
ulation, as opposed to physical con-
fiscation, would not be compensable. 
If the Court decided that the law of 
a later period provides the back-
ground principles, then regulation 
might be compensable, but the Court 
would have to confront the fact that 
legislatures regularly determined 
which uses were prohibited, indepen-
dent of the common law, and inde-
pendent of whether the uses were 
lawful when the owner purchased. 
What makes the Court's analysis 
unworkable is its attempt to package 
the law of two incompatible eras and 
peddle it as historical fact.26 
V 
The Court makes sweeping and, in 
my view, misguided and unsup-
ported changes in our taking doc-
trine. While it limits these changes 
to the most narrow subset of govern-
L Ed 2d, at 820 Nor apparently are we to find 
this compact in the early federal taking cases, 
which clearly permitted prohibition of harm-
ful uses despite the alleged loss of all value, 
whether or not the prohibition was a com-
mon-law nuisance, and whether or not the 
prohibition occurred subsequent to the pur-
chase. See supra, at , , 
120 L Ed 2d, at 833-834, 836-837, and n 16. I 
cannot imagine where the Court finds its 
"historical compact." \f not in history 
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ment regulation—those that elimi-
nate all economic value from land— 
these changes go far beyond what is 
necessary to secure petitioner Lucas' 
private benefit. One hopes they do 
not go beyond the narrow confines 
the Court assigns them to today. 
I dissent. 
Justice Stevens, dissenting. 
Today the Court restricts one 
judge-made rule and expands an-
other. In my opinion it errs on both 
counts. Proper application of the 
doctrine of judicial restraint would 
avoid the premature adjudication of 
an important constitutional ques-
tion. Proper respect for our prece-
dents would avoid an illogical expan-
sion of the concept of "regulatory 
takings/' 
I 
As the Court notes, ante, at , 
120 L Ed 2d, at 809, South Caroli-
na's Beachfront Management Act 
has been amended to permit some 
construction of residences seaward 
of the line that frustrated petition-
er's proposed use of his property. 
Until he exhausts his right to apply 
for a special permit under that 
amendment, petitioner is not enti-
tled to an adjudication by this Court 
of the merits of his permanent tak-
ings claim. MacDonald, Sommer & 
Frates v County of Yolo, 477 US 340, 
351, 91 L Ed 2d 285, 106 S Ct 2561 
(1986). 
It is also not clear that he has a 
viable "temporary takings" claim. If 
1. In this regard, it is noteworthy that 
petitioner acquired the lot about 18 months 
before the statute was passed; there is no 
we assume that petitioner is now 
able to build on the lot, the only 
injury that he may have suffered is 
the delay caused by the temporary 
existence of the absolute statutory 
ban on construction. We cannot be 
sure, however, that that delay 
caused petitioner any harm because 
the record does not tell us whether 
his building plans were even tempo-
rarily frustrated by the enactment 
of the statute.1 Thus, on the present 
record it is entirely possible that 
petitioner has suffered no injury-in-
fact even if the state statute was 
unconstitutional when he filed this 
lawsuit. 
It is true, as the Court notes, that 
the argument against deciding the 
constitutional issue in this case rests 
on prudential considerations rather 
than a want of jurisdiction. I think 
it equally clear, however, that a 
Court less eager to decide the merits 
would follow the wise counsel of 
Justice Brandeis in his deservedly 
famous concurring opinion in Ash-
wander v Tennessee Valley Author-
ity, 297 US 288, 341, 80 L Ed 688, 56 
S Ct 466 (1936). As he explained, the 
Court has developed "for its own 
governance in the cases confessedly 
within its jurisdiction, a series of 
rules under which it has avoided 
passing upon a large part of all the 
constitutional questions pressed 
upon it for decision." Id. at 346, 80 L 
Ed 688, 56 S Ct 466. The second of 
those rules applies directly to this 
case. 
"2. The Court will not 'anticipate 
a question of constitutional law in 
advance of the necessity of decid-
ing it/ Liverpool, N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. 
v Emigration Commissioners, 113 
evidence that he ever sought a building per-
mit from the local authorities. 
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US 33, 39 '28 L Ed 899, 5 S Ct 
352]; [citing rive additional cases]. 
It is not the habit of the Court to 
decide questions of a constitu-
tional nature unless absolutely 
necessary to a decision of the 
case.' Burton v United States 196 
US 283, 295 149 L Ed 482, 25 S Ct 
243]." Id., at 346-347, 91 L Ed 2d 
285, 106 S Ct 2561. 
Cavalierly dismissing the doctrine 
of judicial restraint, the Court today 
tersely announces that "we do not 
think it prudent to apply that pru-
dential requirement here." Ante, at 
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 811. I respect-
fully disagree and would save consid-
eration of the merits for another 
day. Since, however, the Court has 
reached the merits, I shall do so as 
well. 
II 
In its analysis of the merits, the 
Court starts from the premise that 
this Court has adopted a "categori-
cal rule that total regulatory takings 
must be compensated," ante, at , 
120 L Ed 2d, at 819, and then sets 
itself to the task of identifying the 
exceptional cases in which a State 
may be relieved of this categorical 
obligation. Ante, at , 120 
L Ed 2d, at 820. The test the Court 
announces is that the regulation 
must do no more than duplicate the 
result that could have been achieved 
under a State's nuisance law. Ante, 
at , 120 L Ed 2d, at 821. Under 
this test the categorical rule will 
apply unless the regulation merely 
makes explicit what was otherwise 
an implicit limitation on the owner's 
property rights. 
In my opinion, the Court is doubly 
in error. The categorical rule the 
Court establishes is an unsound and 
unwise addition to the law and the 
Court's formulation of the exception 
to that rule is too rigid and too 
narrow. 
The Categorical Rule 
As the Court recognizes, ante, at 
, 120 L Ed 2d, at 812, Pennsylva-
nia Coal Co. v Mahon, 260 US 393, 
67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158, 28 ALR 
1321 (1922), provides no support for 
i ts—or, indeed, any—categor ica l 
rule. To the contrary. Justice 
Holmes recognized that such abso-
lute rules ill tit the inquiry into 
"regulatory takings." Thus, in the 
paragraph that contains his famous 
observation that a regulation may go 
"too far" and thereby constitute a 
taking, the Justice wrote: "As we 
already have said, this is a question 
of degree—and therefore cannot be 
disposed of by general propositions." 
Id. at 416, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158, 
28 ALR 1321. What he had 
"already. . .said" made perfectly 
clear that Justice Holmes regarded 
economic injury to be merely one 
factor to be weighed: "One fact for 
consideration in determining such 
limits is the extent of the diminu-
tion [of value.] So the question de-
pends upon the particular facts/' Id. 
at 413, 67 L Ed 322, 43 S Ct 158. 28 
ALR 1321. 
Nor does the Court's new categori-
cal rule find support in decisions 
following Mahon. Although in dicta 
we have sometimes recited that a 
law "effects a taking if [it] . . . de-
nies an owner economically viable 
use of his land," Agins v Tiburon, 
447 US 255, 260, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 
S Ct 2138 «1980), our rulings have 
rejected such an absolute position. 
We have frequently—and recently— 
held that, in some circumstances, a 
law that renders property valueless 
may nonetheless not constitute a 
taking. See, e.g., First English Evan-
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gelicai Lutheran Church of Glendale 
v County of Los Angeles, 482 US 
304, 313, 96 L Ed 2d 250, 107 S Ct 
2378 (1987); Goldblatt v Hempstead, 
369 US 590, 596, 8 L Ed 2d 130, 82 S 
a 987 '1962j; United States v Cal-
tex, 344 US 149. 155, 97 L Ed 157, 
73 S Ct 200 (1952); Miller v Schoene, 
276 US 272, 72 L Ed 568, 48 S Ct 
246 U928); Hadachek v Sebastian, 
239 US 394, 405, 60 L Ed 348, 36 S 
Ct 143 (1915); Mugier v Kansas, 123 
US 623, 657, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 
(1887); cf. Ruckelshaus v Monsanto 
Co., 467 US 986, 1011, 81 L Ed 2d 
815, 104 S Ct 2862 (1984); Connolly v 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora-
tion, 475 US 211, 225, 89 L Ed 2d 
166, 106 S Ct 1018 (1986). In short, 
as we stated in Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Assn. v DeBenedictis, 480 US 
470, 490, 94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 
1232 (1987), " f Although a compari-
son of values before and after' a 
regulatory action 'is relevant, . . . it 
is by no means conclusive/ " 
In addition to lacking support in 
past decisions, the Court's new rule 
is wholly arbitrary. A landowner 
whose property is diminished in 
value 95% recovers nothing, while 
an owner whose property is dimin-
ished 100% recovers the land's full 
value. The case at hand illustrates 
this arbitrariness well. The Beach-
front Management Act not only pro-
hibited the building of new dwellings 
in certain areas, it also prohibited 
2. This aspect of the Act was amended in 
1990. See SC Code § 4S-39-290(B) (Supp 1990). 
3. Of course, the same could easily be said 
in this case: Lucas may put his land to "other 
uses"—fishing or camping, for example—or 
may sell his land to his neighbors as a buffer. 
In either event, his land is far from "value-
less." 
This highlights a fundamental weakness in 
the Court's analysis: its failure to explain why 
only the impairment of "economically benefi-
the rebuilding of houses that were 
"destroyed beyond repair by natural 
causes or by fire." 1988 SC Acts 634, 
§ 3; see also Esposito v South Caro-
lina Coastal Council, 939 F2d 165, 
167 (CA4 1991 ).2 Thus, if the homes 
adjacent to Lucas' lot were destroyed 
by a hurricane one day after the Act 
took effect, the owners would not be 
able to rebuild, nor would they be 
assured recovery. Under the Court's 
categorical approach, Lucas (who 
has lost the opportunity to build) 
recovers, while his neighbors (who 
have lost both the opportunity to 
build and their homes) do not re-
cover. The arbitrariness of such a 
rule is palpable. 
Moreover, because of the elastic 
nature of property rights, the 
Court's new rule will also prove un-
sound in practice. In response to the 
rule, courts may define "property" 
broadly and only rarely find regula-
tions to effect total takings. This is 
the approach the Court itself adopts 
in its revisionist reading of venera-
ble precedents. We are told that— 
notwithstanding the Court's findings 
to the contrary in each case—the 
brewery in Mugler, the brickyard in 
Hadacheck, and the gravel pit in 
Goldblatt all could be put to "other 
uses" and that, therefore, those 
cases did not involve total regulatory 
takings.3 Ante, at , n 13, 120 L 
Ed 2d, at 819-820. 
cial or productive use,'' ante, at , 120 L 
Ed 2d, at 813 (emphasis added), of property is 
relevant in takings analysis. I should think 
that a regulation arbitrarily prohibiting an 
owner from continuing to use her property for 
bird-watching or sunbathing might constitute 
a taking under some circumstances; and, con-
versely, that such uses are of value to the 
owner. Yet the Court offers no basis for its 
assumption that the only uses of property 
cognizable under the Constitution are devel-
opmental uses. 
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On the other hand, developers and 
investors may market specialized es-
tates to take advantage of the 
Court's new rule. The smaller the 
estate, the more likely that a regula-
tory change will effect a total taking. 
Thus, an investor may, for example, 
purchase the right to build a multi-
family home on a specific lot, with 
the result that a zoning regulation 
that allows only single-family homes 
wouid render the investor's property 
interest "valueless."4 In short, the 
categorical rule will likely have one 
of two effects: Either courts will al-
ter the definition of the ''denomina-
tor" in the takings "fraction," ren-
dering the Court's categorical rule 
meaningless, or investors will ma-
nipulate the relevant property inter-
ests, giving the Court's rule sweep-
ing effect. To my mind, neither of 
these results is desirable or appro-
priate, and both are distortions of 
our takings jurisprudence. 
Finally, the Court's justification 
for its new categorical rule is re-
markably thin. The Court mentions 
in passing three arguments in sup-
port of its rule; none is convincing. 
First, the Court suggests that "total 
deprivation of feasible use is, from 
the landowner's point of view, the 
equivalent of a physical appropria-
tion." Ante, at , 120 L Ed 2d, at 
814. This argument proves too much. 
From the "landowner's point of 
view," a regulation that diminishes 
a lot's value by 50% is as well "the 
equivalent" of the condemnation of 
half of the lot. Yet, it is well estab-
4. This unfortunate possibility is created by 
the Court's subtle revision of the "total regu-
latory takings" dicta. In past decisions, we 
have stated that a regulation effects a taking 
if it "denies an owner economically viable use 
of his land," Agins v Tiburon. 447 US, 255, 
260, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 S Ct 2138 (1980) 
lished that a 50% diminution in 
value does not by itseif constitute a 
taking. See Euclid v Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 US 365, 384, 71 L Ed 303, 
47 S Ct 114, 54 ALR 1016 (1926) 
(75% diminution in value). Thus, the 
landowner's perception of the regu-
lation cannot justify the Court's new 
rule. 
Second, the Court emphasizes that 
because total takings are "relatively 
rare" its new rule will not adversely 
affect the government's ability to "go 
on." Ante, at , 120 L Ed 2d, at 
814. This argument proves too little. 
Certainly it is true that defining a 
small class of regulations that are 
per se takings will not greatly hin-
der important governmental func-
tions—but this is true of any small 
class of regulations. The Court's sug-
gestion only begs the question of 
why regulations of this particular 
class should always be found to ef-
fect takings. 
Finally, the Court suggests that 
"regulations that leave the owner 
. . . without economically beneficial 
. . . use . . . carry with them a 
heightened risk that private prop-
erty is being pressed into some form 
of public service." Ibid. As discussed 
more fully below, see infra, Part III, 
I agree that the risks of such sin-
gling out are of central concern in 
takings law. However, such risks do 
not justify a per se rule for total 
regulatory takings. There is no nec-
essary correlation between "singling 
out" and total takings: a regulation 
may single out a property owner 
(emphasis added), indicating that this "total 
takings" test did not apply to other estates. 
Today, however, the Court suggests that a 
regulation may effect a total taking of tiny 
real property interest. See ante, at , n 7, 
120 L Kd 2d, at 813-814. 
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without depriving him of all of his 
property, see e.g., Nollan v Califor-
nia Coastal Comm'n, 483 US 825, 
837, 97 L Ed 2d 677, 107 S Ct 3141 
(1987); J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v At-
kinson, 121 NH 581, 432 A2d 12 
(1981); and it may deprive him of all 
of his property without singling him 
out, see e.g., Mugler v Kansas, 123 
US 623, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S a 273 
(1887); Hadachek v Sebastian, 239 
US 394, 60 L Ed 348, 36 S Ct 143 
(1915). What matters in such cases is 
not the degree of diminution of 
value, but rather the specificity of 
the expropriating act. For this rea-
son, the Court's third justification 
for its new rule also fails. 
In. short, the Court's new rule is 
unsupported by prior decisions, arbi-
trary and unsound in practice, and 
theoretically unjustified. In my opin-
ion, a categorical rule as important 
as the one established by the Court 
today should be supported by more 
history or more reason than has yet 
been provided. 
The Nuisance Exception 
Like many bright-line rules, the 
categorical rule established in this 
case is only "categorical" for a page 
or two in the U. S. Reports. No 
sooner does the Court state that "to-
tal regulatory takings must be com-
pensated," ante, at , 120 L Ed 
2d, at 819, than it quickly estab-
lishes an exception to that rule. 
The exception provides that a reg-
ulation that renders property value-
less is not a taking if it prohibits 
uses of property that were not "pre-
viously permissible under relevant 
property and nuisance principles." 
Ante, at , 120 L Ed 2d, at 821. 
The Court thus rejects the basic 
holding in Mugler v Kansas, 123 US 
623, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 (1887). 
There we held that a state-wide stat-
ute that prohibited the owner of a 
brewery from making alcoholic bev-
erages did not effect a taking, even 
though the use of the property had 
been perfectly lawful and caused no 
public harm before the statute was 
enacted. We squarely rejected the 
rule the Court adopts today: 
"It is true, that, when the defen-
dants . . . erected their breweries, 
the laws of the State did not for-
bid the manufacture of intoxicat-
ing liquors. But the State did not 
thereby give any assurance, or 
come under an obligation, that its 
legislation upon that subject 
would remain unchanged. [T]he 
supervision of the public health 
and the public morals is a govern-
mental power, 'continuing in its 
nature/ and 'to be dealt with as 
the special exigencies of the mo-
ment may require;' . . . 'for this 
purpose, the largest legislative dis-
cretion is allowed, and the discre-
tion cannot be parted with any 
more than the power itself.'" Id., 
at 669, 31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273. 
Under our reasoning in Mugler, a 
state's decision to prohibit or to reg-
ulate certain uses of property is not 
a compensable taking just because 
the particular uses were previously 
lawful. Under the Court's opinion 
today, however, if a state should 
decide to prohibit the manufacture 
of asbestos, cigarettes, or concealable 
firearms, for example, it must be 
prepared to pay for the adverse eco-
nomic consequences of its decision. 
One must wonder if Government 
will be able to "go on" effectively if 
it must risk compensation "for every 
such change in the general law." 
Mahon, 260 US, at 413, 67 L Ed 322, 
43 S Ct 158, 28 ALR 1321. 
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The Court's holding today effec-
tively freezes the State's common 
law, denying the legislature much of 
its traditional power to revise the 
law governing the rights and uses of 
property. Until today, I had thought 
that we had long abandoned this 
approach to constitutional law. More 
than a century ago we recognized 
that "the great office of statutes is to 
remedy defects in the common law 
as they are developed, and to adapt 
it to the changes of time and circum-
stances." Munn v Illinois, 94 US 113, 
134, 24 L Ed 77 (1877). As Justice 
Marshall observed about a position 
similar to that adopted by the Court 
today: 
"If accepted, that claim would rep-
resent a return to the era of Lo-
chner v New York, 198 US 45 [49 
L Ed 937, 25 S Ct 539] (1905), 
when common-law rights were 
also found immune from revision 
by State or Federal Government. 
Such an approach would freeze 
the common law as it has been 
constructed by the courts, perhaps 
at its 19th-century state of devel-
opment. It would allow no room 
for change in response to changes 
in circumstance. The Due Process 
Clause does not require such a 
result." PruneYard Shopping Cen-
ter v Robins, 447 US 74, 93, 64 L 
Ed 2d 741, 100 S Ct 2035 (1980) 
(concurring opinion). 
Arresting the development of the 
common law is not only a departure 
from our prior decisions; it is also 
profoundly unwise. The human con-
dition is one of constant learning 
5. Even measured in terms of efficiency, the 
Court's rule is unsound. The Court today 
effectively establishes a form of insurance 
against certain changes in landuse regula-
tions. Like other forms of insurance, the 
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and evolution—both moral and prac-
tical. Legislatures implement that 
new learning; in doing so they must 
often revise the definition of prop-
erty and the rights of property own-
ers. Thus, wh». n the Nation came to 
understand that slavery was morally 
wrong and mandated the emancipa-
tion of all slaves, it, in eifect, rede-
fined "property." On a lesser scale, 
our ongoing self-education produces 
similar changes in the rights of 
property owners: New appreciation 
of the significance of endangered 
species, see, e.g., Andrus v Allard, 
444 US 51, 62 L Ed 2d 210, 100 S Ct 
318 (1979); the importance of wet-
lands, see, e.g., 16 USC § 3801 et seq. 
[16 USCS §§3801 et seq.]; and the 
vulnerability of coastal lands, see, 
e.g., 16 USC § 1451 et seq. [16 USCS 
§§ 1451 et seq.J, shapes our evolving 
understandings of property rights. 
Of course, some legislative redefin-
itions of property will effect a taking 
and must be compensated—but it 
certainly cannot be the case that 
every movement away from common 
law does so. There is no reason, and 
less sense, in such an absolute rule. 
We live in a world in which changes 
in the economy and the environment 
occur with increasing frequency and 
importance. If it was wise a century 
ago to allow Government " 'the larg-
est legislative discretion'" to deal 
with " ' the special exigencies of the 
moment,' " Mugler, 123 US, at 669, 
31 L Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273, it is impera-
tive to do so today. The rule that 
should govern a decision in a case of 
this kind should focus on the future, 
not the past.5 
Court's rule creates a ''moral hazard" and 
inefficiencies: In the face of uncertainty about 
changes in the law, developers will ovennvest, 
safe in the knowledge that if the law changes 
adversely, they will be entitled to compensa-
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The Court's categorical approach 
rule will, I fear, greatly hamper the 
efforts of local officials and planners 
who must deal with increasingly 
complex problems in land-use and 
environmental regulation. As this 
case—in which the claims of an indi-
vidual property owner exceed $1 
million—well demonstrates, these of-
ficials face both substantial uncer-
tainty because of the ad hoc nature 
of takings law and unacceptable pen-
alties if they guess incorrectly about 
that law.6 
Viewed more broadly, the Court's 
new rule and exception conflict with 
the very character of our takings 
jurisprudence. We have frequently 
and consistently recognized that the 
definition of a taking cannot be re-
duced to a "set formula" and that 
determining whether a regulation is 
a taking is "essentially [an] ad hoc, 
factual inquir[y]." Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v New York City, 
438 US 104, 124, 57 L Ed 2d 631, 98 
S Q 2646 (1978) (quoting Goldblatt v 
Hempstead, 369 US 590, 594, 8 L Ed 
2d 130, 82 S Ct 987 (1962)). This is 
unavoidable, for the determination 
whether a law effects a taking is 
ultimately a matter of "fairness and 
justice," Armstrong v United States, 
364 US 40, 49, 4 L Ed 2d 1554, 80 S 
Ct 1563 (1960), and "necessarily re-
quires a weighing of private and 
public interests." Agins, 447 US, at 
261, 65 L Ed 2d 106, 100 S Ct 2138. 
tion. See generally Farber, Economic Analysis 
and Just Compensation, 12 Int'l Rev of Law & 
Econ 125(1992) 
6. As the Court correctly notes, in regula-
tory takings, unlike physical takings, courts 
have a choice of remedies. See ante, at , n 
17, 120 L Ed 2d, at 822. They may "invali-
date the] excessive regulation" or they may 
"allofw] the regulation to stand and orde{r] 
The rigid rules fixed by the Court 
today clash with this enterprise: 
"fairness and justice" are often dis-
served by categorical rules. 
Ill 
It is well established that a tak-
ings case "entails inquiry into [sev-
eral factors:] the character of the 
governmental action, its economic 
impact, and its interference with 
reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations." Prune Yard, 447 US, at 83, 
64 L Ed 2d 741, 100 S Ct 2035. The 
Court's analysis today focuses on the 
last two of these three factors: the 
categorical rule addresses a regula-
tion's "economic impact," while the 
nuisance exception recognizes that 
ownership brings with it only cer-
tain "expectations." Neglected by 
the Court today is the first, and in 
some ways, the most important fac-
tor in takings analysis: the character 
of the regulatory action. 
The Just Compensation Clause 
"was designed to bar Government 
from forcing some people alone to 
bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne 
by the public as a whole." Arm-
strong, 364 US, at 49, 4 L Ed 2d 
1554, 80 S Ct 1563. Accordingly, one 
of the central concerns of our tak-
ings jurisprudence is "preventing] 
the public from loading upon one 
individual more than his just share 
of the burdens of government." Mo-
the government to afford compensation for 
the permanent taking." First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church v Countv of Los 
Angeles, 482 US 304, 335, 96 L Ed 2d 250, 107 
S Ct 2378 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see 
also id., at 319-321, 96 L Ed 2d 250, 107 S Ct 
2378. In either event, however, the costs to 
the government are likely to be substantial 
and are therefore likely to impede the devel-
opment of sound land-use policy. 
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nongahela Navigation Co. v United 
States, 148 US 312, 325, 37 L Ed 
463, 13 S a 622 (1893). We have, 
therefore, in our takings law fre-
quently looked to the generality of a 
regulation of property.7 
For example, in the case of so-
i l e d 'developmental exactions," 
ve have paid special attention to the 
risk that particular landowners 
night "b[e] singled out to bear the 
Durden" of a broader problem not of 
lis own making. Nollan, 483 US, at 
*35, n 4, 97 L Ed 2d 677, 107 S Ct 
1141; see also Pennell v San Jose, 
185 US 1, 23, 99 L Ed 2d 1, 108 S Ct 
A9 (1988). Similarly, in distinguish-
ag between the Kohler Act (at issue 
i Mahon) and the Subsidence Act 
it issue in Keystone), we found sig-
ificant that the regulatory function 
i rhe latter was substantially 
roader. Unlike the Kohler Act, 
hich simply transferred back to the 
irtace owners certain rights that 
iey had earlier sold to the coal 
7. This principle of generality is well-rooted 
our broader understandings of the Consti-
;ion as designed in part to control the "mis-
:efs of faction." See The Federalist No. 10, p 
:G. Wills ed 1982) (J. Madison). 
\n analogous concern arises in First 
lendment law. There we have recognized 
.t an individual's rights are not violated 
en his religious practices are prohibited 
ier a neutral law of general applicability. 
- example, in Employment Division, De-
tment of Human Resources of Oregon v 
;th, 494 US 872, 879-880, 108 L Ed 2d 876, 
S Ct 1595 (1990), we observed: 
Our) decisions have consistently held that 
right of free exercise does not relieve an 
vidua! of the obligation to comply with a 
A and neutral law of general applicability 
the ground that the law proscribes (or 
cnbes) conduct that his religion pre-
^es tor proscribes).' United States v Lee, 
US 252. 263, n 3 [71 L Ed 2d 127, 102 S 
1051] (1982) (Stevens. J., concurring in 
menu . In Prince v Massachusetts, 
US 158 [88 L Ed 645, 64 S Ct 438] U944), 
leid that a mother could be prosecuted 
companies, the Subsidence Act af-
fected all surface owners—including 
the coal companies—equally. See 
Keystone, 480 US, at 486, 94 L Ed 
2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232. Perhaps the 
most familiar application of this 
principle of generality arises in zon-
ing cases. A diminution in value 
caused by a zoning regulation is far 
less likely to constitute a taking if it 
is part of a general and comprehen-
sive land-use plan, see Euclid v Am-
ber Realty Co., 272 US 365, 71 L Ed 
303, 47 S Ct 114, 54 ALR 1016 
(1926); conversely, "spot zoning" is 
far more likely to constitute a tak-
ing, see Penn Central. 438 US, at 
132, and n 28, 57 L Ed 2d 631, 98 S 
Ct 2646. 
The presumption that a perma-
nent physical occupation, no matter 
how slight, effects a taking is wholly 
consistent with this principle. A 
physical taking entails a certain 
amount of "singling out."8 Consis-
tent with this principle, physical oc-
under the child labor laws for using her chil-
dren to dispense literature in the streets, her 
religious motivation notwithstanding. We 
found no constitutional infirmity in excluding 
[these children) from doing there what no 
other children may do.' id., at 171 [88 L Ed 
645, 64 S Ct 438]. In Braunfeld v Brown, 366 
US 599 [6 L Ed 2d 563, 81 S Ct 1144] (1961) 
(plurality opinion), we upheld Sunday-closing 
laws against the claim that they burdened the 
religious practices of persons whose religions 
compelled them to refrain from work on other 
days. In Gillette v United States, 401 US 437, 
461 [28 L Ed 2d 168. 91 S Ct 828] (1971), we 
sustained the military Selective Service Sys-
tem against the claim that it violated free 
exercise by conscripting persons who opposed 
a particular war on religious grounds." 
If such a neutral law of general applicabil-
ity may severely burden constitutionally pro-
tected interests in liberty, a comparable bur-
den on property owners should not be consid-
ered unreasonably onerous. 
8. See Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special 
Interests, 77 Va L Rev 1333, 1352-1354 (1991). 
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cupations by third parties are more 
likely to effect takings than other 
physical occupations. Thus, a regula-
tion requiring the installation of a 
junction box owned by a third party, 
Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 458 US 419, 73 L Ed 2d 
868, 102 S Q 3164 (1982), is more 
troubling than a regulation requir-
ing the installation of sprinklers or 
smoke detectors; just as an order 
granting third parties access to a 
marina, Kaiser Aetna v United 
States, 444 US 164, 62 L Ed 2d 332, 
100 S Ct 383 (1979), is more trou-
bling than an order requiring the 
placement of safety buoys in the 
marina. 
In analyzing takings claims, courts 
have long recognized the difference 
between a regulation that targets 
one or two parcels of land and a 
regulation that enforces a state-wide 
policy. See, e.g., A.A. Profiles, Inc. v 
Ft. Lauderdale, 850 F2d 1483, 1488 
(CA11 1988); Wheeler v Pleasant 
Grove, 664 F2d 99, 100 (CA5 1981); 
Trustees Under Will of Pomeroy v 
Westlake, 357 So 2d 1299, 1304 (La 
App 1978); see also Burrows v 
Keene, 121 NH 590, 432 A2d 15, 21 
(1981); Herman Click Realty Co. v 
St. Louis County, 545 SW2d 320, 
324-325 (Mo App 1976); Huttig v 
Richmond Heights, 372 SW2d 833, 
842-843 (Mo 1963). As one early 
court stated with regard to a water-
front regulation, "If such restraint 
were in fact imposed upon the estate 
of one proprietor only, out of several 
estates on the same line of shore, 
9. See Zalkin. Shifting Sands and Shifting 
Doctrines: The Supreme Court's Changing 
Takings Doctrine and South Carolina's 
Coastal Zone Statute, 79 Cal L Rev 205, 216-
217, nn 46-47 (1991) (collecting statutes). 
10. This provision was amended in 1990. 
the objection would be much more 
formidable." Commonwealth v Al-
ger, 61 Mass 53, 102 (1851). 
In considering Lucas' claim, the 
generality of the Beachfront Man-
agement Act is significant. The Act 
does not target particular landown-
ers, but rather regulates the use of 
the coastline of the entire State. See 
SC Code § 48-39-10 (Supp 1990). In-
deed, South Carolina's Act is best 
understood as part of a national ef-
fort to protect the coastline, one ini-
tiated by the Federal Coastal Zone 
Management Act of 1972. Pub L 92-
583, 86 Stat 1280, codified as 
amended at 16 USC §1451 et seq. 
[16 USCS §§ 1451 et seq.]. Pursuant 
to the Federal Act, every coastal 
State has implemented coastline reg-
ulations.9 Moreover, the Act did not 
single out owners of undeveloped 
land. The Act also prohibited owners 
of developed land from rebuilding if 
their structures were destroyed, see 
1988 SC Acts 634 § 3,10 and what is 
equally significant, from repairing 
erosion control devices, such as sea-
walls, see SC Code § 48-39-29CKBK2) 
(Supp 1990). In addition, in some 
situations, owners of developed land 
were required to "renourisfh] the 
beach . . . on a yearly basis with an 
amount . . . of sand . . . not . . . 
less than one and one-half times the 
yearly volume of sand lost due to 
erosion." 1988 SC Acts 634 § 3, p 
5140.11 In short, the South Carolina 
Act imposed substantial burdens on 
owners of developed and undevel-
See SC Code § 48-39-29(XB) (Supp 1990). 
11. This provision was amended in 1990; 
authority for renourishment was shifted to 
local governments. See SC Code § 48-39-350(A) 
(Supp 1990). 
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oped land alike l2 This generality 
indicates that the Act is not an ef-
fort to expropriate owners of unde-
veloped land 
Admittedly, the economic impact 
of this regulation is dramatic and 
petitioner's investment-backed ex-
pectations are substantial Yet, if 
anything, the costs to and expecta-
tions of the owners of developed land 
are even greater I doubt, however, 
that the cost to owners of developed 
land of renounshing the beach and 
allowing their seawalls to deterio-
rate effects a taking The costs im-
posed on the owners of undeveloped 
land, such as petitioner, differ from 
these costs only in degree, not in 
kind 
The impact of the ban on develop-
mental uses must also be viewed in 
light of the purposes of the Act The 
legislature stated the purposes of the 
Act as "protecting], preserving], re-
storing] and enhancing] the beach/ 
dune system ' of the State not only 
for recreational and ecological pur 
poses but also to <fprotec[t] life and 
property" SC Code § 48-39-260U)(a) 
(Supp 1990) The State, with much 
science on its side, believes that the 
"beach/dune system [acts] as a 
buffer from high tides, storm surge, 
[and] hurricanes" Ibid This is a 
traditional and important exercise of 
the State's police power, as demon-
strated by Hurricane Hugo, which in 
1989, caused 29 deaths and more 
than $6 billion in property damage 
m South Carolina alone 13 
In view of all ot these factors, even 
12. In this regard the Act more closely 
resembles the Subsidence Act in Kevstone 
than the Kohler Act in Pennsylvania Coai Co 
v Mahon 260 US 393 67 L Ed 322 43 S Ct 
158 28 ALR 1321 (1922) and more closely 
resembles the general zoning scheme in Eu 
did v Amber Realty Co 272 US 365 71 L Ed 
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assuming that petitioner's property 
was rendered valueless, the risk in-
herent in investments of the sort 
made by petitioner, the generality of 
the Act, and the compelling purpose 
motivating the South Carolina Legis-
lature persuade me that the Act did 
not effect a taking of petitioner's 
property 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent 
Statement ot Justice Souter. 
I would dismiss the writ of certio-
rari in this case as having been 
granted improvidently After 
briefing and argument it is abun 
dantly clear that an unreviewable 
assumption on which this case comes 
to us is both questionable as a con-
clusion of Fifth Amendment law and 
sufficient to frustrate the Court's 
ability to render certain the legal 
premises on which its holding rests 
The petition for review was 
granted on the assumption that the 
state by regulation had deprived the 
owner of his entire economic inter-
est in the subject propeity Such was 
the state trial court's conclusion, 
which the state supreme court did 
not leview It lb apparent now that 
in light of our prior cases, see e g, 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn v 
DeBenedictis, 480 US 470, 493 502, 
94 L Ed 2d 472, 107 S Ct 1232 (1987), 
\ndrus v Allard, 444 US 51, 65-66, 
62 L Ed 2d 210, 100 S Ct 318 (1979), 
Penn Central Transportation Corp v 
New York City, 438 US 104, 130-131, 
303 47 S Ct 114 54 ALR 1016 (1926) than the 
specific landmark designation in Penn Central 
Transportation Co v New York City 438 US 
104 57 L Ed 2d 631 98 S Ct 2646 (1978) 
13 7alkin 79 Cal L Rev at 212 213 
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57 L Ed 2d 631, 98 S Ct 2646 (1978), 
the trial court's conclusion is highly 
questionable. While the respondent 
now wishes to contest the point, see 
Brief for Respondent 45-50, the 
Court is certainly right to refuse to 
take up the issue, which is not fairly 
included within the question pre-
sented, and has received only the 
most superficial and one-sided treat-
ment before us. 
Because the questionable conclu-
sion of total deprivation cannot be 
reviewed, the Court is precluded 
from attempting to clarify the con-
cept of total (and, in the Court's 
view, categorically compensable) tak-
ing on which it rests, a concept 
which the Court describes, see ante, 
at n 6, 120 L Ed 2d, at 813, as 
so uncertain under existing law as to 
have fostered inconsistent pro-
nouncements by the Court itself. Be-
cause that concept is left uncertain, 
so is the significance of the excep-
tions to the compensation require-
ment that the Court proceeds to rec-
ognize. Thi3 alone is enough to show 
that there is little utility in attempt-
ing to deal with this case on the 
merits. 
The imprudence of proceeding to 
the merits in spite of these unprom-
ising circumstances is underscored 
by the fact that, in doing so, the 
Court cannot help but assume some-
thing about the scope of the uncer-
tain concept of total deprivation, 
even when it is barred from explicat-
ing total deprivation directly. Thus, 
when the Court concludes that the 
application of nuisance law provides 
an exception to the general rule that 
complete denial of economically ben-
eficial use of property amounts to a 
compensable taking, the Court will 
be understood to suggest (if it does 
not assume) that there are in fact 
circumstances in which state-law 
nuisance abatement may amount to 
a denial of all beneficial land use as 
that concept is to be employed in 
our takings jurisprudence under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The nature of nuisance law, how-
ever, indicates that application of a 
regulation defensible on grounds of 
nuisance prevention or abatement 
will quite probably not amount to a 
complete deprivation in fact. The 
nuisance enquiry focuses on conduct, 
not on the character of the property 
on which that conduct is performed, 
see 4 Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§821B (1979) (public nuisance); id., 
§822 (private nuisance), and the 
remedies for such conduct usually 
leave the property owner with other 
reasonable uses of his property, see 
W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & 
D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on 
Law of Torts § 90 (5th ed 1984) (pub-
lic nuisances usually remedied by 
criminal prosecution or abatement), 
id., § 89 (private nuisances usually 
remedied by damages, injunction or 
abatement); see also, e.g., Mugler v 
Kansas, 123 US 623, 668-669, 31 L 
Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 (1887) (prohibi-
tion on use of property to manufac-
ture intoxicating beverages "does 
not disturb the owner in the control 
or use of his property for lawful 
purposes, nor restrict his right to 
dispose of it, but is only a declara-
tion by the State that its use . . . for 
certain forbidden purposes, is preju-
dicial to the public interests"); Hada-
check v Sebastian, 239 US 394, 412, 
60 L Ed 348, 36 S Ct 143 (1915) 
(prohibition on operation of brick-
yard did not prohibit extraction of 
clay from which bricks were pro-
duced). Indeed, it is difficult to imag-
ine property that can be used only to 
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sion of total deprivation cannot be 
reviewed, the Court is precluded 
from attempting to clarify the con-
cept of total (and, in the Court's 
view, categorically compensable) tak-
ing on which it rests, a concept 
which the Court describes, see ante, 
at n 6, 120 L Ed 2d, at 813, as 
so uncertain under existing law as to 
have fostered inconsistent pro-
nouncements by the Court itself. Be-
cause that concept is left uncertain, 
so is the significance of the excep-
tions to the compensation require-
ment that the Court proceeds to rec-
ognize. This alone is enough to show 
that there is little utility in attempt-
ing to deal with this case on the 
merits. 
The imprudence of proceeding to 
the merits in spite of these unprom-
ising circumstances is underscored 
by the fact that, in doing so, the 
Court cannot help but assume some-
thing about the scope of the uncer-
tain concept of total deprivation, 
even when it is barred from explicat-
ing total deprivation directly. Thus, 
when the Court concludes that the 
application of nuisance law provides 
an exception to the general rule that 
complete denial of economically ben-
eficial use of property amounts to a 
compensable taking, the Court will 
be understood to suggest (if it does 
not assume) that there are in fact 
circumstances in which state-law 
nuisance abatement may amount to 
a denial of all beneficial land use as 
that concept is to be employed in 
our takings jurisprudence under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The nature of nuisance law, how-
ever, indicates that application of a 
regulation defensible on grounds of 
nuisance prevention or abatement 
will quite probably not amount to a 
complete deprivation in fact. The 
nuisance enquiry focuses on conduct, 
not on the character of the property 
on which that conduct is performed, 
see 4 Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§821B (1979) (public nuisance); id., 
§ 822 (private nuisance), and the 
remedies for such conduct usually 
leave the property owner with other 
reasonable uses of his property, see 
W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & 
D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on 
Law of Torts § 90 (5th ed 1984) (pub-
lic nuisances usually remedied by 
criminal prosecution or abatement), 
id., §89 (private nuisances usually 
remedied by damages, injunction or 
abatement); see also, e.g., Mugler v 
Kansas, 123 US 623, 668-669, 31 L 
Ed 205, 8 S Ct 273 (1887) (prohibi-
tion on use of property to manufac-
ture intoxicating beverages "does 
not disturb the owner in the control 
or use of his property for lawful 
purposes, nor restrict his right to 
dispose of it, but is only a declara-
tion by the State that its use . . . for 
certain forbidden purposes, is preju-
dicial to the public interests"); Hada-
check v Sebastian, 239 US 394, 412, 
60 L Ed 348, 36 S Ct 143 (1915) 
(prohibition on operation of brick-
yard did not prohibit extraction of 
clay from which bricks were pro-
duced). Indeed, it is difficult to imag-
ine property that can be used only to 
852 
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REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Earl D. TANNER and Mary Louise Tan-
ner, his wife, David V. Trask, Grant S. 
Kesler, and Larry Y. Lunt, Defendants, 
Cross-Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COM-
PANY, a corporation, Defendant 
and Cross-Defendant. 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Earl D. TANNER and Mary Louise Tan-
ner, his wife; David V. Trask; Grant S. 
Kesler; and Larry V. Lunt, Defendants 
and Appellants. 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
TRASK & BRITT, a professional corpora-
tion; Grant S. Kesler; Larry V. Lunt; 
and Capitol Life Insurance Co., a cor-
poration, Defendants and Appellants. 
Nos. 17692, 19348 and 19684. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 19, 1987. 
Rehearing Denied Aug. 17, 1987. 
City redevelopment agency brought ac-
tions to acquire properties within blighted 
area. The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, David B. Dee and Peter F. Leary, 
JJ., found that agency did not misrepresent 
or mislead condemnees into waiving claims 
and abandoning litigation challenging agen-
cy's jurisdiction to condemn their proper-
ties, and awarded compensation. Cases 
were consolidated on appeal. The Supreme 
Court, Hall, CJ., held that: (1) agency was 
not required to present proof of conditions 
precedent to condemnation, where con-
demnee signed stipulations waiving 
claims and defenses to authority of agen 
to condemn their properties and withdr* 
condemnation funds which had been depc 
ited in court; (2) juror's cursory inspects 
of subject premises did not mandate reve 
sal of jury verdict, where numerous phot 
graphs of building were received into e\ 
dence at trial; and (3) refusal to alio 
condemnees to call agency's consultant t 
testify as expert witness regarding valu 
of property was not prejudicial error, an 
where consultant's testimony would no 
have substantially affected outcome. 
Affirmed. 
1. Stipulations <s=»14(4) 
City redevelopment agency was not re-
quired to present proof of conditions prece-
dent to condemnation in condemnation com-
pensation trial where condemnees signed 
stipulations waiving all claims and defenses 
to authority of agency to condemn their 
property, and withdrew condemnation 
funds agency had deposited with court. 
U.C.A.1953, 11-19-23.9. 78-34-9. 
2. Estoppel <3=>92(4) 
Once property owner chooses to with-
draw money deposited by state in obtaining 
condemnation order, owner waives all ob-
jections and defenses to action and to tak-
ing of his property, except any claim to 
greater compensation. U.C.A.1953, 78-34-
9. 
3. Appeal and Error <3=>931(1) 
Where there is dispute and disagree-
ment in evidence, reviewing court will as-
sume that trial judge believed those 
aspects and fairly drew inferences to be 
derived therefrom which gave his decision 
support. 
4. Trial «=>344 
Affidavits filed by third persons are 
not competent to impeach jury verdict. 
5. Eminent Domain «=»262(5) 
Juror's cursory view of premises which 
formed basis of eminent domain proceed-
ings did not warrant reversal of jury ver-
dict, where numerous photographs of both 
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inside and outside of building were received 
into evidence at trial, condemnees were still 
using building as of time compensation pro-
ceeding was brought, and jury's verdict 
was fully supported by evidence. 
6. Eminent Domain <3= 262(5) 
Refusal to allow condemnees to call 
consultant for city redevelopment agency 
to testify as expert witness regarding val-
ue of condemned property was harmless 
error, if any, where consultant did not have 
independent opinion as to value of proper-
ty, at least two other appraisors who actu-
ally appraised property testified as to its 
value, and other appraisors were available. 
7. Appeal and Error $=*1056.1(1) 
Exclusion of evidence is harmless un-
less excluded evidence would probably 
have had substantial influence in bringing 
about different verdict or finding. 
Harold A. Hintze, Provo, and William D. 
Oswald, Salt Lake City, for Redevelopment 
Agency. 
Robert S. Campbell and E. Barney Ge-
sas, Salt Lake City, for defendants Tanner, 
Trask, Kesler, and Lunt. 
Craig S. Cook, Salt Lake City, for Trask 
& Britt. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
These cases, consolidated for purposes of 
appeal, emanate from action of the Rede-
velopment Agency of Salt Lake City (the 
RDA) to acquire appellants' properties. 
The Tanner group in case No. 19348 and 
the Trask group in case No. 19684 appeal 
separate trial court determinations that the 
RDA did not misrepresent or mislead appel-
lants into waiving claims and abandoning 
litigation challenging the RDA's jurisdic-
tion to condemn their properties. Case No. 
17692 involves a condemnation compensa-
tion trial and raises claims of jury miscon-
duct and trial court error in denying appel-
1. Utah Neighborhood Development Act, 1st 
Spec. Sess., ch. 5, 1969 Utah Laws 1134 (codified 
as amended at Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-19-1 to 
-35 (1986)). While amendments were made to 
this act in 1983, they do not affect the resolution 
of these appeals. 
lants' request to call the RDA's consultant 
to testify as an "expert witness." For 
reasons enumerated below, we affirm the 
trial court's determination in each of the 
three appeals. 
I 
In 1969, the Utah legislature enacted the 
"Utah Neighborhood Development Act" l 
Under the provisions of this act, municipal 
redevelopment agencies are created and 
empowered in part to undertake "redevel-
opment projects" within areas determined 
to be "blighted."2 Acquisition and rede-
velopment of "blighted" property contrib-
utes to the health of the community and 
may be accomplished by various means, 
including eminent domain.3 
Pursuant to this act, Salt Lake City's 
Board of Commissioners (the Commission) 
was designated to act as the City's RDA. 
In June 1977, the Commission enacted an 
ordinance specifying 18V2 blocks of down-
town Salt Lake City, Utah, as a "blighted" 
area. Appellants' real properties are situ-
ated on Block 53 (between Third and 
Fourth South and State Street and Second 
East) and are included within the project 
area. In early 1979, the RDA began the 
statutory process necessary for the acquisi-
tion of Block 53. A "redevelopment plan" 
for Block 53 was finally published and put 
into effect by the Commission in June 1979. 
In July 1979, the Tanner group and the 
Trask group filed separate actions in Third 
District Court challenging the authority of 
the RDA to condemn their properties. 
Shortly thereafter, the RDA commis-
sioned a private architectural firm to devel-
op a "master plan" report for Block 53. 
Apparently, the purpose of this report was 
to provide recommendations and guidelines 
to private developers choosing to bid on the 
acquisition and redevelopment of the block. 
In October 1979, the RDA met with appel-
lants at the architect's office to review 
2. Id 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 11-19-23.9(2) (1986). 
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drawings and a scale model of the "master 
plan." Representations made by the RDA 
at and subsequent to that meeting are at 
issue herein. 
In November 1979, the RDA offered the 
Trask group $277,400 and the Tanner 
group $394,000 for their respective proper-
ties. Both groups declined, and further 
negotiation continued for approximately 
two months. In January 1980, the RDA 
commenced condemnation proceedings 
against appellants' properties. Thereafter, 
the parties entered into stipulations where-
in the RDA agreed to deposit with the 
court 100 percent of a higher estimate of 
the market value of the properties for ap-
pellants' immediate withdrawal and use. 
In exchange, appellants stipulated to the 
RDA's immediate possession of the proper-
ties and agreed to dismiss their lawsuits 
and waive all claims and challenges (except 
the issue of just compensation) to the 
RDA's authority to condemn. Pursuant to 
these stipulations, both trial courts entered 
orders of immediate occupancy for the 
RDA, and appellants withdrew the monies 
the RDA deposited with the courts. The 
parties thereafter proceeded to trial on the 
issue of "just compensation." 
In August 1980, a jury awarded the Tan-
ner group $357,000 as just compensation 
for their property. This sum was less than 
the $417,640 appellants originally received 
and resulted in a $60,640 refund to the 
RDA. Subsequently, the Trask group stip-
ulated that the $294,044 offered by the 
RDA was in fact just compensation for 
their property. 
Thereafter, the Tanner group filed ap-
peal No. 17692, claiming jury misconduct 
and error by the court in refusing appel-
lants' request to call the RDA's consultant 
to testify as an expert witness. While that 
appeal was pending, both the Trask group 
and the Tanner group alleged that the 
RDA misrepresented and abandoned its 
original plans for the use of their proper-
ties. Accordingly, appellants filed several 
motions below, including motions to vacate 
4. 649 P.2d 5 (Utah 1982). 
the orders of immediate occupancy and to 
dismiss the condemnation proceedings. 
Therein, appellants sought to withdraw 
their stipulations to the RDA's occupancy 
and right to condemn their properties. 
Upon motions to this Court, we stayed the 
parties' pending appeals and remanded the 
cases to the trial courts for evidentiary 
proceedings on the issues of misrepresenta-
tion and mistake. We also issued an order 
of mandamus in Tanner v. District Judges 
of Third Judicial District Court* There-
after, both trial courts conducted evidentia-
ry hearings and subsequently denied appel-
lants' requests for relief, thereby sustain-
ing the condemnation awards and the bind-
ing effect of the stipulations. Appeals in 
cases No. 19348 and No. 19684 followed.5 
II 
Cases No. 19348 and No. 19684 
Both the Tanner group and the Trask 
group argue on appeal that since the RDA 
failed to follow statutory prerequisites to 
condemning their properties, the trial 
courts had no jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of the lawsuits and dismissal of the 
condemnation actions was required. How-
ever, as discussed below, the dispositive 
issue presented by these appeals is wheth-
er appellants were induced by mistake or 
misrepresentation into signing stipulations 
waiving all claims and defenses to the 
RDA's authority. The conclusions of the 
trial courts in favor of the RDA are not 
clearly erroneous and preclude this Court 
from substituting its judgment for that of 
the trial courts. 
[1] Each "Order of Immediate Occupan-
cy" based upon the parties' stipulations 
provided in pertinent part: 
[T]he Court having carefully examined 
the pleadings and the written Stipulation 
pertaining thereto referred to above, 
and, having determined that plaintiff has 
5. Due to their similarity, we deal with the issues 
raised in cases No. 19348 and No. 19684 simul-
taneously. 
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the right of eminent domain W and that 
the purpose for which the property of 
defendants sought by plaintiff herein to 
be condemned is for a public purpose ^ 
and that the property is located within a 
redevelopment project area which is 
blighted, and that the project area is 
detrimental or inimical to the public 
health, safety or welfare, and that the 
immediate occupancy thereof is neces-
sary and proper; and, the parties having 
expressly reserved for future adjudica-
tion only the issue of the amount of just 
compensation to be paid Defendants^ in 
accordance with the provisions of Sec-
tion 78-34-9, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended: 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: 
1. Subject to and in accordance with 
the "Stipulation for Order of Immediate 
Occupancy/* a copy of which is attached 
hereto and by reference made a part 
hereof, Plaintiff be and is hereby autho-
rized to occupy the property belonging to 
Defendants above-named described in the 
Complaint on file herein . . . [descriptions 
of particular property] which said proper-
ties are sought for uses by the public in 
connection with and as part of the C.B.D. 
Neighborhood Development Project au-
thorized and approved by the Salt Lake 
City Commission on June 21, 1979. 
2. Plaintiff is hereby permitted to 
take immediate possession of said prop-
erties and continue in possession of the 
same pending further hearing and trial 
on the issue of just compensation which 
is the only issue which may be raised in 
this action 
3. Plaintiff has tendered into court 
and deposits with the Clerk of the Court 
herewith for the benefit of Defendants 
the sum of [$294,044 for the Trask group 
6. Under the provisions of the Utah Neighbor-
hood Development Act, the RDA may condemn 
property through the procedures of eminent do-
main. Utah Code Ann. § 11-19-23.9(1986); see 
also Redevelopment Agency v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 
47, 48 (Utah 1974); Redevelopment Agency v. 
Mitsui Inv., Inc., 522 P.2d 1370, 1371 n. 2 (Utah 
1974). 
and $417,640 for the Tanner group] being 
100% of the amount of just compensation 
based upon two independent appraisals 
which Plaintiff has caused to be made of 
the premises, adjusted to the date of 
taking. 
5. Defendants may withdraw the [to-
tal sums indicated above] deposited with 
the Clerk of the Court for the use and 
benefit of Defendants without prejudice 
to any claim they may wish to assert for 
additional just compensation in the trial 
of the matter 
(Emphasis added.) Pursuant to these or-
ders, the RDA deposited with the courts 
100 percent of the agreed sums. Appel-
lants subsequently withdrew these monies 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 
(1977), which provides in pertinent part: 
Upon the application of the parties in 
interest, the court shall order that the 
money deposited in the court be paid 
forthwith for or on account of the just 
compensation to be awarded in the pro-
ceeding. A payment to a defendant as 
aforesaid shall be held to be an abandon-
ment by such defendant of all defenses 
excepting his claim for greater compen-
sation.M 
(Emphasis added.) ^ h e explicit effect of 
the parties' stipulations (££&}withdrawal of 
funds ^pursuant to section 78-34-9 was to 
relieve the RDA of presenting proof that 
the conditions precedent to condemnation 
under section 11-19-23.9 had been met 
Indeed, the plain language of both stipula-
tions reflects the acknowledgment of all 
parties that the RDA was entitled to imme-
diate occupancy. Because the stipulations 
do not recite the existence of controversy 
as to either the RDA's authority to take 
the properties or the RDA's compliance 
with statutory prerequisites to condemning 
7. Redeveloping areas to terminate urban blight 
is a public purpose. See Tribe v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 540 P.2d 499, 503-04 (Utah 1975); see 
also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-34, 75 
S.Ct. 98, 102-103, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954). 
8. This Court has heretofore indicated the appli-
cability of section 78-34-9 to redevelopment 
law. See, e.g., Mitsui Inv., Inc., 522 P.2d at 1372 
& n. 3. 
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the same, appellants did not preserve any 
such issues for future determination. Con-
sequently, in the appropriate exercise of 
discretion, the trial courts accepted the 
stipulations and entered the appropriate or-
ders of occupancy. For all intents and 
purposes, the taking was then complete. 
The fact that the stipulations only pre-
served the issue of just compensation for 
trial is not surprising. Whenever issues 
pertaining to authority or jurisdiction „ to 
condemn exist at the time an order of im-
mediate occupancy is sought, the best in-
terests of all concerned, including the 
court, dictate that those issues be resolved 
prior to issuance of the order. Otherwise, 
the condemnor runs the risk of defeat and 
the resultant loss of funds expended in 
preparing the property for its new use. 
Similarly, the condemnee runs the risk of 
irreparable harm to the property if the 
condemnor is permitted to occupy and alter 
the property to accommodate the new use. 
The specific facts of the instant case illus-
trate this conclusion. The RDA's planned 
use for the properties apparently included 
development and construction of new build-
ings and plazas. In view of the magnitude 
of this project and the resultant significant 
change in the nature of the existing proper-
ties, it is incomprehensible that the parties 
would stipulate and agree to orders of im-
mediate occupancy if legitimate issues of 
authority and compliance with statutory 
procedures remained to be resolved.9 
[2] In Utah State Road Commission v. 
Friberg,10 the parties entered into a stipula-
tion that was incorporated into an order 
establishing the state's right to condemn 
and reserving for later determination the 
amount of compensation to be awarded and 
the date for assessing valuation.11 There-
in, this Court noted, "A defendant may be 
9. Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 
821, 840 (Utah 1984) (Hall, CJ., dissenting). 
10. 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984) (plurality opinion). 
11. Id. at 827. 
12. Id. at 833 n. 10 (citing Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-34-9)." 
13. See 6 J. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Do-
main, § 24.11[l][c], at 24-177 (3d ed. 1986) 
barred from litigating the merits of t 
State's authority after an order of immec 
ate occupancy has been granted if 1 
waives his right to litigate those issues < 
he withdraws the money deposited by tl 
State in obtaining the order." 12 This la 
guage correctly states the established ar 
applicable rule that once a property own* 
chooses to withdraw the money deposite 
by the State in obtaining the order, h 
waives all objections and defenses to th 
action and to the taking of his property 
except any claim to greater compensation.1 
Appellants would have us ignore thi 
rule by recognizing that the "term 'defens 
es' [in section 78-34-9] cannot include th< 
failure of the lower courtfs] to acquire sub 
ject matter jurisdiction but rather is limitet 
to personal defenses of the landowner." Ii 
other words, appellants contend that ever 
though they waived all claims and defenses 
regarding the RDA's compliance with stat-
utory procedures and authority to con-
demn, they can now raise those same 
claims and defenses to show the trial 
courts' lack of jurisdiction in these cases. 
We disagree. Appellants apparently mis-
understand both the language of and prin-
ciples behind section 78-34-9 and the na-
ture and result of their stipulations. The 
stipulations are proof of the state's power 
to expel appellants from their properties. 
By entering into the stipulations and with-
drawing the monies, appellants acknowl-
edged that the jurisdictional conditions 
precedent to the RDA's exercising the pow-
er to condemn were properly satisfied. 
Therefore, the lower courts' jurisdiction in 
that regard was not at issue. 
To adopt appellants' arguments would be 
to sanction abuse in settlement proceedings 
by allowing parties (once they determine 
that additional money is available) to invali-
(based upon the Uniform Eminent Domain 
Code); 6 J. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Do-
main, § 26.31 (3d ed. 1986); 6A J. Sackman, 
Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 28.321(2) (3d ed. 
1985); 1A J. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Do-
main § 4.6, at 4-37 (3d ed. 1985) (waiver and 
estoppel); see also City of Durham v. Bates, 273 
N.C. 336, 160 S.E.2d 60 (1968); State v. Jackson, 
388 S.W.2d 924 (Tex. 1965). 
REDEV. AGCY. OF SALT LAKE CITY v. 
Cite as 740 P.2d 1296 (Utah 1987) 
TANNER Utah 1301 
date stipulations by simply claiming that 
issues they stipulated to can forever be 
raised.14 Indeed, departing from the rule 
in section 78-34-9 invites controversy in 
every condemnation case and affords a 
means for parties to manipulate the mea-
sure of the compensation, which the statu-
tory provision attempts to prevent. 
Therefore, upon accepting the benefits 
under section 78-34-9, appellants in the 
instant cases, absent_ misrepresentation. 
are precluded fromattacking the Utah 
Neighborhood Development Act, the juris-
diction of the courts to enter the order 
granting the RDA possession of the prop-
erties, and the failure of the RDA to strict-
ly comply with statutory prerequisites to 
condemnation. Accordingly, we now turn 
to the issue of misrepresentation and the 
factual circumstances underlying the stipu-
lations. 
Ill 
Appellants claim that the trial courts 
erred by denying their motions in these 
cases. Without marshalling all of the evi-
dence in support of the trial courts' deter-
minations,15 appellants summarily contend 
that they were improperly induced to with-
draw their challenges to the condemnation 
proceedings by the RDA's own representa-
tions that their properties would be used 
for a municipal office building and plaza 
complex. These representations in turn al-
legedly persuaded appellants that the prop-
erties were being condemned for a public 
use. Therefore, they contend that they 
were led to believe that since the City could 
condemn their properties if the RDA failed 
in its attempt, they had no valid defense to 
the RDA's condemnation action or possibili-
ty of success in their related lawsuits. 
Consequently, they stipulated to the RDA's 
authority to condemn. Appellants now 
claim that the RDA's representations were 
either false when made or have become 
false because the RDA has abandoned the 
14. In their briefs, appellants express a willing-
ness to return the monies they withdrew if they 
could be allowed to challenge the jurisdiction 
and authority of the RDA to condemn their 
properties. Such willingness is irrelevant here. 
existence of an uncontroverted public use. 
Accordingly, appellants argue that the stip-
ulations should be dismissed and they 
should be allowed to challenge the authori-
ty of and procedures followed by the RDA. 
Also, appellants claim that the trial 
courts erred by ignoring this Court's man-
date in Tanner and by not finding clear 
and convincing evidence of unilateral mis-
take or material misrepresentation requir-
ing rescission of the stipulations. In short, 
appellants would have us believe that the 
lower courts arbitrarily disregarded and 
failed to fairly examine evidence on remand 
that plainly showed material misrepresen-
tation and justifiable mistake that culmi-
nated in the stipulations to waive jurisdic-
tional defenses. We are not persuaded. 
First, the orders and opinion of this 
Court on remand did not mandate a partic-
ular result. Rather, we instructed the trial 
courts to take additional evidence and give 
due consideration to that evidence before 
reaching a conclusion.16 At the evidentiary 
hearings, both trial courts heard extensive 
evidence regarding appellants' contentions. 
Appellants were given ample opportunity 
to present their evidence and arguments 
regarding mistake and misrepresentation. 
That the trial courts below declined to 
adopt appellants' contentions does not 
prove that they failed to give due consider-
ation to appellants' evidence. Upon our 
review of the records, we conclude that the 
trial courts did not fail to comply with our 
orders and previous decision. 
[3] Second, appellants' claims are predi-
cated on our acceptance of their version of 
the events which occurred and how the 
trial courts should have perceived the cir-
cumstances as they existed. However, the 
facts appellants advance in support of their 
arguments are carefully chosen to the ex-
clusion of other evidence in the records 
supporting the lower courts' decisions. 
Due to the trial court's advantaged posi-
15. Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah 
1987) (citing Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)). 
16. See Tanner, 649 P.2d at 5-6. 
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tion, the presumptions favor its judg-
ment.17 Where there is dispute and dis-
agreement in the evidence, we assume that 
the trial judge believed those aspects and 
fairly drew the inferences to be derived 
therefrom which gave his decision sup-
port.18 To this end, neither trial judge 
found credible the evidence appellants mar-
shalled. Instead, the courts viewed the 
evidence as supporting the determination 
that there were no material misrepresenta-
tions or mistakes underlying the stipula-
tions. These conclusions are not clearly 
erroneous. Accordingly, the decisions of 
the trial courts are affirmed. 
We have also examined appellants' other 
objections to the trial courts' determina-
tions and find them to be without merit. 
IV 
Case No. 17692 
In this case, the Tanner group attacks 
the Third District Court's denial of their 
motion for a new trial based upon alleged 
jury misconduct and failure to allow the 
RDA's consultant to testify as an expert 
witness. In April 1981, appellants present-
ed affidavits alleging that several jurors 
had viewed the subject property during the 
trial on just compensation. Appellants 
claim that these unauthorized views were 
prejudicial grounds for a new trial. In 
denying appellants' motion for a new trial 
on the grounds of juror misconduct, the 
court observed: 
[Wjhatever cursory visit was made to the 
condemned property was at most harm-
less error, and did not prejudice this jury 
which took considerable amount of time 
in reviewing all of the photographs and 
17. McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 
1978). 
18. See Gillmor v. Gillmor, 657 P.2d 736, 739 
(Utah 1982). 
19. Apparently, most jurors refused to sign affi-
davits admitting any unauthorized view. 
20. 75 Wash. 430, 134 P. 1097 (1913). 
21. Id. at 437, 134 P. at 1099-1100. See also 
State v. Marvin, 124 Ariz. 555, 559, 606 P.2d 406, 
testimony of experts before arriving at 
its verdict. 
Upon review of the record, the trial judge's 
determination is not clearly erroneous. 
[4] First, a majority of the affidavits 
offered by appellants should not have been 
considered. Specifically, appellants provid-
ed several affidavits of affiants who 
"polled" the individual jurors. These affi-
davits purported to restate what jurors told 
the affiants after being contacted some-
time subsequent to the trial.19 As early as 
1913, courts held that affidavits filed by 
third persons were not competent to im-
peach jury verdicts. In Maryland Casual-
ty Co. v. Seattle Electric Co.,20 that court 
held that "affidavits of third persons as to 
unsworn statements of jurors tending to 
show either the fact of misconduct or its 
effects upon the verdict cannot be received 
for any purpose because they are of a 
purely hearsay character."21 Because ap-
pellants' affidavits are primarily of this 
character, the trial judge could properly 
refuse to consider them. 
Second, appellants offered the affidavit 
of Don K. Green ("Juror Green") and con-
tended that his view was manifestly preju-
dicial because of the changed conditions of 
the condemned property and the surround-
ing premises. In the past, this Court has 
ruled that in eminent domain proceedings, 
the jury is precluded from basing its ver-
dict on self-obtained evidence not presented 
at trial.22 However, many courts have held 
that an unauthorized visit by a juror will be 
regarded as harmless where the visit did 
not disclose any evidence not already ad-
mitted at trial.23 Jury misconduct, there-
410 (1980) (en banc); Rowley v. Group Health 
Coop., 16 Wash.App. 373, 379, 556 P.2d 250, 254 
(1976). 
22. State ex rel Road Comm'n v. White, 22 Utah 
2d 102, 103, 449 P.2d 114 (1969). 
23. See, e.g., Nelson v. C & C Plywood Corp., 154 
Mont. 414, 432-33, 465 P.2d 314, 324 (1970); 
Winters v. Hassenbusch, 89 S.W.2d 546, 552-53 
(Mo.CtApp.1936); Reed v. L Hammel Dry 
Goods Co., 21S Ala. 494, 497, 111 So. 237, 239-40 
(1927). 
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fore, must be judged on the individual facts 
and circumstances of the case.24 
In the instant case, review of Juror 
Green's affidavit indicates that he experi-
enced no more than a cursory view of the 
subject premises. Indeed, "[he merely] 
went inside the building along the hall of 
the first floor and then went out of the 
building. He then looked down the alley 
and looked at the side of the building/' In 
contrast, numerous photographs of both 
the inside and outside of the building were 
received into evidence at trial, after the 
court determined that they adequately de-
picted the property on the day of its taking. 
Appellants, however, cite this Court's de-
cision in State ex rel Road Commission v. 
White25 as determinative of this issue. In 
White, individuals had "razed the frame 
house and extensively had demolished the 
interiors of the other buildings/'26 There-
fore, because of one juror's unauthorized 
view of the property, "the jury well may 
have been influenced adversely with re-
spect to an objective valuation of the prop-
erty as of the time of taking." v White is 
distinguishable because that property had 
been vandalized and burned after the own-
er had vacated and before the compensa-
tion hearing. In contrast, appellants here-
in were still using the building in question 
as of the time of this just compensation 
proceeding.28 Apparently, then, it had not 
significantly deteriorated and was not suf-
fering from nonuse. Moreover, appellant 
Kesler himself testified at trial that the 
pictures admitted into evidence accurately 
reflected the property at the time of its 
taking, as well as at the time of trial. So, 
contrary to the assertion of appellants, the 
condition of the property had not changed 
significantly from the date of its taking 
until the date of trial. 
[5] Accordingly, the jury's verdict in 
this caae was fully supported by the evi-
dence, and the observations made by the 
offending juror did not add to the evidence 
24. See White, 22 Utah 2d at 103, 449 P.2d at 115. 
25. 22 Utah 2d 102, 449 P.2d 114. 
26. 22 Utah 2d at 103, 449 P.2d at 114. 
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properly received and considered by the 
jury. Therefore, any error was harmless, 
and this reason for a new trial must fail. 
Finally, appellants contend that the trial 
court erred in not allowing them to call the 
RDA's consultant to testify as an expert 
witness regarding the value of the proper-
ty. By means of a motion in limine, the 
RDA excluded consultant Raymond Fletch-
er from giving subpoenaed testimony on 
the basis of the attorney-client privilege 
and the work product doctrine. Apparent-
ly, Fletcher had not actually appraised ap-
pellants' property and did not have an inde-
pendent opinion as to its value. Rather, he 
had been retained as a confidential adviser 
to review the independent appraisals and 
consult with the RDA in preparation for 
the condemnation suit. 
[6,7] Appellants argue that because 
Fletcher's opinion as to the value of the 
property was higher than that of the ap-
praiser who actually testified for the RDA, 
the value of the property was "low-balled" 
and appellants had no way to effectively 
contradict that evidence. In short, appel-
lants claim that Fletcher's testimony could 
have been used to show that the value of 
appellants' land was greater than the 
amount the RDA was offering. The court 
granted the RDA's motion in limine to ex-
clude Fletcher's testimony, apparently on 
the grounds that he had not actually ap-
praised the property and was not an expert 
witness in that sense, but rather had 
worked as a consultant and confidential 
advisor to the RDA and its attorney. We 
pass over the potential attorney-client and 
work product problems that the RDA con-
tends might have arisen had Fletcher testi-
fied, because we are satisfied that even if 
exclusion of the evidence was erroneous, 
the judgment still could not be reversed. 
The exclusion of evidence is harmless un-
less the excluded evidence would probably 
have had a substantial influence in bring-
28. Respondent notes in its brief that after the 
order of immediate occupancy was entered, the 
subject property was leased back to defendants. 
27. Id. 
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ing about a different verdict or finding.29 
Upon viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the jury verdict,80 there 
is no reasonable likelihood that a different 
result would have followed from permitting 
the jury to consider the testimony of 
Fletcher as to the appraised value of the 
property; at least two other appraisers 
who actually appraised the property testi-
fied as to its value.31 Nor have appellants 
shown that other appraisers were unavail-
able. Indeed, the record indicates that at 
least one other individual who actually ap-
praised the property was not called by ap-
pellants to testify. 
Appellants have not shown, and we do 
not believe, that Fletcher's testimony 
would have substantially affected the out-
come. Therefore, exclusion of his testimo-
ny was not prejudicial error. 
V 
Conclusion 
In sum, the determinations of the trial 
courts are not clearly erroneous, and there 
is no basis for reversing the judgments. 
Accordingly, the orders are in all respects 
affirmed. 
STEWART, Associate CJ., HOWE 
and DURHAM, JJ., and GEORGE E. 
BALLIF, District Judge, concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., having disqualified 
himself, does not participate herein; 
Ballif, District Judge, sat 
29. Hill v. Hartog, 658 P.2d 1206, 1208 (Utah 
1983); Gillmor, 657 P.2d at 743. 
30. Hill, 658 P.2d at 1209. 
Chad A. SPOR, Ray Spor, Paul C. Spor, 
Spor Brothers Motor Company, a Utah 
corporation, Spors, Inc., a Utah corpo-
ration, and Gold-Spor Mining Compa-
ny, a Wyoming corporation, Plaintiffs 
and Respondents, 
v. 
CRESTED BUTTE SILVER MINING, 
INC., a Colorado corporation, Defend-
ant, Third-Party Plaintiff, and Appel-
lant, 
v. 
CANDELARIA METALS, INC., a Nevada 
corporation, Third-Party Defendant. 
No. 19403. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 25, 1987. 
In action which sought declaration of 
rescission or termination of preincorpora-
tion contract, the Fourth District Court, 
Millard County, David Sam, J., granted 
summary judgment in favor of first con-
tracting party and second party appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Stewart, Associate 
CJ., held that genuine issues of material 
fact regarding whether prepayment of loan 
between parties was intended to satisfy all 
obligations of both parties under agree-
ment, thus constituting either rescission or 
accord and satisfaction of entire agree-
ment, precluded grant of summary judg-
ment. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Contracts «=»252, 253 
Mutual rescission is like contract to 
undo prior contract and must include at 
least offer and acceptance and evidence 
mutual meeting of minds to rescind; this 
may take form of simple offer and accept-
ance or demand followed by agreement or 
31. The fact that appellants' own appraiser testi-
fied that the property was worth $850,000 re-
futes appellants' argument that without Fletch-
er's testimony, they had no way to contradict 
the estimate of the RDA's appraiser. 
STATE v. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
David Franklin YOUNG, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 890424. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 17, 1993. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Timothy 
R. Hanson, J., of first-degree murder and 
theft and was sentenced to death, and he 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J-, 
held that: (1) death statute is constitution-
al; (2) court acted within discretion in or-
dering defendant to be shackled during 
portions of penalty phase; (3) prosecutor 
was entitled to introduce additional aggra-
vating circumstances at penalty phase that 
were not charged or proven in the guilt 
phase; (4) defendant's pro se answer to 
civil complaint filed by victim's sister was 
properly admitted; (5) court properly al-
lowed prosecutor to present rebuttal argu-
ment at penalty phase; (6) court properly 
rejected proffered instruction that jury 
could consider sympathy at penalty phase; 
(7) court should have upheld defendant's 
challenge for cause to juror who stated 
that death penalty was always appropriate; 
(8) jury should have been permitted to con-
sider possible verdict of guilty and mental-
ly ill; and (9) defendant was entitled to 
present allocution by way of statement to 
jurors prior to deliberation at penalty 
phase. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Zimmerman, Durham and Stewart, JJ-, 
concurred in part and dissented in part and 
filed opinions. 
Hall, C.J. and Howe, Acting, C.J., dis-
sented in part. 
1. Homicide <e=>357(9) 
Aggravating circumstance of death 
penalty statute that the homicide was com-
mitted for personal or pecuniary gain gave 
adequate notice to defendant that it applied 
YOUNG Utah 327 
327 (Utah 1993) 
to the killing of the victim and taking of 
her purse, money, credit cards, and truck. 
(Per Chief Justice Hall, with one Justice 
concurring and one Justice concurring in 
the result.) U.C.A.1953, 76-5-202(l)(f). 
2. Homicide <$=>343 
In view of fact that jury found first-
degree murder with aggravating circum-
stances that the murder occurred during 
attempt to commit rape and for pecuniary 
gain, any error in applying to defendant 
aggravating circumstance that defendant 
had previous felony conviction was harm-
less with respect to determination that de-
fendant was eligible for death penalty. 
(Per Chief Justice Hall, with one Justice 
concurring and one Justice concurring in 
the result.) U.C.A.1953, 76-5-202(l)(d, f, h). 
3. Constitutional Law <s=>55 
Doctrine of separation of powers pro-
hibits state of Utah from requiring federal 
courts to review Utah conviction. (Per 
Chief Justice Hall, with one Justice concur-
ring and one Justice concurring in the re-
sult.) 
4. Criminal Law <s=>1206.1(2) 
Death penalty under Utah statutory 
scheme is constitutional. (Per Chief Jus-
tice Hall, with one Justice concurring and 
one Justice concurring in the result.) 
U.C.A.1953, 76-5-202. 
5. Jury e»33(l.l, 2.10) 
Defendant has right to impartial jury 
drawn from fair cross section of communi-
ty. 
*. Jury *=>33a.U 
To establish prima facie violation of 
right to jury that represents fair cross sec-
tion of community, defendant must show 
that excluded group represented distinctive 
group in community, that group was not 
fairly and reasonably represented in jury 
venires, and that underrepresentation is 
due to systematic exclusion of group dur-
ing jury selection process. 
7. Jury <3=>33(1.10) 
Geographical distribution and socioeco-
nomic status are not distinctive classifica-
tions or groups for Sixth Amendment fair 
STATE v 
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XIX. MERGING OF THEFT 
CONVICTION 
[68] Defendant claims that his convic-
tion for theft should merge with his mur-
der conviction because theft is a lesser 
included offense of first degree murder 
under the aggravating circumstance that 
the murder was committed for personal or 
pecuniary gain. A defendant cannot be 
convicted of both first degree murder and a 
lesser included offense of that crime.221 
We have determined that one crime is a 
lesser included offense of another "where 
the two crimes are 'such that the greater 
cannot be committed without necessarily 
having committed the lesser.'"222 This 
court examined the relationship between 
lesser included offenses and the aggrava-
ting circumstances under the first degree 
murder statute in the case of State v. Shaf- • 
fer.m Although we held in Shaffer that 
the defendant's conviction of robbery 
merged with his conviction of murder un-
der aggravating circumstance (h) in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-202, we stated that a 
defendant could be convicted of a crime 
that might also serve as the basis for an 
aggravating circumstance if the prosecu-
tion did not rely on that crime for proof of 
the aggravating circumstance.224 
[69] In determining whether the State 
relied on proof of the theft for its proof of 
the aggravating circumstance, it becomes 
necessary to examine what was actually 
proved at trial.225 The jury convicted de-
fendant of theft of a motor vehicle. The 
jury also convicted him under the aggrava-
ting circumstances in subsections (d) (rape), 
22!. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3). 
222. State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983) 
(quoting State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 
1983)). 
223. 725 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1986). 
224. Id. at 1314 n. 3. 
225. Hill, 674 P.2d at 97. 
226. The evidence, including defendant's own 
statements in his confession and in the pro se 
answer introduced in the penalty phase, also 
indicated that he killed the victim in order to 
prevent her from identifying him and to aid him 
Utah Rap 853-^ 857 P2d—3 
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(h) (prior felony), and (f) (pecuniary or oth-
er personal gain). Evidence at trial was 
sufficient to prove aggravating factors (d) 
and (h) and also sufficient to prove that in 
addition to the victim's motor vehicle, de-
fendant took her credit cards, her purse, 
and her money.226 This additional evidence 
independently supports a finding of murder 
for gain under subsection (f). The crime of 
murder in the first degree under subsection 
(f) could have been proved absent the theft 
conviction. The trial court correctly deter-
mined that the theft conviction should not 
merge with the first degree murder convic-
tion. 
XX. CUMULATIVE ERROR 
Defendant claims that the cumulative ef-
fect of errors during the guilt and penalty 
phases of his trial require a new penalty 
hearing. The doctrine of cumulative error 
allows for a new trial when standing alone, 
no error is severe enough to warrant a new 
trial, but when considered together, the 
errors denied the defendant a fair trial.227 
This court ascribes to the doctrine of cumu-
lative error, but we do not believe that the 
doctrine warrants a new trial or penalty 
hearing in this case. Although defendant 
has claimed many errors on appeal, we 
have determined that the majority of his 
claims do not constitute error; the remain-
der are merely harmless error. We have 
examined the effect of the harmless errors 
and determine that the cumulation of these 
errors did not result in a fundamentally 
unfair trial.228 Therefore, the doctrine of 
in leaving the state. This evidence could be 
used to support a finding of "other personal 
gain" under subsection (f). While we have not 
defined "other personal gain," it seems clear 
that the purposes of escape and prevention of 
identification would fit within the plain mean-
ing of those terms. 
227. State v. Ellis, 748 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1987); 
State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (Utah 
1986). 
228. See generally State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 
499-500 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concur-
ring) (discussing harmlessness of several errors 
in light of confession and other evidence of guilt 
and gruesomeness of crime). 
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cumulative error does not afford defendant 
relief.22* 
We have duly reviewed defendant's other 
claims of error raised in the context of the 
points above and find them to be without 
merit.230 
Associate Chief Justice Howe concurs in 
this opinion, and we would affirm the con-
viction and sentence. However, a majority 
of the court, in the opinions that follow, 
reverse and remand for a new trial. 
HOWE, Associate C.J., concurs. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
I dissent from parts II, IV, X, XII, XV, 
and XVII.A of the lead opinion. I dissent 
in part from part VI of the lead opinion. I 
concur in the result reached in part VIII of 
the lead opinion but dissent from its ratio-
nale. The first three parts of this opinion 
address issues arising from the penalty 
phase of Young's trial. The next two parts 
address issues arising from the guilt phase 
of the trial. The ensuing two parts discuss 
jury selection issues. The final part ana-
lyzes the constitutionality of Utah's statu-
tory scheme for narrowing the class of 
defendants eligible for the death penalty. 
I. SHACKLING OF DEFENDANT 
DURING PENALTY PHASE 
(lead opinion part XII) 
Young argues that the trial court violat-
ed his rights under the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments when it required him 
to remain in shackles in the presence of the 
jury during the penalty phase. I concur 
with the lead opinion that "it is within the 
sound discretion of the trial court to deter-
mine the safety measures necessary to in-
sure the security of the courtroom and its 
occupants. These safety measures may in-
229. See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 288 
(Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090, 110 
S.Ct. 1837, 108 L.Ed.2d 965 (1990); Bishop, 753 
P.2d at 489; Rammel, 721 P.2d at 498, 501-02. 
230. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 896 (Utah 
1989). 
I. Even Duckett v. State, 104 Nev. 6, 752 P.2d 
752, 755 (1988), upon which the lead opinion 
relies, admits that physical restraints at sentenc-
clude shackling a defendant in appropri-
ate circumstances" (Emphasis added.) 
The problem in this case is the manifest 
lack of the requisite necessity. Young's 
unwarranted shackling amounted to an im-
permissible comment on the evidence and 
violated his due process rights by creating 
unacceptable prejudice. 
Because of the inherently prejudicial im-
pact of appearing shackled before the jury, 
courtroom shackling is permitted only "as 
a last resort." See Illinois v. Allen, 397 
U.S. 337, 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061, 25 
L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). In all the cases I have 
examined, reviewing courts have required a 
showing of necessity before tolerating a 
trial court's decision to shackle. See, e.g., 
Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712, 728 (9th 
Cir.1989), cert, denied, 495 U.S. 910, 110 
S.Ct. 1937, 109 L.Ed.2d 300 (1990); Elledge 
v. Bugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1452 (11th Cir. 
1987), cert denied, 485 U.S. 1014, 108 S.Ct. 
1487, 99 L.Ed.2d 715 (1988); Tyars v. Fin-
ner, 709 F.2d 1274, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1983); 
People v. Duran, 16 Cal.3d 282, 290, 127 
Cal.Rptr. 618, 623, 545 P.2d 1322, 1327 
(1976); Bello v. State, 547 So.2d 914, 918 
(Fla.1989).1 Thus, I agree with the Ninth 
Circuit that "a trial judge may . . . impose 
restraints only when 'confronted with dis-
ruptive, contumacious, [and] stubbornly de-
fiant defendants.' . . . Shackling . . . must 
be limited to cases urgently demanding 
that action." Tyars, 709 F.2d at 1284 
(quoting Allen, 397 U.S. at 343, 90 S.Ct. at 
1060-61). 
Furthermore, before a court may shackle 
a disruptive defendant, it must first "pur-
sue less restrictive alternatives." Spain, 
883 F.2d at 721; see also Tyars, 709 F.2d 
at 1284. Lesser restraints could include 
increasing courtroom security personnel, 
ing may not be imposed absent necessity. Fur-
thermore, although Duckett upheld a sentenc-
ing-stage shackling order, it did not, as the lead 
opinion suggests, hold that the constitutional 
right to be free of shackles did not exist at 
sentencing; it held only that the constitutional 
right to be free of prison garb, established in 
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 
48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976). did not exist at sentenc-
ing. 
27-12-160 HIGHWAYS 1186 
27-12-160.' 1-15 designated as Veterans' Memo-
rial Highway. 
(1) There is established the Veterans' Memorial 
Highway composed of the existing Interstate High-
way 15 from the Utah-Idaho border to the Utah-Ari-
zona border. 
(2) The department shall designate Interstate 15 
as the "Veterans' Memorial Highway" on all future 
state highway maps. 1991 
27-12-161. Legacy Loop Highway. 
(1) There is established Legacy Loop Highway 
comprising the existing highway from Route 15 south 
of St George, northerly on Route 18 to Route 56 at 
Beryl Junction, then easterly on Route 56 to Inter-
state Highway 15 in Cedar City. 
(2) The Department of Transportation shall desig-
nate the portions of the highways identified in Sub-
section (1) as the Legacy Loop Highway on all future 
state highway maps. 1991 
CHAPTER 13 
COLLECTOR ROAD CONSTRUCTION ACT 
(Repealed by Laws 1975, ch. 76, § 47; 1982, 
ch. 30, § 5.) 
27-13-1 to 27-13-10. Repealed. 
CHAPTER 14 
Section 
27-14-1 
27-14-2 
27-14-3. 
27-14-4. 
27-14-5. 
27-14-6. 
27-14-7. 
27-14-8. 
SIDEWALK CONSTRUCTION 
Citation. 
Purpose. 
Definitions. 
Designated county and city sidewalks — 
Construction on easements granted by 
transportation department. 
Funding priorities by county and city of-
ficials — Factors. 
Pedestrian safety to be considered in 
highway planning. 
Rules and regulations — Transportation 
department — Cooperation with the 
county legislative body. 
County or city granting exemption from 
construction — Not eligible to utilize 
funds under act. 
27-14-L Citation. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the 
"Utah Sidewalk Construction Act" 1975 (1st s s.> 
27-14-2. Purpose. 
The legislature recognizes that adequate sidewalks 
and pedestrian safety devices are essential to the gen-
eral welfare of the citizens of the state It is the opin-
ion of the legislature that existing sidewalks within 
the state, especially in the most populated areas, are 
not adequate to service the walking public with a 
result of creating unnecessary hazards to pedestrian 
and vehicular traffic. It is the intent of this act to 
provide a means whereby a portion of the funds re-
ceived by the counties and participating cities as B 
and C road funds may be used for the construction of 
curbs, gutters, sidewalks and pedestrian safety de-
vices pursuant to the guidelines set forth in this act 
The legislature deems it to be in the best interest of 
the state if pedestrian safety construction t» to be 
performed on state highways that it be performed un-
der the direction of the counties and participating 
cities pursuant to rules and regulations of the state 
Department of Transportation developed in coopera-
tion with the counties and participating cities It u 
the further intention of the legislature that the fundj 
permitted to be expended pursuant to this act be 
deemed add.cional to funds normally used by countiee 
and participating cities for sidewalk construction and 
shall not be used in substitution for local sidewalk 
construction funds. 1*75 (lit &JJ 
27-14-3. Definitions. 
As used in this act 
(1) "Construction" means the function of con-
structing or reconstructing a sidewalk with or 
without curb and gutter and shall include land 
acquisition, engineering or inspection and may 
be more fully defined by the rules and regula-
tions of the Department of Transportation 
(2) "Participating city" means any city having 
at least third class status 
(3) "Curb and gutter" means the area between 
the roadway and sidewalk designed for water 
runoff and safety of pedestrian and vehicular 
traffic 
(4) "Pedestrian safety devices" means any de-
vice or method designed to foster the safety of 
pedestrian traffic. 1975 a* SJJ 
27-14-4. Designated county and city sidewalka 
— Construction on easements granted 
by transportation department 
(1) All sidewalks, including curbs and gutters 
within the unincorporated areas of a county and 
within nonparticipating cities or towns situated 
within the county, shall be designated county side-
walks. All sidewalks within participating cities shall 
be designated city sidewalks 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law 
counties and participating cities may construct and 
maintain curbs, gutters, sidewalks and pedestrian 
safety devices adjacent to the traveled portion of state 
highways upon easements that may be granted by 
the state Department of Transportation. The state 
Department of Transportation shall cooperate with 
counties and participating cities to accomplish pedes-
trian safety construction and maintenance. 
1975 (1st a&) 
27-14-5. Funding priorities by county and city 
officials — Factors. 
(1) The county legislative body of the counties and 
the governing officials of participating cities may es-
tablish funding priorities relating to construction of 
curbs, gutters, sidewalks or other pedestrian safety 
construction, with funds permitted to be expended by 
this act, based on factors including, but not limited to. 
(a) existing useable rights-of-way; 
(b) auto-pedestrian accident experience; 
(c) average daily automobile traffic; 
(d) average daily pedestrian traffic; 
(e) average daily school age pedestrian traffic; 
and 
(f) speed of automobile traffic. 
(2) All construction performed pursuant to this act 
shall be barrier free to wheelchairs at crosswalks and 
intersections. ^^j 
27-14-e. Pedestrian safety to be considered in 
highway planning. 
Pedestrian safety consideration* shall be included 
in all state highway engineering and planning where 
pedestrian traffic would be a significant factor on all 
27-12-96. Acquisition of rights-of-way and other 
real property. 
The department may acquire any real property or 
interests in real property necessary for temporary, 
present, or reasonable future state highway purposes 
by gift, agreement, exchange, purchase, condemna-
tion, or otherwise. Highway purposes as used in this 
chapter includes: 
(1) rights-of-way, including those necessary 
for state highways within cities and towns; 
(2) the construction, reconstruction, reloca-
tion, improvement, and maintenance of the state 
highways and other highways, roads, and streets 
under the control of the department; 
(3) limited access facilities, including rights of 
access, air, light, and view and frontage and ser-
vice roads to highways; 
(4) adequate drainage in connection with any 
highway, cut, fill, or channel change and the 
maintenance of any highway, cut, fill, or channel 
change; 
(5) weighing stations, shops, offices, storage 
buildings and yards, and road maintenance or 
construction sites; 
(6) road material sites, sites for the manufac-
ture of road materials, and, access roads to the 
sites; 
(7) the maintenance of an unobstructed view 
of any portion of a highway to promote the safety 
of the traveling public; 
(8) the placement of traffic signals, directional 
signs, and other signs, fences, curbs, barriers, 
and obstructions for the convenience of the trav-
eling public; 
(9) the construction and maintenance of storm 
sewers, sidewalks, and highway illumination; 
(10) the construction and maintenance of live-
stock highways; and 
(11) the construction and maintenance of road-
side rest areas adjacent to or near any highway. 
1991 
78-34-7 JUDICIAL CODE 346 
(2) the names of all owners and claimants of 
the property, if known, or a statement that they 
are unknown, who must be styled defendants 
(3) a statement of the right of the plaintiff 
(4) if a right of way is sought, the complaint 
must show its location, general route and ter-
mini, and must be accompanied by a map thereof, 
so far as the same is involved in the action or 
proceeding. 
(5) a description of each piece of land sought to 
be taken, and whether the same includes the 
whole or only part of an entire parcel or tract All 
parcels lying in the county and required for the 
same public use may be included in the same or 
separate proceedings, at the option of the plain-
tiff, but the court may consolidate or separate 
them to suit the convenience of parties 1953 
78-34-7. Who may appear and defend. 
All persons in occupation of, or having or claiming 
an interest in, any of the property described in the 
complaint, or in the damages for the taking thereof, 
though not named, may appear, plead and defend, 
each in respect to his own property or interest, or that 
claimed by him, in the same manner as if named in 
the complaint. 1953 
78-34-8. Powers of court or judge. 
The court or judge thereof shall have power 
(1) to hear and determine all adverse or con-
flicting claims to the property sought to be con-
demned, and to the damages therefor, and 
(2) to determine the respective rights of differ-
ent parties seeking condemnation of the same 
property. / 1981 
78-34-9. Occupancy of premises pending action 
— Deposit paid into court — Proce-
dure for payment of compensation. 
The plaintiff may move the court or a judge thereof, 
at any time after the commencement of suit, on notice 
to the defendant, if he is a resident of the state, or has 
appeared by attorney in the action, otherwise by serv-
ing a notice directed to him on the clerk of the court, 
tor an order permitting the plaintiff to occupy the 
premises sought to be condemned pending the action, 
including appeal, and to do such work thereon as may 
be required The court or a judge thereof shall take 
proof by affidavit or otherwise of the value of the 
premises sought to be condemned and of the damages 
which will accrue from the condemnation, and of the 
reasons for requiring a speedy occupation, and shall 
grant or refuse the motion according to the equity of 
the case and the relative damages which may accrue 
to the parties. If the motion is granted, the court or 
judge shall enter its order requiring the plaintiff as a 
condition precedent to occupancy to file with the clerk 
of the court a sum equivalent to at least 75% of the 
condemning authority's appraised valuation of the 
property sought to be condemned. The amount thus 
fixed shall be for the purposes of the motion only, and 
shall not be admissible in evidence on final hearing 
The rights of the just compensation for the land so 
taken or damaged shall vest in the parties entitled 
thereto, and said compensation shall be ascertained 
and awarded as provided in Section 78-34-10 and es-
tablished by judgment therein, and the said judgment 
shall include, a* part of the just compensation 
awarded, interest at the rate of 8% per annum on the 
amount finally awarded as the value of the property 
and damages, from the date of taking actual posses-
sion thereof by the plaintiff or order of occupancy, 
whichever is earlier, to the date of judgment, but in-
terest shall not be allowed on so much thereof as shall 
have been paid into court Upon the application of the 
parties in interest, the court shall order the money 
deposited in the court be paid forthwith for or on ac-
count of the just compensation to be awarded in the 
proceeding A payment to a defendant as aforeaaid 
shall be held to be an abandonment by such defen-
dant of all defenses excepting his claim for greater 
compensation If the compensation finally awarded ii 
respect of such lands, or any parcel thereof, shall ei-
ceed the amount of the money so received the court 
shall ent-r judgment against the plaintiff for tot 
amount of the deficiency If the amount of money at 
received by the defendant is greater than the araoue* 
finally awarded, the court shall enter judgment 
against the defendant for the amount of the excee* 
Upon the filing of the petition for immediate occu-
pancy the court shall fix the time within which, ana* 
the terms upon which, the parties in possebsion *oafl 
be required to surrender possession to the plainutf 
The court shall make such orders in respect to encua> 
brances, hens, rents, assessments, insurance at* 
other charges, if any, as shall be just and equitable. 
78-34-10. Compensation and damages — He* 
assessed. 
The court, jury or referee must hear such leg*! evi-
dence as may be offered by any of the parties to int 
proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and m 
sess. 
(1) the value of the property sought to be ow> 
demned and all improvements thereon *w* 
taming to the realty, and of each and every ite-
rate estate or interest therein, and if it conawuef 
different parcels, the value of each parcel and ef 
each estate or interest therein shall be sepafalefr 
assessed 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned o*> 
stitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the < 
ages which will accrue to the portion not *> 
to be condemned by reason of its severance 1 
the portion sought to be condemned and the o»> 
struction of the improvement in the manner an* 
posed by the plaintiff. 
(3) if the property, though no part thereof • 
taken, will be damaged by the construcuoo 4 Jae 
proposed improvement, the amount of such daw 
ages. 
(4) separately, how much the portion •** 
sought to be condemned, and each estate or inter 
est therein, will be benefited, if at all by «•» 
construction of the improvement propoaed if enf 
plaintiff If the benefit shall be equal to the «**> 
ages assessed under Subdivision (2) 0/ lh» m 
tion, the owner of the parcel shall be allow* m 
compensation except the value of the perta* 
taken, but if the benefit shall be lese the* m 
damages so assessed, the former shall be *> 
ducted from the latter, and the remainder a** 
be the only damages allowed in addition at • * 
value of the portion taken. 
(5) As far as practicable compensation Mall* 
assessed for each source of damages separately 
78-34-11. When right to damages 
have accrued. 
For the purpose of assessing compenanUea 
damages, the right thereto shall be deemed le * 
accrued at the date of the service of summon* a* 
actual value at that date shall be the measure** 
pensation for all property to be actually Unea\ i 
70-34-11. When right to damages deemed * 
have accrued. 
For the purpose of assessing compensation •*• 
damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to h*w 
accrued at the date of the service of summons, and IU 
actual value at that date shall be the measure of co» 
penaation for all property to be actually taken, ud 
\ tot basis of damages to property not actually taken, 
I tot injuriously affected, in all cases where such dam-
[ ges are allowed, as provided in the next preceding 
I gction (Section 78-34-10). No improvements put 
I fon the property subsequent to the date of service of 
I «mmons shall be included in the assessment of com-
I jmsauon or damages. less 
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PREAMBLE 
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, 
the people of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate 
the principles of free government, do ordain and es-
tablish this CONSTITUTION. 1896 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 
1. [Inherent and inalienable r ights . ! 
2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
4. [Religious liberty — No property qualification to 
vote or hold office. 1 
5. [Habeas corpus.] 
6. [Right to bear arms.J 
7. [Due process of law.] 
8. [Offenses bailable.] 
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.] 
10. [Trial by jury.] 
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
[Rights of accused persons.] [Proposed.] 
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of 
warrant.] 
15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
17. [Elections to be free •— Soldiers voting.] 
18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impair ing 
contracts.] 
19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
22. (Private property for public use.] 
23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
25. (Rights retained by people.] 
26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
27. (Fundamental rights.] 
28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.] [Pro-
posed.) 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.) 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to 
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, 
possess and protect property; to worship according to 
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peace-
ably, protest against wrongs, and petition for redress 
of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts 
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that 
right. 1896 
Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the peo-
ple.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all 
free governments are founded on their authority for 
their equal protection and benefit, and they have the 
right to alter or reform their government as the pub-
lic welfare may require. 1896 
Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.] 
The State of Utah is an inseparable part of the 
Federal Union and the Constitution of the United 
States is the supreme law of the land. 1896 
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty — No property qualifi-
cation to vote or hold office.] 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. 
The Sta te shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion or prohibit ing the free exercise 
thereof; no religious test shall be required as a quali-
fication for any office of public t rus t or for any vote at 
any election; nor shall any person be incompetent as 
a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the 
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church 
and State , nor shall any church dominate the State or 
interfere with i ts functions. No public money or prop-
erty shall be appropriated for or applied to any reli-
gious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the sup-
port of any ecclesiastical establ ishment. No property 
qualification shall be required of any person to vote, 
or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 
1896 
Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, 
the public safety requires it. 1896 
Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.] 
The individual r ight of the people to keep and bear 
a rms for security and defense of self, family, others, 
property, or the s tate , as well as for other lawful pur-
poses shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall 
prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use 
of arms. 1984 (2nd S.S.) 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law. 1896 
Sec. 8. [Offenses bailable.] 
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bail-
able except: 
411 
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Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in 
levving war against it, or in adhering to its enemies 
or in giving them aid and comfort No person shall be 
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two 
witnesses to the same overt act 1896 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil 
power. 1 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the 
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be 
quartered in any house without the consent of the 
owner, nor in time of war except in a manner to be 
prescribed by law 1896 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.! 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall 
have been duly convicted, shall exist within this 
State 1896 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.l 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation 1896 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any 
franchise, privilege or immunity 1896 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation 1896 
Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed 
to impair or deny others retained by the people 1896 
Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibi-
tory.] 
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory 
and prohibitory, unless by express words they are de-
clared to be otherwise 1896 
Sec. 27. [Fundamental rights.] 
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is 
essential to the security of individual rights and the 
perpetuity of free government 1896 
Sec. 28. [Declaration of the rights of crime vic-
tims.] [Proposed.] 
(1) To preserve and protect victims' rights to jus-
tice and due process, victims of crimes have these 
rights, as defined by law 
(a) To be treated with fairness, respect, and 
dignity, and to be free from harassment and 
abuse throughout the criminal justice process, 
(b) Upon request, to be informed of, be present 
at, and to be heard at important criminal justice 
hearings related to the victim, either in person or 
through a lawful representative, once a criminal 
information or indictment charging a crime has 
been publicly filed in court, and 
(c) To have a sentencing judge, for the purpose 
of imposing an appropriate sentence, receive and 
consider, without evidentiary limitation, reliable 
information concerning the background, charac-
ter, and conduct of a peioon convicted of an of-
fense except that this subsection does not apply 
to capital cases or situations involving privileges 
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as 
creating a cause of action tor money damages, costs, 
or attorney's fees, or for dismissing any criminal 
charge, or relief from any criminal judgment 
(3) The provisions of this section shall extend to all 
felony crimes and such other crimes or acts, including 
juvenile offenses, as the Legislature may provide 
(4) The Legislature shall have the power to enforce 
and define this section by statute (19941 
ARTICLE II 
STATE BOUNDARIES 
Section 
1 [State boundaries ] 
Section 1. [State boundaries.] 
The boundaries of the S ta te of U tah shall be as 
follows 
Beginning a t a point formed by the intersection of 
the thirty-second degree of longitude west from 
Washington, with the thir ty-seventh degree of nor th 
la t i tude, thence due west along said thir ty-seventh 
degree of nor th la t i tude to the intersection of the 
same with the thi r ty-seventh degree of longitude 
west from Washington, thence due north along said 
thi r ty-seventh degree of west longitude to the inter-
section of the same with the forty-second degree of 
north la t i tude , thence due eas t along said forty-sec-
ond degree of nor th la t i tude to the intersection of the 
same with the thir ty-fourth degree of longitude west 
from Washington, thence due south along said thir ty-
fourth degree of west longitude to the intersection of 
the same with the forty-first degree of north la t i tude, 
thence due eas t along said forty-first degree of nor th 
la t i tude to the intersection of the same with the 
thirty-second degree of longitude west from Washing-
ton, thence due south along said thirty-second degree 
of west longitude to the place of beginning 1896 
ARTICLE III 
ORDINANCE 
[Religious toleration — Polygamy forbidden ] 
[Right to public domain disclaimed — Taxation of 
lands — Exemption ] 
[Territorial debts assumed ] 
[Free nonsectanan schools ] 
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable with-
out the consent of the United States and the people of 
this State 
[Religious toleration — Polygamy forbidden.] 
First — Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is 
guaranteed No inhabitant of this State shall ever be 
molested m person or property on account of his or 
her mode of religious worship, but polygamous or plu-
ral marriages are forever prohibited 1896 
[Right to public domain disclaimed — Taxation 
of lands — Exemption.] 
Second — The people inhabiting this State do af-
firm and declare that they forever disclaim all right 
and title to the unappropriated public lands lying 
within the boundaries hereof, and to ail lands lying 
within said limits owned or held by any Indian or 
Indian tribes, and that until the title thereto shall 
have been extinguished by the United States, the 
same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of 
the United States, and said Indian lands shall remain 
under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the 
Congress of the United States The lands belonging to 
citizens of the United States, residing without this 
State shall never be taxed at a higher rate than the 
lands belonging to residents of this State, but nothing 
Amend. I UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 406 
CHARLES COTES WORTH 
PINCKNEY, 
CHARLES PINCKNEY, 
PIERCE BUTLER. 
Georgia WILLIAM FEW, 
ABR BALDWIN. 
In Convention Monday September 17th 1787. 
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr. 
Hamilton from New York, New Jersey, Pennsylva-
nia, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina and Georgia. Resolved, 
That the preceding Constitution be laid before the 
United States in Congress assembled, and that it is 
the Opinion of this Convention, that it should after-
wards be submitted to a Convention of Delegates, 
chosen in each State by the People thereof, under the 
Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent 
and Ratification; and that each Convention assenting 
to, and ratifying the Same, should give Notice thereof 
to the United States in Congress assembled. 
Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this Convention, 
that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall 
have ratified this Constitution, the United States in 
Congress assembled should fix a Day on which Elec-
tors should be appointed by the States which shall 
have ratified the same, and a day on which the Elec-
tors should assemble to vote for the President, and 
the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings un-
der this Constitution. That after such Publication the 
Electors, should be appointed, and the Senators and 
Representatives elected: That the Electors should 
meet on the Day fixed for the Election of the Presi-
dent, and should transmit their Votes certified, 
signed, sealed and directed, as the Constitution re-
quires, to the Secretary of the United States in Con-
gress assembled, that the Senators and Representa-
tives should convene at the Time and Place assigned; 
that the Senators should appoint a President of the 
Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving, opening and 
counting the Votes for President; and, that after he 
shall be chosen, the Congress, together with the Pres-
ident, should, without Delay, proceed to execute this 
Constitution. 
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention. 
Go. WASHINGTON, Presidt. W. JACKSON, Secretary. 
AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS] 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVII 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.) 
Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the se-
curity of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in 
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in 
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
Present The States of [Quartering soldiers.! 
a. IAVAUN rox 
CHAIRMAN 
WAYNC S W1NTI US 
ViaCHAlAMAN 
Q I M H CHURCH 
SAMUCL J. TAYLOR 
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RONALD A FERNIEY 
SfCRCTARY 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
2410 We*! 2100 South 
Salt lake Gfy, Utah 84119 
October 24, 1975 
Director 
Blaine J. Kay. P.E. 
Assistant Director 
CV. Anderson, P.E. 
District Director 
W. D. Hurley, 
The Honorable Stanley Green, Mayor 
City of Centervllle 
470 North 400 West 
Centervllle, Utah 84014 
Dear Mayor Green: 
This office has received two letters from Mr. L. Val Roberts, 
Attorney at Law, pertaining to the desire of residents to install 
curb and gutter on the west side of Main Street, north of Parrish 
Lane. It is our understanding that Centervllle has an ordinance 
requiring installation of sidewalk where curb and gutter has been 
placed. 
Inasmuch as the standard state right-of-way of 66 feet was in 
question, Mr. BJorn Wang, District R/W Design Engineer, was asked to help 
resolve the problem. It appears the state does not have a 33 foot 
righc-of-way west of the monument line through the area in question, 
but that placement of the curb and gutter with the back of curb 
25.5 feet from the monument line (standard for 66' right-of-way) 
would be well within the state right-of-way. 
Mr, Edward D. Julio, District Traffic Engineer, and I, made an 
on-the-site inspection to determine the possibility of shifting the 
curb and gutter easterly to provide room for the parking strip and 
sidewalk on existing right-of-way. It is our opinion that shift 
should not be made due to the width of the present, roadway and the 
set-back of the existing curb and gutter north of the area. 
We regret that we could not be more helpfull in providing a 
solution, however, the department does not have funds for obtaining 
additional right-of-way in that area at the present time. We do 
appreciate your concern for upgrading and providing a safe traffic 
condition on state highways. 
Yours truly, 
cc: W. D, Hurley y 
L. Val Roberts^ 
B. Wang 
E. D. Julio 
// , //£ 
/fasti. ^ y~/%yft> » 
Andrew J .yoopko/ 
Cotitract Xlaima & Uti l i ty Officer 
AJS:tb 
FARMINGTON, UTAH, THURSDAY, DECEMBER 1, 1994 
* * * * * 
THE COURT: We are in chambers in the matter in 
Utah Department of Transportation vs. Joseph Val Rav Roberts 
and Verle Roberts, his wife. Case number 920700170. 
Mr. Ward is here on behalf of the Department of 
Transportation. Mr. Roberts is here representing himself and 
his wife. Mr. Roberts is a member of the bar. Counsel has 
asked to visit with the Court in chambers. 
What can I help you with, gentlemen? 
MR. WARD: Your Honor, I have a couple of 
concerns. Number one, after the taking of the depositions, 
it appears to me as though Mr. Jackman is $1,000 or less on 
his appraisal unless he's changed. We are 2,000 on our 
appraisal. I am not getting to the penny, and I am not 
representing that, I am just talking in generalities. I 
would like to know where we are going with this. 
Mr. Roberts has — when his deposition was taken, 
he's testified to 275,000. 
THE COURT: Well, let me just say at this point, 
first of all, I think I will say right now, and this is where 
we are going, and I think I've equivocated about it on this. 
The only issue before the Court is the value of the property 
and any severance damage. Those are the only issues we will 
hear, period. 
5 
spent a good deal of time researching. 
THE COURT: I have indicated before, the only 
issues before this Court at this time, Mr. Roberts, are value 
of the take before and after, and severance damage. It has 
nothing to do with the title to the property as far as where 
the line was located. That has been resolved by stipulation, 
and it's over and done. 
MR. ROBERTS: As to the value of the severance 
damages, that figure that I gave of 103,000 versus 275,000 
won't necessarily encompass the value associated with the 
loss of the use of the land on the south boundary of the 
driveway, because it's so narrow you can't do anything with 
it but grow weeds, and it would also include the loss of 
the land taken by the backfill and the berm along the west 
edge of the property, and it would also include the loss of 
the benefits from the nine-foot-high private hedge or 
eight-foot-high private hedge and the loss of the large 
willow tree, 
THE COURT: So you've included in your change of 
value all of your severance damages? 
MR. ROBERTS: That's what I've tried to do, your 
Honor, to the best of my ability. I am not otherwise 
competent to, except as a property owner, to testify as to 
what the individual value of any particular severance damage 
may be. I couldn't even tell you — 
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MR. WARD: Okay. 
MR. ROBERTS: For that limited purpose, we don't 
object. 
Q. (BY MR. WARD) So your original appraisal was 
based upon what, Mr. Hoi brook? 
A. The fact that the property necessary for 
construction of this project was already in the State 
right-of-way. 
Q. How much was that appraisal? 
A. $900. 
Q. What was that based upon? 
A. Well, it was based on a minimum value for the 
taking and the easement. Under the State acquisition 
schedules, there is a minimum value that is paid no matter 
how much property we take or whether we take any. If we need 
to get a deed and an instrument, there is a $250 minimum paid 
to the property owner, and for the temporary easement it 
would have been $100. And then I did give him some credit, 
even though it was in the right-of-way, for landscaping trees 
at the time, and it came to a total of $900 at that time. 
MR. ROBERTS: Your Honor, I am going to object to 
his testimony that the improvements were in the right-of-way 
since your Honor has — it's been offered only to explain 
that the testimony is a fact that it was that way and it is 
objectionable. 
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be considered as property taken. 
So the fact that there is a berm behind that wall 
only is relevant insofar as it may constitute a diminution in 
the value of the remainder. In this case, there is no such 
testimony that the construction of the berm behind the wall, 
the wall, the elevation of the driveway or any of those items 
which may have altered somewhat the access to defendant's 
property in any way diminished the value of the remainder. 
There is absolutely no evidence to support that argument. 
There has been evidence offered by Mr. Roberts of 
a value of the property at the time of the take to be 
$275,000. I assume he bases that on some commercial value, 
but the Court finds that the best evidence is that that was 
not the highest and best use. Even assuming it was, there is 
no basis to support that value in the property. 
As to his testimony as to the value remaining 
after the take, the Court would find that the $103,000 
estimate presented by Mr. Roberts is without support or 
foundation, and although as a property owner he has 
competency to testify relative to value, the question of the 
weight to be accorded to that testimony is for the Court, and 
the Court finds that based upon his experience, his basis for 
his estimates and general knowledge in that area, that his 
estimate in that regard is basically not competent. 
The Court further notes that there has been 
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evidence relative to a grade behind the retaining wall not 
being provided in the plans, and possibly not in conformity 
with the guidelines of the building code and even department 
standards. The Court makes no finding as to why it ended up 
in that manner. However, there has been some evidence in 
that regard, but I have heard absolutely no evidence to the 
effect that it in any way affected the value of the remainder 
so as to constitute severance damage. 
The Court will, however, order that the fill be 
placed to bring the grade up to as it's required by the 
plans. The Court will allow that either to be done by 
Mr. Roberts and reimburse him a reasonable amount or require 
that the city complete that. 
Mr. Roberts, how do you want it? Do you want, to 
do it or do you want them to do it? 
MR. ROBERTS: If those are the choices, your 
Honor, they can do it. I would prefer a different choice. 
THE COURT: That is the only alternative you 
have. The Court will order that the city is to bring the 
grade up to and equal to that provided by the plans. They 
are to slope the berm back over a three-foot area. They are 
to provide the fill sufficient to do that and sod sufficient 
to sod that from the west side of the retaining wall to a 
point three feet back from the wall. I calculate that that 
is 394 square feet of sod, and I estimate 28 cents a square 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
UTAH DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION 
Case No. 920700170 
Plaintiff 
TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
-vs-
JOSEPH VAN RAY ROBERTS 
Defendant 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the above entitled matter came on 
for hearing before the Hon. RODNEY PAGE, Judge of the above 
entitled Court on November 17, 1992. 
WHEREUPON the following proceedings were had and the 
following testimony was adduced, to wit: 
A p p e a r a n c e s : 
STEVE LEWIS, ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff; 
J. VAL ROBERTS, ESQ., 
Attorney for Defendant. 
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THE COURT: What about number 12, Utah Department of 
Transportation vs. Val Roberts. 
MR. ROBERTS: I believe that's stipulated, your 
Honor. 
MR. LEWIS; We have a resolution, if we can 
approach. 
THE COURT: You may. This is a question as far as 
the disposition of proceeds that are being held in the Clerk's 
office? 
MR. LEWIS: Right. On the calendar it reflects 
Steve Ward is the moving party. My name is Steve Lewis. 
THE COURT: I wouldn't want to be getting mixed up 
with his name either. 
MR. WARD: I can take it. 
MR. LEWIS: I don't work in the same division. I 
used to work in the same division. He is an honorable fellow. 
THE COURT: Just in jest, Mr. Ward. 
MR. LEWIS: The Motion, your Honor, is one by the 
Utah State Tax Commission for distribution of proceeds. 
Notice was given to Mr. and Mrs. Roberts and to counsel for 
UDOT. The Record should reflect that there was an affidavit 
filed reflecting amounts that were owed. 
Originally in our motion we asked for—we asked that 
monies be distributed based on liens that had been filed in 
Davis County. Currently there is $900.00 being held by the 
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Clerk of the Court here. And Mr. Roberts today is stipulating 
that monies reflected in this affidavit, which total $782.46, 
would be distributed. He has initialed it. 
MR. ROBERTS: If I may, your Honor—pardon me, about 
to lose my voice. If I may, what I am stipulating to is that 
their accounting is correct, and that the money is in fact 
owed. Because of the way at least I interpret the Utah 
statute on what happens if you remove proceeds in a 
condemnation action, I am not prepared to stipulate to the 
removal of the proceeds, except that—as far as myself is 
concerned, or my wife. What I am basically saying is that 
their accounting is correct and their liens are valid. I have 
no defense to them taking the amount of money that they have 
set out. And I have initialed the amounts as being correct. 
So as far as agreeing to the distribution per se, that's 
not what I am doing. 
MR. LEWIS: Your Honor, there is an affidavit that 
sets forth the amounts. 
THE COURT: I have seen the affidavit. 
MR. LEWIS: Okay. Out in the hall we went through 
that. I told Mr. Roberts if the distribution is made today, 
it will clear off all those balances. 
MR. ROBERTS: And I don't dispute the accounting. 
MR. LEWIS: That it would be in his interest. 
THE COURT: Well, the Court will order that the 
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funds be distributed pursuant to the accounting set forth in 
the affidavit that was filed by Jan Penney. The balance of 
those funds I suppose you would like? 
MR. ROBERTS: Oh, no, they stay here. 
THE COURT: You want to remain there. 
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: So you don't give up that question as 
far as that is concerned. 
MR. ROBERTS: That's correct, your Honor. 
THE COURT: With that understanding you may submit 
such an Order. The Court will sign that order. 
Thank you all for appearing. 
MR. LEWIS: If I can reflect on the record that a 
copy of that Order will be handed to Mr. Roberts and Mr. Ward 
today. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. LEWIS: One other small thing, on the affidavit 
it shows that the '91 return and the '91 return haven't been 
filed. Mr. Roberts reflects his '91 return has been filed 
with nothing owing. If there is something further owing, we 
may have a further motion before the Court. 
THE COURT: Well, that's between you and Mr. 
Roberts. 
MR. LEWIS: Thank you very much, your Honor. 
MR. ROBERTS; May we take the Order and get 
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THE COURT: One that requires it certain as to 
the sidewalk if federal funds are involved, and if you can 
show me the law, I'll take a look at that time and then we 
will look at whether federal funds are involved. 
MR. ROBERTS: All right. That again is Title 29 
of the federal code. 
THE COURT: Submit it in the proper form and I 
will take a look at it. You have 10 days to do it. 
MR. WARD: Your Honor, it's our position that the 
order of occupancy has been granted. He drew down on the 
money, the 7824. 
THE COURT: Hasn't the money been drawn down? 
MR. ROBERTS: No. That is another issue. 
MR. WARD: The money has been drawn down, 7824.12 
or something. The only issue left is how much. I mean if he 
had a question, he should have raised that at the time of the 
order of occupancy. We are not going to relitigate the 
design of the highway because that is not what the statute 
provides. When he draws down on the money, your Honor, and 
there is a Supreme Court case on this, Qgden vs. UDOT when he 
draws down on the money and doesn't reserve anything, the 
only issue left is how much do we owe him. 
THE COURT: Mr. Roberts, that would be correct, 
MR. ROBERTS: Except we didn't draw down on the 
money. In fact, both the letter and the statute which 
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1 requires the state to pay — 
2 THE COURT: Did you withdraw the money? 
3 MR. ROBERTS: No, your Honor. 
4j MR. WARD: That is wrong, your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: It's still in the file. 
6 MR. ROBERTS: No. Let me tell you how it came 
7 together. We were in two hearings together. In fact, Ted 
8 Lewis, attorney for the State Tax Commission, knew about 
9 money being paid into this account three or four days before 
10 I did, and he called me and said they are going to pay 
11 another $500. What do you want to do with it? And I said, 
12 "I don't want anything done with it. It stays this way 
13 because of the very statute." 
14 THE COURT: Did the State come in and take the 
15 money? 
16 MR. ROBERTS: The State came in and took it. We 
17 don't have the 75 percent that is required. 
18 THE COURT: Did you stipulate that they could? 
19 MR. ROBERTS: No, sir. I said I don't have an 
20 offense to it. There is nothing I can do about it. I did 
21 not stipulate. 
22 THE COURT: Did you appear? 
23 MR. ROBERTS: I did appear at two hearings, your 
24 Honor, before yourself. 
25 THE COURT: Did you consent to their withdrawal? 
MR. ROBERTS: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I see. We will need to look at what 
the minute entry says in those. 
MR. ROBERTS: Absolutely no consent at all. 
MR. WARD: We take the position, your Honor, some 
of what he says is true. We had a tax lien against him and 
they picked up the money, and if he had wanted to make 
reservations, he should have made them at that time reserving 
certain issues, and I'm unaware of that he did any of that. 
THE COURT: We will look at that. 
MR. ROBERTS: They were reserved too. If we need 
to, we will ask the court reporter to do a transcript. 
THE COURT: Find those dates and I will have her 
look at those. 
MR. ROBERTS: Now, that is another issue. As far 
as we are concerned, both our rights to parol process, equal 
protection of the law, and our sewer lines have been rich, 
because we have not received the money. It's just been 
passed from one State agency to the other. That's where we 
are at on that. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ROBERTS: Now, the other major problem is the 
18 foot of the construction easement. No one has been 
willing to take the foot-and-a-half-high mound of earth that 
they left behind away and put the sod back the way it was. 
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in value? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Are you aware, Mr. Jones, that the parties have 
entered into a stipulation to pay compensation? 
MR. ROBERTS: Objection, relevance as to the 
survey. 
THE COURT: Sustained. I think that has already 
been stipulated to, Counsel. 
MR. WARD: I was asking if he knew that, your 
Honor. 
or not. 
THE COURT: It's irrelevant whether he knows that 
MR. WARD: All right. 
No further questions, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Redirect, Mr. Roberts? 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR, ROBERTS: 
Q. Mr. Jones, at your deposition, I believe you 
testified that there were, in addition to I think what you 
referred to as the east boundary by description, there were 
two other lines establishing the east boundary of the 
defendant's property. Is that not so? 
A. In my deposition, I believe I indicated that 
there were two possibilities of the west line of the 
right-of-way. If, in fact, you assume some things, one of 
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1 which was that if you assume that the old existing wells that 
2 were drilled many years ago along the west side of this 
3 street were contained with private property, then that west 
4 line would be approximately six feet east of* where it's 
5 indicated on the Centerville plats now. 
6 Q. Does that show on this survey? 
7 A. Not on this one. It shows on the other survey, 
8 the other plat. 
9 Q. This plat here? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 THE COURT: I think we are going now where I am 
12 not going to allow to us go, Mr. Roberts. We are not going 
13 to go litigate where your east boundary line is, period. 
14 That has been stipulated and decided, and I am not hearing 
15 any evidence in that regard other than what I've 
16 inadvertently let in at this point. So we are finished. 
17 That is not an issue. Go on if you want to go to something 
18 else, but we will hear no more about that. 
19 MR. ROBERTS: It's the inadvertence that I 
20 believe prejudices the defendants* case in making a record on 
21 what the overall circumstances are surrounding the 
22 right-of-way from date of beginning to present taking. 
23 THE COURT: Mr. Roberts, you entered into a 
24 stipulation and agreed where that boundary line was, and you 
25 are bound by .that stipulation, and therefore, it's not a 
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question of litigation- Now, I won't tell you again. Let's 
go from there. 
MR. ROBERTS: I appreciate the Court's 
utilization of inadvertence. No other questions for this 
witness. 
MR. WARD: No further questions, your Honor. 
MR. ROBERTS: Now, the issue then becomes — 
THE COURT: Wait a minute. Are you through with 
this witness? 
MR. ROBERTS: No further. He has no questions. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
May this witness be excused? 
MR. ROBERTS: This depends on what Mr. Campbell 
is going to testify to. 
THE COURT: That is your problem. May this 
witness be excused? 
MR. ROBERTS: Subject to re-call. 
THE COURT: All right. You may be excused. 
(Witness excused.) 
MR. ROBERTS: May I speak with the witness 
privately, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
(Whereupon a discussion was held off the record.) 
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, your Honor, this witness has 
other commitments. He will, however, be available on the 
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MR. ROBERTS: I have no other witnesses. 
THE COURT: You rest subject to calling 
Mr. Aposhian? 
MR. ROBERTS: And subject to, depending on what 
is testified to. 
THE COURT: Well, you have a right to rebuttal. 
MR. ROBERTS: Yes, rebuttal witnesses, that's 
fine. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. WARD: We will call Mr. Dean Hoi brook. 
THE COURT: Mr. Hoi brook, would you step up, 
please. If you would raise your right hand and face the 
clerk. 
DEAN W. HOLBROOK 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiff, being 
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
PIR5CT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. WARD: 
Q. State your name and your address and occupation 
if you would, Mr. Holbrook. 
A. Dean W. Holbrook. 360 North 700 East, 
Bountiful, Utah. Right now, I'm retired. I was at the 
time of this acquisition the chief of right-of-way of the 
Utah Department of Transportation, and as such, I'm 
representing them here today. 
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appraisal of the subject property? 
A. Yes. In fact, they are defined in the report 
itself. 
Q. When were you first retained to make an appraisal 
of the subject property? 
A. Well, I got involved with this acquisition back 
in 1990 and came out and took a look at it, and it went on 
for a period of time. The initial appraisal, per se, was 
done in 1992, and I made it at that time. 
Q. Did you have occasion to talk with the landowner? 
A. Oh, yes, many times. 
Q. Did you explain to him what you were doing there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ultimately make an initial appraisal? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was that based on? 
A. My initial appraisal was — just a moment here. 
My initial appraisal was based — was made in April of 
1992. It was made based on the fact that the property that 
was needed for this acquisition was jalxaady in the State 
MR. WARD: Your Honor, I'm only offering this to 
explain the difference in the two appraisals. I am not 
trying to go into — 
THE COURT: I understand. 
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MR. WARD: Okay. 
MR. ROBERTS: For that limited purpose, we don't 
4 
1 
2 
3| object. 
Q. (BY MR. WARD) So your original appraisal was 
51 based upon what, Mr. Hoi brook? 
6 A
*
 T h e f
^ct that the property necessary for 
7 construction of this project was already in the State 
81 right-of-way. 
91 Q. How much was that appraisal? 
10 A. $900. 
11 Q. What was that based upon? 
12 A. Well, it was based on a minimum value for the 
13 taking and the easement. Under the State acquisition 
14 schedules, there is a minimum value that is paid no matter 
15 how much property we take or whether we take any. If we need 
16 to get a deed and an instrument, there is a $250 minimum paid 
17 to the property owner, and for the temporary easement it 
18 would have been $100. And then I did give him some credit, 
19 even though it was in the right-of-way, for landscaping trees 
20 at the time, and it came to a total of $900 at that time, 
21 MR. ROBERTS: Your Honor, I am going to object to 
22 his testimony that the improvements were in the right-of-way 
23 since your Honor has — it's been offered only to explain 
24 that the testimony is a fact that it was that way and it is 
25 objectionable. 
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1 THE COURT: I am not receiving it for the truth 
2 of the matter asserted in here as to the location of the 
3 right-of-way, only to explain the reasons for his valuation. 
4 MR. WARD: I just didn't want it, 
5 MR. ROBERTS: That is the term I should have 
6 used, truth of the matter asserted. 
7 MR. WARD: There has been a change, your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: I understand. 
9 Q. (BY MR. WARD) Then the condemnation case was 
10 filed? 
11 A. The condemnation case was filed. 
12 Q. Then you were made aware of the stipulation of 
13 the parties? 
14 A. That's right. 
15 Q. That stipulation necessitated a revision of your 
16 appraisal? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. In that the parties stipulated that six feet 
19 would be taken and paid for? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. Did you make a new appraisal, Mr. Holbrook? 
22 A. Yes, I did. 
23 Q. Tell us about that appraisal. 
24 A. Well, of course, the difference being that we 
25 were now going to pay for the property as defined in the 
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